World: Forum 2000 Looks At War on Terror

World: Forum 2000 Looks At War on Terror
By Jeffrey Donovan

James Woolsey
(RFE/RL)
Are the Islamic world and the West on a collision course? Has the ouster of Saddam Hussein improved the chances for democracy in the Middle East? Is the war on terror being won or lost? These are just some of the issues discussed today at the Forum 2000 conference in Prague. The annual gathering, launched in 1997 by former Czech President Vaclav Havel, brings together prominent politicians and thinkers from around the world to discuss ways to avert threats to international peace.


Prague, 10 October 2005 (RFE/RL) -- How to assess the state of relations between the West and the Islamic world?
That depends on whom you ask. And to be sure, there were no shortage of voices -- ranging from alarming to reassuring -- at today's Forum 200 conference in Prague.

To hear James Woolsey describe it, the West is engaged in what the former director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) calls "the long war of the 21st century."

Woolsey told RFE/RL he sees the West in a battle with three forms of totalitarianism: the remnants of Ba'athism in Iraq and Syria, the Shi'ite clerical regime of Iran, and the Sunni jihadists of Al-Qaeda.

The latter, he says, are largely underpinned by the Wahhabi ideology of Saudi Arabia and are the main threat to the West.

"I would say that the Wahhabis and the Islamist jihadis, Salafis like Al-Qaeda, are not all true representatives of Islam," Woolsey said. "We do not need to take their word for that any more than the world needed to take the word of [Tomas de] Torquemada and the Spanish Inquisition in the late 15th century that they were true representatives of Christianity. They were not; they were totalitarian bastards. And the Wahhabis and Al-Qaeda are the modern equivalents."

"The anti-Western hysteria, the anti-American hysteria, is exploited by authoritarian leaders in order to deflect attention from serious corruption and repression in their own countries." -- former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim
For Woolsey, who was CIA director in the mid-1990s, none of these groups can be appeased with concessions, such as a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

"You could have an Israeli-Palestinian settlement tomorrow and the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia would still be fanatically anti-Shi'ite, anti-Sufi, anti-Jewish, anti-Christian, anti-female, anti-democracy, anti-music, and so would Al-Qaeda be," Woolsey said. "Indeed, the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia and the Islamist jihadis such as Al-Qaeda pretty much agree on everything, except on one thing: who should be in charge."

But former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim believes the West -- and the United States in particular -- can do a lot more to improve relations with the Muslim world and be a positive force for change there.
Anwar Ibrahim
(RFE/RL)

Anwar, who was freed in 2004 after being imprisoned on politically motivated charges, knows about repression. He said that while the Muslim world has legitimate grievances with the West -- such as the war in Iraq -- leaders in the Islamic world use those issues to further repress their people.

"The anti-Western hysteria, the anti-American hysteria, is exploited by authoritarian leaders in order to deflect attention from serious corruption and repression in their own countries," Anwar said.

Anwar, who now teaches at Oxford University in Britain, said that Muslims are receptive to the current U.S. drive for democracy in the Middle East. But he said there remains a fundamental lack of trust due to the perceived failure to address Muslim grievances.

"I'm not denying the fact that the rhetoric of freedom and democracy by the administration in Washington is generally well received. But people are suspicious," Anwar said. "They see the war in Iraq. They see the failure to address the issues of the dispossessed Palestinians. So I think what is required is an effective [U.S.] engagement [with the Muslim world]."

Engagement is also a word used by Ghassan Salame. The former Lebanese culture minister now teaches international relations in Paris and advises UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In an interview with RFE/RL, Salame categorically rejected the notion of a "clash of civilizations" between Islam and the West.

"The Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia and the Islamist jihadis such as Al-Qaeda pretty much agree on everything, except on one thing: who should be in charge." -- former CIA director James Woolsey
"Civilizations are not political actors in the international arena so that they can clash or they can enter into a dialogue," Salame said. "Civilizations are just a reservoir for our values, for our ideas, for our dreams, for our languages, from which we borrow from time to time and very often we forget. So, that's what civilizations are, they are not actors. Individuals are actors, groups are actors, states are actors."

In that light, Salame sees the current insurgency in Iraq fueled not by a clash with the West, but by a combination of American mistakes and actions by Iraq's neighbors.

"They [Iraq's neighbors] used the very porous borders between them and Iraq in order to do a lot of unnecessary and very hostile and very destabilizing things in Iraq -- in order precisely to keep America busy in Iraq so that it doesn't turn against them," Salame said.

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, some governments in the region feared they might become the next targets of the war on terror. The U.S. considers Iran and Syria to be state sponsors of terrorism.

200 Years of New Kharijism: the Ongoing Revision of Islam

200 Years of New Kharijism: the Ongoing Revision of Islam
By Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani
Chairman, Islamic Supreme Council of America

We live in a time when the enemies of Islam are attempting to destroy it from within.
Resourceful and determined, they announce new mode of leadership that pretends to restore the purity of the faith as a guise to gain the confidence of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The unwary observer is readily misled by their portrayal, which is eagerly disseminated by the media. In fact, it is these proponents of extremism who are themselves outside the realm of true Islam. “The Religion of God,” al-Khatib said, “lies between extremism and the laxity.”

1.0 Prophetic Traditions

The advent of these extremists was foretold by the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (s).
Prophet Muhammad’s authentic traditionsii detail for us the characteristics and behavior of the extremists, stating that their existence in our world would be revealed when “…the destitute (al-buhm) camel-herds compete in building tall structures,”iii or in another narration “…the barefoot, naked, indigent (al-‘âla) shepherds compete in building tall structures.”iv

“…The barefoot and the naked are the heads of the people,”v or “…the barefoot and naked, the deaf and dumb are the kings of the earth.”vi

“Barefoot and naked” and “deaf and dumb” are metaphors to describe in figurative
speech just how depraved the new leaders would be. “Barefoot and naked” relates to people of the desert, and implies their utter ignorance in matters pertaining to organized society.vii “Deaf and dumb” implies that they would fail to use common sense in anything concerning religion, though they are perfectly sound in mind and limb.viii Implied as well is the notion that the extremists’ ultimate goal is world domination, to be “kings of the earth.”

The traditions reveal another of the signs of the extremists’ onset is “the affectation of eloquence by the rabble and their betaking to palaces in big ities.”ix

Prophet Muhammad predicted a reversal in society whereby these depraved leaders would take over the rule of every region by force. They would become extremely rich and their primary concern would be to erect the tallest buildings, rather than maintain order or care for the common welfare.x

2.0 A Reversal of Values

Sadly, we have witnessed the realization of the Prophet’s prediction in the dominance of extremist ideology in the Middle East and its increasing influence in the West. Because of their influence and their reversal of values, we now see doctrinal, political, and physical wars of exclusion being waged everywhere in the name of Islam. In the United States, extremist ideologues have waged a fifty-year long campaign to exclude moderate, traditional Muslims from political arenas as well as the mosque. The effect has been to create the impression that the 200 Years of New Kharijism – The Ongoing Revision of Islam Islamic Supreme Council of America
extremists are the majority whereas they are simply the most vociferous, having made it more comfortable for the majority of Muslims to stay at home, away from their doctrinal wrangling.

These two phenomena, depraved leadership and exclusionism, are the mainstays of
New Kharijism in our time. What clearer proof of this than what took place in Makka on November 20, 1979, when hundreds of armed men seized the Holy Mosque under the 36-year old Juhayman al-‘Utaybi and proclaimed him as the new leader of the country? They held the mosque for two weeks during which they practiced lewd sexual behavior with the women they held captive and those they had brought with them.

According to the New York Times, “There were hundreds of casualties on both sides
before Saudi forces were able to drag out the last remnant of what by then was a bunch of filthy, bedraggled young men.” Al-‘Utaybi and sixty-three of the captured were later executed by public beheading. According to As Sayyid Yusuf al-Rifa‘i, these wild young people learned their ways from the same teacher as Abdel Aziz Ibn Baz (d. 2000), a famous Wahhabi scholar.

3.0 The Original Khawârij

Before we speak of the modern phenomenon of New Kharijism it is important to define
the principal constituents of Khariji doctrines. The name “Khawârij” was applied to those who, in the time of the Successors of the Companions to the Prophet (one generation after Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime), parted ways with other Muslims and declared them disbelievers, just as the followers of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, “Wahhabis” (also known as the “Salafis”), do today.xi

The Khawârij or “Kharijites” were tens of thousands of Muslims mostly comprised of
Qur’an memorizors and devoted worshippers who prayed and fasted above the norm. Yet, they declared every one of the Companions and all who associated with them to be apostate disbelievers and took up arms against them. The practices of declaring Muslims apostate (takfîr/tashrîk) and taking armed action (baghî) against the central Muslim authority – the Caliphate – became and continues to remain the hallmark of the Khawârij.

In addition, the Khawârij altered the interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna, and used them to declare it lawful to kill and take the property of Muslims, as do their modern counterparts, the Wahhabis.xii

The classification of the Wahhabis as Kharijis has been a leitmotiv of Sunni heresiography for the past 200 years. Only now has it become politically incorrect among the scholars of Islam (ulema).

4.0 Three Principles of the New Kharijis

The chief brand of New Kharijism, or Wahhabism, distinguishes itself from traditional
Islam by three main principles:

1. Anthropomorphism of the Deity: Attributing a body to the object of Islamic worship.

2. Disrespect of Prophet: Harming the Prophet through:

200 Years of New Kharijism – The Ongoing Revision of Islam Islamic Supreme Council of America

- Disrespect of his noble person, mosque, grave, vestiges, Family, or Companions.
- Disrespect of those who visit, love, and praise him.
- Disparaging or holding his status as an intercessor in disdain.

3. Disregard for the schools and methods of the Sunni Imams including:
- The Imams of Sunni doctrine (‘aqîda): al-Ash‘ari and al-Maturidi.
- The scholars of traditional Sunni jurisprudence (fiqh): Abu Hanifa, Malik, ash-Shafi‘i, and Ahmad.
- The Imams of Sunni morals (akhlâq) known as the Polesxiii of the science of soulpurification (tasawwuf): al-Junayd, al-Gilani, al-Shadhili, al-Rifa‘i, al-Chishti, al- Suhrawardi, Shah Naqshband, and al-Tijani.xiv

Since all sincere Muslims believe God is transcendent and love their Prophet, it follows that this third principle, disregard for the Sunni Schools and their jurisprudential authority, is by far the most harmful tenet of New Kharijism and its most devastating achievement. The attack on the schools of thought has resulted in the pollution of pure belief, the arrogant rejection of Islamic authority, and the discrediting of pious Muslims striving to follow the straight path.

The traditional schools were immediately supplanted by extremist ideologues and
radical centers of education. Africans tell the story of a young man sent to study Shari‘a at great expense by his Sunni parents. Upon his return a few years later, he refused to eat a chicken slaughtered in his honor by his father stating, “my father is an apostate.” Scenarios like this one quickly caused a great rift between the generations of peace-loving Muslims and the chaosdriven youth who were their children.

More ugly still is the violence wreaked by extremists on the Muslims of Syria, Egypt,
Algeria, Afghanistan, Daghestan, Chechnya, and within the Indian Subcontinent. Violence and societal upheaval were instilled at the new schools by radical ideologues like Egyptian ex- Communist Sayyid Qutb. Sayyid Qutb declared a Muslim is either a “revolutionist” or an infidel, and went so far as to declare all the Islamic societies of his time apostate and fit to be overthrown. He stated, “Islam is a force that runs to gift freedom to all people on the earth with no regard to the variety of their religious beliefs. When this force meets with aberrant forces, it is the duty of his so-called “Islam” to struggle and annihilate them.”xvi

Invoking the memory of the original Kharijis, he also wrote, “Islam is a whole: its separated parts should be united and the differences removed.”xvii

5.0 Prohibitions of the New Kharijis

Today Sayyid Qutb’s spiritual children – such as the followers of Taqi al-Din al-
Nabahani, who are outlawed in most Muslim countries – tell Muslims not to:
- Participate in government.
- Sit on jury duty.

- Vote.
- Collaborate with other faith groups.
- Recite the remembrance of God in collective gatherings of dhikr.xviii
- Commemorate the birthday of our Prophet (mawlid) nor read poetry in his honor.
- Wear turbans or attempt to revive Prophetic traditions concerning dress.
- Show deference or respect to religious scholars or pious elders.
- Visit the tombs of saints.

5.0 The Ongoing Revision of Islam

The Neo-Kharijis and their sponsors are mounting a worldwide offensive to convince
Muslims and the rest of the world that theirs is the only way. To this end, a vast publishing campaign to revise Islam has been under way since the early thirties, an effort that has been redoubled since the eighties. This campaign is waged on five fronts:

5.1 Tampering with the Texts

A wanton, unethical manipulation of the great books of Islam has removed words or
entire chapters from classical works by the great Imams such as al-Nawawi, al-Sawi, and Ibn ‘Abidin. Quranic exegeses such as Tafsir al-Jalalayn and the works of ‘Abd Allah Yusuf ‘Ali have all been reprinted with changes. This corrupt tampering of these guiding texts has been documented at length.xix

5.2 “Improving” on the Foundational Books of Islam

They have unabashedly published corrective comments on manuals whose contents
were long ago established as normative in the scholarly community of Islam. Many such
instances have also been documented. xx

5.3 Revising Their Own Source Texts

Not content to fiddle with historically accepted books, they also find fault with the
minor texts they publish and distribute in order to gainsay their own putative authorities. This is a patent illustration of the principle that each new generation of innovators rejects the previous one as too moderate.xxi

5.4 Reprinting Discredited Works

The Neo-Kharijis are supplementing their own works by re-circulating books that have
already been condemned by the majority of scholars. Though heretical and un-Islamic,
numerous books are now being promoted as the fundamental guides for the practice of Islam.xxii

5.5 Promoting the Works of Unqualified, Self-styled Scholars to Attack Sufis and Asharis Including:
- Muhammad Ahmad ‘Abd al-Salam,
- Muhammad al-Shuqayri,
- Ibn Abi al-‘Izz,
- Muhammad Nasiruddeen al-Albani,
- Abdul Aziz Bin Abdullah Bin Baz,
- Muhammad bin Saleh Al-'Uthaymin,
- Dr. Abu Ameenah Bilal Phillips,
- Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din al-Hilali,
- Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan,
- And many others. xxiii

Their dismissal of the traditional schools of thought, their development of schools as incubators for radical ideology, their attack on the source texts of Islam and generations of recognized scholars, and their financing by ideological counterparts worldwide, have truly enabled the Neo-Kharajite movement to dominate the vision of Islam in the world. Finding roots in the Khawârij of ca. 750 CE, and given new life by Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab in the 19th century, these extremists have only really succeeded in their efforts to subvert Islam in the past 75 years.

Traditional Muslims, the silent majority, remain numerous and confidant enough to
repel the Neo-Kharajite movement from within Islam, given the necessary support. However, backed by the oil-wealth of their ideological counterparts overseas, Neo-Kharajites have a definitive advantage over the majority of Muslims, who have only their own humble resources at their disposal. Only with real financial and political support can classical Muslim scholars and moderate, mainstream Muslims reclaim the banner of Islam from these usurpers, retake the podium they have hijacked, repel these extremists and discredit their heretical ideology. Truly, this is a battle worth fighting. And it is a battle which, with the help of Almighty God, we can
and must win.

Truly we belong to Allah and to Him is our return, and there is no power nor might except in Allah the Exalted and Almighty Lord.

NOTES:
i In al-Dhahabi, Siyar A‘lam al-Nubala’ (1997 ed. 13:598).

ii Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and advice communicated through verifiable chains of transmission, known as the ahadith. The body of traditions are called the Sunna, and form the second basis for Islamic law, in addition to the Holy Qur’an.
iii The well-known hadith of Gibril in Sahih al-Bukhari.
iv Sahih Muslim.
v Ibid.
vi Ibid
vii see Al-Taymi, Sulayman.
viii Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari.
ix Related by Al-Tabarani, through Abu Hamza, on the authority of Ibn ‘Abbas.
x Al-Qurtubi.
xi Ibn ‘Abidin, Radd al-Muhtar ‘ala al-Durr al-Mukhtar (3:309), “Bab al-Bughat” [Chapter on Rebels].
xii Al-Sawi, Hashiya ‘ala Tafsir al-Jalalayn (v. 58:18-19) in the Cairo, 1939 al-Mashhad al-Husayni edition (3:307-8) repr. Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-‘Arabi in Beirut.
xiii Aqtâb, sing. qutb
xiv The schools of tasawwuf are known as Paths, turuq, sing. Tarîqa.
xv Qutb, Sayyid, World’s Peace and Islam.
xvi The Future is Islaam (p. 203).
xvii Social Justice in Islam (p. 35).
xviii Dhikr is considered by traditional Muslims as the most excellent form of devotion for a servant of God, and is stressed over a hundred times in the Holy Qur’an. For the spiritually-inclined, it is polish for the heart, the essence of
the science of faith, and the key to all success. Nor are there any restrictions on the form, frequency, or timing of dhikr whatsoever.
xix Cf. Appendix, “Albani and Company,” in Struggle for the Soul of Islam: Exposing the Scholars of Najd and the Wahhabi/Salafi Movement, paragraph on Ibn Baz.
xx For example: Ibn Abi al-‘Izz’s commentary on al-Tahawi’s ‘Aqida. Al-Tahawi’s `Aqida is a normative classic of Islam but Ibn Abi al-‘Izz is unknown and nacceptable as a source for Ahl al-Sunna teachings. Examples of his unreliability are his rejection of al-Tahawi’s articles:
! §35: “The Seeing of Allah by the People of the Garden is true, without their vision being all-encompassing and without the manner of their vision being known” and
! §38: “He is beyond having limits placed on Him, or being restricted, or having parts or limbs, nor is He contained by the six directions as all created things are”.
Al-`Izz states, “Can any vision be rationally conceived without face-to-face encounter? And in it there is a proof for His elevation (‘uluw) over His reatures,” and “Whoever claims that Allah is seen without direction, let him verify his reason!” [Ibn Abi al-‘Izz, Sharh al-‘Aqida al-Tahawiyya, p. 195]. He also endorses Ibn Taymiyya’s view of the finality of Hellfire, in flat contradiction of the al-Tahawi’s statement, §83. “The Garden and the Fire are created and shall never be extinguished nor come to an end.” [Ibid. p. 427-430] There is also doubt as to Ibn Abi al-‘Izz’s identity and authorship of this Sharh.

xxi Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqqi objects apoplectically to Ibn Taymiyya in his edition of the latter’s Iqtida’ al-Sirat al-Mustaqim in the section entitled “Innovated festivities of time and place.” He criticizes Ibn Taymiyya for saying that “some people innovate a celebration out of love for the Prophet and to exalt him, and Allah may reward them for this love and striving.” Al-Fiqqi writes a two-page footnote exclaiming, “How can they possibly obtain a reward for this?! What striving is in this?!”

xxii Including:
! Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s Tawhid, which is replete with doctrinal errors such as: o Calling the Ash‘aris “Nullifiers of the Divine Attributes” (mu‘attila) [chapters 2, 16]
o Declaring the Lesser shirk an integral part of the Greater. [7]
o Misinterpreting the hadith “do not make my grave an idol” to mean: do not even pray near it whereas the agreed-upon meaning is: Do not pray towards or on top of it. [20]
o Stating: “The disbelievers who know their disbelief are better-guided than the believers.” (inna al-kuffâr al-ladhîna ya‘rifûna kufrahum ahdâ sabîlan min al-mu’minîn) [23]
o Stating: “Among the polytheists are those who love Allah with a tremendous love” [31].
o Stating that “the two opposites [belief and disbelief] can be found in a single heart” [41] in
violation of the verse [Allah has not assigned unto any man two hearts within his body] (33:4).
This and the previous four concepts are fundamental to understand their propagation of mutual suspicion among Muslims.
o Stating that Allah is explicitly said to have two hands: the right holds the heaven and the other holds the earth, and the other is explicitly named the left hand. [67]

! ‘Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s al-Sunna, a foundational book of the Wahhabi creed. According to Shu‘ayb al-Arna’ut, “at least 50 percent of the hadiths are weak or outright forgeries” in this book. Its publication was sponsored by His Highness King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud and a Jedda businessman named Muhammad Nasif in Cairo in 1349/1930 at al-Matba‘a al-Salafiyya.

The same Muhammad Nasif financed:
! an attack on Imam Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari and the Hanafi School by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mu‘allimi al-Yamani (d. 1386 H) entitled al-Tankil li Ma W arada fi Ta’nib al-Kawthari min al-Abatil.

o the reprinting of al-Qari’s hapless fatwa against the parents of the Prophet.
o the dissemination in India of al-Khatib’s derogatory biography of Imam Abu Hanifa from Tarikh Baghdad.

Also:
! Ibn Taymiyya: Fatwa Hamawiyya; ‘Aqida W asitiyya; Hadith al-Nuzul; Awliya’ al-Shaytan; Iqtida’ al-Sirat al- Mustaqim; Qa‘ida fi al-Tawassul; Ziyarat al-Qubur, etc.
! Ibn al-Qayyim: al-Qasida al-Nuniyya; Ijtima‘ al-Juyush al-Islamiyya.
! al-Harawi’s Dhamm ‘Ilm al-Kalam wa Ahlih
! al-Biqa‘i’s takfîr of Shaykh Muhyi al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi – may Allah have mercy on him – in his book Masra‘ al- Tasawwuf, Tanbih Al-Ghabi Ila Takfir Ibn ‘Arabi, ed. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil (Bilbis: Dar al-Taqwa, <1989>)
xxiii In Arabic:
! Muhammad al-Shuqayri who wrote the book al-Sunna wa al-Mubtada‘at
! Muhammad Khalil Harras wrote a commentary on Ibn Taymiyya’s ‘Aqida W asitiyya – distributed for free in the Arab world
! Al-Albani
! ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, al-Albani’s student and deputy in Kuwait, al-Fikr al-Sufi (“Sufi Thought”) and its abridgment Fada’ih al-Sufiyya (“The Disgraces of the Sufis”).

! ‘Abd al-Rahman Dimashqiyya
! Mahmud ‘Abd al-Ra’uf al-Qasim al-Madkhali, al-Kashf ‘an Haqiqat al-Sufiyya (“Unveiling the Reality of the Sufis”), 1993. The book was refuted by Dr. ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Isa in his 700-page Haqa’iq ‘an al-Tasawwuf.

! Al-Tuwayjiri (Hamd ibn ‘Abd al-Muhsin). With all respect to his person, he demanded that women caught driving in Saudi Arabia be labeled as prostitutes in the courts.
! Al-Jaza’iri (Abu Bakr)
! Al-Wadi‘i (Muqbil ibn Hadi), Nashr al-Sahifa fi Dhikr al-Sahih min Aqwal A’immat al-Jarh wa al-Ta‘dil fi Abi Hanifa. Fada’ih (“Disgraces”), 1999.
In English
! Ibn Baz, Sunnah and Caution against Innovation
! An anonymous tract entitled A Brief Introduction to the Salafi Da‘wah.
! Muhammad Ma‘soomee al-Khajnadee (d. 1961 ce), Blind Following of Madhhabs (Birmingham: al- Hidaayah Publishing, 1993).

! A. A. Tabari, a fictitious name for the author of The Other Side of Sufism, abtract distributed in Wahhabi funded mosques and posted on the Internet.
! The Naqshbandi Tariqat Unveiled, al-Hidaayah, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia

Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia
by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.
This article originally appeared in the Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1656, published May 30, 2003


Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation) is an emerging threat to American interests in Central and South Asia and the Middle East. It is a clandestine, cadre-operated, radical Islamist political organization that operates in 40 countries around the world, with headquarters apparently in London. Its proclaimed goal is jihad against America and the overthrow of existing political regimes and their replacement with a Caliphate (Khilafah in Arabic), a theocratic dictatorship based on the Shari'a (religious Islamic law). The model for Hizb is the "righteous" Caliphate, a militaristic Islamic state that existed in the 7th and 8th centuries under Mohammad and his first four successors, known as the "righteous Caliphs."

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks taught the United States a painful lesson--that it must be alert to emerging threats, including terrorism and other destabilizing activities against its military assets, citizens, and allies. Some of these emerging threats, combined with the actions of terrorist jihadi organizations, such as al-Qaeda, may also generate political instability in key geographic areas and threaten friendly regimes. In Central Asia, the security situation has deteriorated because the war against Saddam Hussein's regime has intensified the resolve of anti-American forces already active in the region.1

The United States has important national security interests at stake in Central Asia, including access to the military bases used to support operations in Afghanistan, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and technologies for their production, and securing access to natural resources, including oil and gas. The U.S. is also committed to spreading democracy, promoting market reforms, and improving human rights standards in the vast heartland of Eurasia.

Therefore, to prevent Hizb ut-Tahrir from destabilizing Central Asia and other areas, the U.S. should expand intelligence collection on Hizb. The U.S. should encourage Central Asian governments to pursue reforms that will expand civil society and diminish the alienation on which Hizb and fundamentalist Islamist movements are preying. Specifically, the U.S. should condition security assistance on economic reform, encourage democracy and popular participation, discredit radical Islamist movements, and support religious and political moderation and pluralism.

A MODERN FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami is an emerging threat to American interests and the countries in which it operates. It has 5,000-10,000 hard-core members, and many more supporters in former Soviet Central Asia (e.g., Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), and is expanding its operations to oil-rich Kazakhstan. Over 10,000 members are active in Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and Indonesia.2 At least 500 are already behind bars in Uzbekistan alone, and hundreds are in custody in the Middle East.3 By breeding violent anti-American attitudes, attempting to overthrow existing regimes, and preparing cadres for more radical Islamist organizations, Hizb poses a threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia and elsewhere in the Islamic world where moderate regimes are found.

Sheikh Taqiuddin an-Nabhani al Falastini, the founder of Hizb, has written that every Muslim should strive to establish a Caliphate and that this religious imperative (fard) upon the Muslim nation (Umma) is so strong that Mohammad's close allies delayed burying his body until a new Caliph was appointed and the Caliphate established.4 The Caliphate would be led by a Caliph: a supreme, pious leader who would combine religious and political power.5

A Caliph, an-Nabhani believes, is a substitute for Mohammad as both political and religious leader. The Caliph would appoint an Amir, or military leader, who would declare jihad and wage war against all non-believers, including the United States. According to Hizb's political vision, such an entity, if established, would not recognize existing national, regional, tribal, or clan differences and would include all Muslims.

An-Nabhani has drafted the constitution of this future Caliphate. It is not the constitution of a democratic state. The Caliph would be appointed by acclamation by "prominent men," with male voters casting a vote of approval. The ruler would not be directly accountable to the people, and there would be no checks or balances between branches of government. Succession would be by designation of the Caliph or acclamation of the oligarchy.

Thus, Hizb explicitly rejects democracy. In fact, one of an-Nabhani's books is titled Democracy: The Law of Infidels.6 Yet some regional observers have called for the legitimization of Hizb and its integration into the existing political model.7 In doing so, they ignore the obvious--Hizb's goal is to smash the existing state apparatus, not to become a player within it.

Radical Islamic Roots
Since its inception in 1952 in Jordanian-occupied East Jerusalem, Hizb has gained tens of thousands of followers from London to Lahore.8 From its beginning, an-Nabhani's organization was influenced by the rabid anti-Semitism propagated by Sheikh Hajj Amin Al-Housseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who was a major Nazi war collaborator.9

An-Nabhani, who was serving at the time on the Islamic appellate court in Jerusalem, was an associate and contemporary of Hajj Amin's.10 He also drew on the organizational principles of Marxism-Leninism, which were quite well-known among the middle- and upper-class Arabs in British Mandate Palestine. Khaled Hassan, one of the founders of the Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was also among the founders of Hizb ut-Tahrir, as was Sheikh Asaad Tahmimi, who became Islamic Jihad's spiritual leader.11 Hizb supported the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and backs the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria, a radical movement on the U.S. State Department's terrorism list.12

An-Nabhani was also member of the radical Islamic Brotherhood (Al Ihwan al-Muslimeen), a secretive international fundamentalist organization founded in Egypt in 1928, which spread throughout the Islamic world and preaches the establishment of a Caliphate. He joined the Brotherhood while studying in Cairo's Al-Azhar University but later left the Brotherhood because he considered it too soft.13 It is likely that Hizb was supported initially by the Saudi-based radical Islamist Wahhabi movement, although the extent to which that support continues today is unclear.14

A SHADOW GLOBAL ORGANIZATION
Hizb ut-Tahrir's spread around the globe, in Western Europe and often in authoritarian states with strong secret police organizations, is impressive. It could be accomplished only by applying 20th century totalitarian political "technology" melded with Islamic notions of the 7th and 8th centuries, as interpreted by medieval Islamic scholars. The genius of Hizb founder an-Nabhani was marrying Orthodox Islamist ideology to Leninist strategy and tactics.

The Leninist Model
Hizb ut-Tahrir is a totalitarian organization, akin to a disciplined Marxist-Leninist party, in which internal dissent is neither encouraged nor tolerated. Because its goal is global revolution, a leading Islamic scholar has compared it to the Trotskyite wing of the international communist movement.15 Its candidate members become well-versed in party literature during a two-year indoctrination course in a study circle, supervised by a party member. Only when a member "matures in Party culture," "adopts the thoughts and opinions of the party," and "melts with the Party" can he or she become a full-fledged member.16 Women are organized in cells supervised by a female cadre or a male relative. After joining the party, the new recruit may be requested (or ordered) to relocate to start a new cell.

When a critical mass of cells is achieved, according to its doctrine, Hizb may move to take over a country in preparation for the establishment of the Caliphate. Such a takeover would likely be bloody and violent. Moreover, its strategy and tactics show that, while the party is currently circumspect in preaching violence, it will justify its use--just as Lenin and the Bolsheviks did--when a critical mass is achieved.17

Hizb's platform and actions fit in with "Islamist globalization"--an alternative mode of globalization based on radical Islam. This ideology poses a direct challenge to the Western model of a secular, market-driven, tolerant, multicultural globalization.18

Where radicalization has taken hold in the Islamic world, Hizb has gained new supporters in droves. It operates clandestinely in over 40 countries around the world, with members organized in cells of five to eight members each. Only a cell commander knows the next level of leadership, ensuring operational security. "Representatives" in Great Britain and Pakistan claim to speak for the organization but have no official address or legal office. Leadership for large regions (e.g., the former Soviet Union), countries, and local areas is kept secret.

Hizb's primary characteristics include the fiery rhetoric of jihad, secret cells and operations, murky funding sources, rejection of existing political regimes, rapid transnational growth, and outlook and goals that are shared with al-Qaeda and other organizations of the global jihadi movement.

Anti-Americanism
Hizb has called for a jihad against the U.S., its allies, and moderate Muslim states. The purpose of the jihad is "to find and kill the Kufar (non-believers)," in fact rejecting the Islamic notion of Greater Jihad against one's own as a sin.19

In documents drafted before 9/11, Hizb leaders accused the United States of imposing hegemony on the world. After 9/11, Hizb claimed that the U.S. had declared war against the global Muslim community (Umma), had established an international alliance under the "pretext" of fighting terrorism, and was reinforcing its grip on the countries of Central Asia. Hizb further claimed that the U.S. accused Osama bin Laden of being responsible for the 9/11 attacks "without any evidence or proof."

The party attempted to use its influence by calling upon all Muslim governments to reject the U.S. appeal for cooperation in the war against terrorism.20 It called for expulsion of U.S. and Western citizens, including Western diplomats, from countries in which it will take power and shredding diplomatic treaties and agreements with Western governments. It further declared:

Muslims! You are religiously obliged to reject this American question which takes you lightly and despises you. America does not have the sublime values that entitle it to tell you what to support and whom to fight against. You possess a divine mission. You are the ones to bring guidance and light to mankind. God described you with the following words: "You are the best people brought forth for the benefit of mankind. You enjoin good and forbid evil. And you believe in God."
As for Jihad...it is legal, in fact it is an obligation, it is the apex of Islamic ethics, as Almighty God says, "Keep in store for them whatever you are capable of, force and equipment with which you can frighten those who are enemies of God and enemies of yourselves...." God's Messenger (Mohammed) said, "Islam is the head, prayer is the backbone and Jihad is the perfection."
Muslims! The law of religion does not allow you to give to America what it is trying to impose upon you. You are not allowed to follow its orders or to provide it with any assistance whatsoever, no matter whether it be intelligence or facilities of using your territory, your air space or your territorial waters. It is not permissible to cede military bases to the Americans, nor it is allowed to coordinate any military activities with them or to collaborate with them. It is not allowed to enter into an alliance with them or to be loyal to them, because they are enemies of Islam and Muslims. God said, "Believers, Do not befriend my enemy and your enemy.... They have rejected the truth that has come to you."21
In a June 2001 article published in the party's journal, Hizb ideologists claim that all methods are justified in the struggle against the unbelievers, including murder. They specifically mention that a pilot's diving a plane hit by enemy fire into a crowd of unbelievers without bailing out with a parachute is a legitimate form of armed struggle. Hizb also demands that Muslims come to the support of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.22
According to Hizb, the main targets of jihad--in addition to moderate Muslim regimes such as Jordan, Pakistan, Egypt, and Uzbekistan--are America and the Jews.

[T]he war waged by America, the head of Kufr, and Britain and their allies from the Kafir states on Afghanistan is a crusade.... What America and Britain are doing is displaying their enmity for the Islamic Ummah. They are enemies; a state of war exists between them and all the Muslims that necessitates adopting an actual state of war as a basis for dealing with them according to the dictates of the Shari'ah rules. That position should be adopted with them and all those who ally themselves with them in their war against the Muslims.23

The war of America and her allies against Islam and the Muslims has shown the corrupt nature of her civilization and her colonial world-view. The War on Iraq...has demonstrated that America and her allies only strive to colonize and plunder the resources of the Islamic world, not to bring about justice and security.... America is intending to deceive you.... [S]he is inherently weak as her ideology is false and corrupt.... The time has come for Islam not just in Iraq but in this entire Ummah. It is time for the Islamic State (Khilafah) to lead the world and save the world from the crimes and oppression of the capitalist system.24

According to one of the Hizb Central Asian leaders, "we are very much opposed to the Jews and Israel.... Jews must leave Central Asia. The United States is the enemy of Islam with the Jews."25

Anti-Americanism, extremism, and preaching the violent overthrow of existing regimes make Hizb ut-Tahrir a prime suspect in the next wave of violent political action in Central Asia and other Muslim countries with relatively weak regimes, such as Pakistan and Indonesia.

Stages of Struggle, Jihad, and Violence
Hizb ut-Tahrir sees its struggle in parallel with the three stages that Mohammad experienced en route to the establishment of the Caliphate 1,400 years ago. These are spreading the word of God to the communities of Arabia; the flight from Mecca to Medina in order to establish the first Islamic community there; and, finally, the conquest of Mecca, jihad, and the establishment of the Caliphate.

Similarly, Hizb divides its strategy into three stages:

"Production of people who believe in the idea and the method of the Party so that they form the Party group" (recruitment and agitation, establishment of cells);
"Interaction with the Ummah; to let the Ummah embrace and carry Islam" (Islamization); and
"Establishing government, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively, and carrying it as a message to the world" (revolutionary takeover and Jihad).26
In the past, members of Hizb participated in coups against pro-Western regimes in the Middle East, such as the failed 1968 officers' coup against King Hussein II of Jordan.27 Despite its authoritarian and highly disciplined cadre structure, Hizb claimed that members who participated in the coup did so in an "individual capacity." However, more recently, Hizb representatives, together with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, participated in coordination meetings sponsored by al-Qaeda in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

Numerous Middle Eastern countries and Germany, where Hizb is establishing links with the neo-Nazis, have taken steps to outlaw its activities. Moreover, the Party clearly states that Jihad has to continue till the Day of Judgment. So whenever disbelieving enemies attack an Islamic country it becomes compulsory on its Muslim citizens to repel the enemy. The members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in that country are part of the Muslims and it is obligatory upon them as [it] is upon other Muslims (not resident in that country) in their capacity as Muslims, to fight the enemy and expel them. Whenever there is a Muslim amir who declares jihad to enhance the Word of Allah and mobilizes the people to do that, the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir will respond in their capacity as Muslims in the country where the general call to arms was proclaimed.28

At this time, Hizb ut-Tahrir aims to seize power and supplant existing governments in Central Asia and elsewhere with an Islamist version based on Shari'a for the purpose of jihad against the West, which includes the following:

"A struggle against Kufr (non-believer) states which have domination and influence over the Islamic countries. The challenge against colonialism in all its intellectual, political, economic, and military forms, involves exposing its plans, and revealing its conspiracies in order to deliver the Ummah from its control and to liberate it."29

"A struggle against the rulers in the Arab and Muslim countries by exposing them, taking them to task, acting to change them whenever they have denied the rights of the Ummah or neglected to perform their duty towards her, or ignored any of her affairs, and whenever they disagreed with the rules of Islam, and acting also to remove their regimes so as to establish the Islamic rule in its place."30
Hizb also seeks to penetrate state structures and convert government officials and military officers to its creed. Its platform openly states that "the Party started to seek the support of the influential people with two objectives in mind:

So that it could manage to continue its daw'ah (Islamic appeal) while secure from affliction
To take over the rule in order to establish the Khilafah and apply Islam."31
Hizb has begun to penetrate the elites in Central Asia. Observers in the region have reported successes in penetrating the Parliament in Kyrgyzstan, the media in Kazakhstan, and customs offices in Uzbekistan.

WHAT IS AT STAKE
U.S. strategic interests in Central Asia include both access to the military bases needed for operations in Afghanistan and deterring the establishment of safe havens for terrorist organizations. The U.S. is seeking to prevent a country, a group of countries, or a transnational movement or organization from establishing hegemonic control in the region. This includes barring transnational Islamic fundamentalist organizations and drug cartels from emerging as ruling bodies or dominant regional power centers.

The U.S. must also prevent Central Asia from becoming an arsenal of dangerous weaponry and should prevent the development and production of weapons of mass destruction in the region, to preclude them from falling into the hands of rogue regimes or terrorists. Furthermore, the U.S. needs to ensure equal access to the energy resources of the region, primarily in the Caspian Sea area, and encourage development of the East-West transportation and economic corridors, also known as the Silk Road. Finally, the U.S. should encourage economic reform, expansion of civic space, democratization, and development of open society in the region.32

The secular regimes of Central Asia have little to no democratic legitimacy. Most of their rulers are Soviet-era communist party leaders. Almost no political space is left for secular opposition in these states. U.S. objectives are thus jeopardized not only by the authoritarian parties of radical Islamic revolution such as Hizb, but also by the authoritarian nature of these Central Asian regimes themselves, with their rampant corruption, declining living standards, poor delivery of public goods and services, and stagnant or declining economies. By governing so poorly and being intolerant and undemocratic, these regimes inadvertently breed religious extremism.33

In this environment, Hizb ut-Tahrir has captured a protest niche that otherwise would be occupied by a legitimate political opposition. Despite this, the U.S. government, along with the policy analysis and expert communities as well as governments in the region and around the world, has yet to attain a clear picture of Hizb's real size and strength and threat it poses.

WHAT THE U.S. DOES NOT KNOW
While reports of increasing Hizb activity abound, the extent to which local Hizb activities are part of a coordinated global plan is still unknown, just as the question of whether every region and country has an autonomous leadership that defines programs and sets deadlines remains unanswered. Hizb is rumored to be operating on a 13-year grand plan which, if it exists at all, is still unknown.

At its inception, Hizb likely had strong connections to Saudi Wahhabism, but it is unclear whether these links remain today. It is equally unclear whether Hizb has one or more state sponsors and, if so, who they are. At various times, experts have speculated that Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan have been involved. The international intelligence community is also uncertain as to who finances the organization; who controls the funds internally; what the mode of financing is (e.g., regional self-sufficiency or centralized funding); and how funds are transferred (e.g., via the Hawala informal banking system or couriers).

The current leader of Hizb is also unknown, as are where he resides and the identity of the senior officers of Hizb. Upon his death, an-Nabhani was succeeded by Sheikh Abd-el Qadim Zaloom, another Palestinian cleric and a former professor at Al-Azhar in Cairo.34 Zaloom was with Hizb for 50 years and died on April 29, 2003.35 While anecdotal reports place the organization's headquarters in London and indicate that many European converts to Islam are staffing mid- and senior levels of the organization, very little evidence confirms this. These questions need to be answered, and a joint international program of collecting intelligence on Hizb and countering its activities must be developed.

WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD DO
The U.S. and its allies in the war on terrorism need to recognize that Hizb ut-Tahrir is a growing threat in Central Asia. Specifically, to develop a comprehensive strategy and counter Hizb's influence, the U.S. should:

Expand intelligence collection on Hizb ut-Tahrir. This needs to be done both in Western Europe and in outlying areas, such as Central Asia, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Most important is information on state sponsorship, leadership, finances, intentions and capabilities, time lines, links with violent terrorist groups, and penetration of state structures. The U.S. intelligence community should work with the United Kingdom's MI5 and MI6 and with the intelligence services of Russia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Central Asian states. U.S. analysts and policymakers, however, should be aware that some of the regimes in question will attempt to portray Hizb as a terrorist organization with links to Osama bin Laden.36

Condition security assistance to Central Asia on economic reform. Hizb is growing in Central Asia due to the "revolution of diminishing expectations," increasing despair, and the lack of secular political space and economic opportunity in the region.37 While some are attracted to Hizb's harsh version of radical Islam, others see it is as an outlet for their frustration with the status quo and an instrument for upward mobility. U.S. assistance to Central Asian countries, which has doubled since 9/11, has not changed the economic dynamics in the region, and most of the funds were understandably earmarked for security cooperation and military assistance.

To jump-start economic development, the Bush Administration should condition Pentagon security assistance on the adoption of free market policies, strengthening property rights and the rule of law, encouraging transparency, and fighting corruption. These measures are likely to make the Central Asian economies more attractive to private investment, stimulate domestic economic growth, and increase prosperity and economic opportunity, thus diminishing the ability of Hizb to use economic decline as an engine for recruitment, as it does in the Ferghana Valley and Kyrgyzstan.

Encourage democracy and popular participation. The scarcity of secular and moderate Islamic democratic politics and credible non-governmental organization (NGO) activities and the lack of freedom of expression may be driving thousands of young recruits to join Hizb in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan. There have been no democratic elections in the region for several years, and the opposition press is either nonexistent or severely curbed. Hizb, as well as jihadi organizations, recruits from among alienated students and urban youth, frustrated with the status quo and facing limited futures.

While economic opportunity, religious freedom, and freedom of expression are not a panacea against Islamist radicalism, as the swelling ranks of young Islamic fundamentalists in Western Europe demonstrate, expanding the civic space and allowing more political pluralism, media diversity, and grassroots initiatives may diminish Hizb's appeal. According to a representative of a major U.S. NGO, some liberalization of the nonprofit sector has been attained in the Central Asian countries since 9/11. This trend needs to be encouraged.38

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department should, however, coordinate their activities with the Pentagon, World Bank, and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, all of which are interested in political stability, reducing corruption, and development of property rights and a more investment-oriented environment. Together, they are more likely to convince the Central Asian regimes to undertake further political liberalization, including competitive, free and fair elections.

Discredit radicals and encourage moderates. The U.S. should encourage local governments to not only crack down on radical Islam (as they already do), but also encourage alternatives. Uzbekistan has reportedly jailed hundreds of Hizbi activists. The Union of Councils' Central Asian Information Network has documented disappearances, 14 deaths in detention, and over 500 political prisoners in Uzbekistan.39 Human Rights Watch claims that thousands of Central Asian prisoners could qualify as political, including many members of Hizb, who receive 15-17 year sentences for minor offenses such as leaflet distribution.40

The State Department and U.S.-funded NGOs should encourage more U.S. media exposure (e.g., Uzbek and other local language broadcasts by Radio Liberty and the Voice of American) and educational contacts, speaking engagements, and exchanges between local clergy and moderate Muslim leaders in the West.41 The Central Asian public needs to be directly exposed to traditional moderate local brands of Islam, Sufi mystical branches (Tariq'at), and reformist moderate Jadidi Islam.

Beyond that, secular regimes in Central Asia should stop persecuting new evangelical Christian denominations, Buddhists, and Zoroastrians. Development of independent media and activities aimed at youth, women, the business community, and ethnic and religious minorities--groups more likely to be discriminated against by Hizb and other radical Sunni groups--should be encouraged and supported.42

However, Hizb, as well as Salafi/Wahhabi and other radical Islamic schools that preach jihad against America and the West, should not be allowed to operate. The U.S. should provide support to local media to cover negative examples of the application of Shari'a law, such as amputations for minor offenses or alcohol possession in Chechnya, Afghanistan under the Taliban, Saudi Arabia, and other places. The consequences of jihad-type civil war, such as in Algeria, which left 100,000-200,000 dead, should also be covered. Positive coverage of the West should also be supported.

CONCLUSION
Hizb ut-Tahrir represents a growing medium- and long-term threat to geopolitical stability and the secular regimes of Central Asia and ultimately poses a potential threat to other regions of the world. The party is transnational, secretive, and extremist in its anti-Americanism. It seeks to overthrow and destroy existing regimes and establish a Shari'a-based Caliphate.

Hizb may launch terrorist attacks against U.S. targets and allies, operating either alone or in cooperation with other global terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. A Hizb takeover of any Central Asian state could provide the global radical Islamist movement with a geographic base and access to the expertise and technology to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. and its allies must do everything possible to avoid such an outcome.

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.


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1. "Hizb-ut-Tahrir s korichnevym ottenkom" (Hizb-ut-Tahrir with a brown tinge), Vecherniy Bishkek, April 4, 2003.

2. Interview with Husain Haqqani, The Carnegie Endowment, May 2003; see also "Fourteen Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Caught," Anatolia Press Agency, March 6, 2000; "More Arrests Reported in Hizb ut-Tahrir Operations," Anatolia Press Agency, March 7, 2000; FBIS/World News Connection, March 7, 2000.

3. Union of Councils Central Asian Information Network, "Uzbekistan: List of 14 Possible Political Prisoners Who Died in Jail, 5 Disappearances and 505 Possible Political Prisoners," at www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/links/uzrt916.html.

4. Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, Khilafa, quoted in Alima Bissenova, "Hizb al-Tahrir Political Thought from the Pan-Islamic Perspective," paper presented at the 8th Annual Convention of the Association for Study of Nationalities, New York, April 2003, p. 6.

5. Al-Mawardi, The Ordinances of Government (United Kingdom: Garnett Publishing, 1996). An-Nabhani based his judgment on the work of Al-Mawardi, the first Islamic scholar who decreed the necessity of establishing the Caliphate. See Bissenova, "Hizb al-Tahrir Political Thought from the Pan-Islamic Perspective," pp. 8-11.

6. "Hizb-ut-Tahrir na `Svobode,'" (Hizb-ut-Tahrir at Radio Liberty); Vremia Po (Almaty, Kazakhstan), July 22, 2001; interview with Vitaly Ponomarev, coordinator of Central Asian program of the Moscow human rights group Memorial, available at FBIS.

7. Alisher Khamidov, "Countering the Call: The U.S., Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Religious Extremism in Central Asia," draft, Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, April 2003.

8. Ahmed Rashid, "Asking for Holy War," at iiccas.org/englsih/enlibrary/libr_22_11_00_1.htm.

9. Michael R. Fischbach, "Biography of Taqyy al-Din an-Nabhani," in Phillip Mattar, ed., Encyclopedia of the Palestinians, at www.palestineremembered.com/Haifa/Ijzim/Story819.html.

10. "While in Baghdad, al-Husseini aided the pro-Nazi revolt of 1941. He then spent the rest of World War II as Hitler's special guest in Berlin, advocating the extermination of Jews in radio broadcasts to the Middle East and recruiting Balkan Muslims for the infamous SS `mountain divisions' that tried to wipe out Jewish communities throughout the region." See "Who was the Grand Mufti, Haj Muhammed Amin al-Husseini?" at www.palestinefacts.org/pf_mandate_grand_mufti.php.

11. Hashem Kassem, "Hizb- ut-Tahrir al Islami" (The Islamic Liberation Party), 2002, at www.eastwestrecord.com/get_articles.asp?articleid=219.

12. Ibid.

13. Fischbach, "Biography of Taqyy al-Din an-Nabhani."

14. Ahmed Rashid, "Asking for Holy War," at iiccas.org/englsih/enlibrary/libr_22_11_00_1.htm.

15. Personal interview with Husain Haqqani, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2003.

16. Hizb ut-Tahrir, "The Reasons for the Establishment of Hizb ut-Tahrir," at www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english.

17. Compare V. I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done (New York: International Publishers, 1988), pp. 111-113 and 122-123 on legal work, and pp. 126-129 on the spread of illegal cells and activities.

18. Alexei Malashenko, "Musul'mane v nachale veka: Nadezhdy & ugrozy" (Muslims in the beginning of the century: Hopes and threats), Moscow Carnegie Center Working Paper No. 7, 2002, pp. 5-6.

19. Sidik Aukbur, "The True Meaning of Jihad," Khilafah, May 2003, at www.khilafah.com/home/category.php?DocumentID=7059&TagID24.

20. "Alliance with America Is a Capital Crime Prohibited by Islam," Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet, September 18, 2001, at www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org.

21. "Alliance with America Is a Capital Crime Prohibited by Islam," Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet, September 18, 2001, at www.khilafah.com/home/category_list.php?

22. Hizb ut-Tahrir, "America and Britain Declare War Against Islam and the Muslims," communiqu? October 14, 2001, at www.khilafah.com/home/category.php?DocumentID=2428&TagID=3.

23. Ibid.

24. Hizb-ut Tahrir Britain, "An Open Letter from Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain to the Iraqi Opposition Groups Conferring in Their Conference in London," December 13, 2002, at www.islamic-state.org/leaflets/021213_OpenLetterToIraqiOppositionConfLondon.pdf.

25. Ahmed Rashid, "Asking for Holy War," International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, at iicas.org/english/enlibrary/libr_22_11_00_1.htm.

26. "The Method of Hizb ut-Tahrir," at english.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/definition/messages.htm.

27. Hashem Kassem, "Hizb- ut-Tahrir al Islami."

28. "The Method of Hizb ut-Tahrir" (italics added).

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid. (bullet points added).

32. "U.S. Interests in the Central Asian Republics," Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 12, 1998, at commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0f.htm.

33. Ariel Cohen, "U.S. Interests in Central Asia," testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific , March 17, 1999, at www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/Test031799.cfm.

34. Ahmed Rashid, "Reviving the Caliphate," chapter 6 of Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 119.

35. "Hizb ut-Tahrir Announces the Death of Its Ameer," at www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/leaflets/leaflet4.htm.

36. Rashid, "Reviving the Caliphate," p. 135. Under the auspices of the Taliban, representatives of Hizb attended meetings in Kabul, Afghanistan, in which the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Al-Qaeda also participated.

37. Ibid., pp. 135-136.

38. Personal interview with a source who requests not to be identified, April 2003.

39. Union of Councils Central Asian Information Network, "Uzbekistan: List of 14 Possible Political Prisoners Who Died in Jail, 5 Disappearances and 505 Possible Political Prisoners."

40. "Uzbekistan: Harassment Before EBRD Annual Meeting," Human Rights Watch, May 2, 2003, at www.hrw.org/press/2003/05/uzbek050203.htm; see also "Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Uzbekistan," Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, May 1, 2003, at hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/uzbek050103-bck.htm.

41. "Muslim Clerics Visit U.S.," Caspian Business News, December 16, 2002, p. 12, at www.caspianbusinessnews.com/NewSite/preview/sections/regional/docs/16-12-2002.pdf. However, USAID, which is funding visits to the U.S. by Central Asian clergy so they can learn how Islam functions in a democracy, should be careful not to expose them to U.S.-based Wahhabis, who are actively abusing the democratic system.

42. Ariel Cohen, "Promoting Freedom and Democracy: Fighting the War of Ideas Against Islamic Terrorism," Comparative Strategy, June 2003, forthcoming.