tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-58141348329607663402024-02-20T19:44:18.301-08:00The Malaysian TimesYour One Stop Center For All News, Anywhere In The World.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.comBlogger83125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-49955359084529189052008-04-06T21:42:00.000-07:002008-04-06T22:06:44.512-07:00World: Forum 2000 Looks At War on TerrorWorld: Forum 2000 Looks At War on Terror <br />By Jeffrey Donovan<br /> <br />James Woolsey <br />(RFE/RL) <br />Are the Islamic world and the West on a collision course? Has the ouster of Saddam Hussein improved the chances for democracy in the Middle East? Is the war on terror being won or lost? These are just some of the issues discussed today at the Forum 2000 conference in Prague. The annual gathering, launched in 1997 by former Czech President Vaclav Havel, brings together prominent politicians and thinkers from around the world to discuss ways to avert threats to international peace.<br /><br /><br />Prague, 10 October 2005 (RFE/RL) -- How to assess the state of relations between the West and the Islamic world? <br />That depends on whom you ask. And to be sure, there were no shortage of voices -- ranging from alarming to reassuring -- at today's Forum 200 conference in Prague.<br /><br />To hear James Woolsey describe it, the West is engaged in what the former director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) calls "the long war of the 21st century."<br /><br />Woolsey told RFE/RL he sees the West in a battle with three forms of totalitarianism: the remnants of Ba'athism in Iraq and Syria, the Shi'ite clerical regime of Iran, and the Sunni jihadists of Al-Qaeda.<br /><br />The latter, he says, are largely underpinned by the Wahhabi ideology of Saudi Arabia and are the main threat to the West.<br /><br />"I would say that the Wahhabis and the Islamist jihadis, Salafis like Al-Qaeda, are not all true representatives of Islam," Woolsey said. "We do not need to take their word for that any more than the world needed to take the word of [Tomas de] Torquemada and the Spanish Inquisition in the late 15th century that they were true representatives of Christianity. They were not; they were totalitarian bastards. And the Wahhabis and Al-Qaeda are the modern equivalents."<br /><br />"The anti-Western hysteria, the anti-American hysteria, is exploited by authoritarian leaders in order to deflect attention from serious corruption and repression in their own countries." -- former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim<br />For Woolsey, who was CIA director in the mid-1990s, none of these groups can be appeased with concessions, such as a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.<br /><br />"You could have an Israeli-Palestinian settlement tomorrow and the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia would still be fanatically anti-Shi'ite, anti-Sufi, anti-Jewish, anti-Christian, anti-female, anti-democracy, anti-music, and so would Al-Qaeda be," Woolsey said. "Indeed, the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia and the Islamist jihadis such as Al-Qaeda pretty much agree on everything, except on one thing: who should be in charge."<br /><br />But former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim believes the West -- and the United States in particular -- can do a lot more to improve relations with the Muslim world and be a positive force for change there. <br />Anwar Ibrahim <br />(RFE/RL) <br /><br />Anwar, who was freed in 2004 after being imprisoned on politically motivated charges, knows about repression. He said that while the Muslim world has legitimate grievances with the West -- such as the war in Iraq -- leaders in the Islamic world use those issues to further repress their people.<br /><br />"The anti-Western hysteria, the anti-American hysteria, is exploited by authoritarian leaders in order to deflect attention from serious corruption and repression in their own countries," Anwar said.<br /><br />Anwar, who now teaches at Oxford University in Britain, said that Muslims are receptive to the current U.S. drive for democracy in the Middle East. But he said there remains a fundamental lack of trust due to the perceived failure to address Muslim grievances.<br /><br />"I'm not denying the fact that the rhetoric of freedom and democracy by the administration in Washington is generally well received. But people are suspicious," Anwar said. "They see the war in Iraq. They see the failure to address the issues of the dispossessed Palestinians. So I think what is required is an effective [U.S.] engagement [with the Muslim world]."<br /><br />Engagement is also a word used by Ghassan Salame. The former Lebanese culture minister now teaches international relations in Paris and advises UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In an interview with RFE/RL, Salame categorically rejected the notion of a "clash of civilizations" between Islam and the West.<br /><br />"The Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia and the Islamist jihadis such as Al-Qaeda pretty much agree on everything, except on one thing: who should be in charge." -- former CIA director James Woolsey<br />"Civilizations are not political actors in the international arena so that they can clash or they can enter into a dialogue," Salame said. "Civilizations are just a reservoir for our values, for our ideas, for our dreams, for our languages, from which we borrow from time to time and very often we forget. So, that's what civilizations are, they are not actors. Individuals are actors, groups are actors, states are actors."<br /><br />In that light, Salame sees the current insurgency in Iraq fueled not by a clash with the West, but by a combination of American mistakes and actions by Iraq's neighbors.<br /><br />"They [Iraq's neighbors] used the very porous borders between them and Iraq in order to do a lot of unnecessary and very hostile and very destabilizing things in Iraq -- in order precisely to keep America busy in Iraq so that it doesn't turn against them," Salame said.<br /><br />After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, some governments in the region feared they might become the next targets of the war on terror. The U.S. considers Iran and Syria to be state sponsors of terrorism.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-17794382399509817352008-04-06T21:41:00.000-07:002008-04-06T21:42:06.828-07:00200 Years of New Kharijism: the Ongoing Revision of Islam200 Years of New Kharijism: the Ongoing Revision of Islam<br />By Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani<br />Chairman, Islamic Supreme Council of America<br /><br />We live in a time when the enemies of Islam are attempting to destroy it from within.<br />Resourceful and determined, they announce new mode of leadership that pretends to restore the purity of the faith as a guise to gain the confidence of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The unwary observer is readily misled by their portrayal, which is eagerly disseminated by the media. In fact, it is these proponents of extremism who are themselves outside the realm of true Islam. “The Religion of God,” al-Khatib said, “lies between extremism and the laxity.”<br /><br />1.0 Prophetic Traditions<br /><br />The advent of these extremists was foretold by the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (s).<br />Prophet Muhammad’s authentic traditionsii detail for us the characteristics and behavior of the extremists, stating that their existence in our world would be revealed when “…the destitute (al-buhm) camel-herds compete in building tall structures,”iii or in another narration “…the barefoot, naked, indigent (al-‘âla) shepherds compete in building tall structures.”iv <br /><br />“…The barefoot and the naked are the heads of the people,”v or “…the barefoot and naked, the deaf and dumb are the kings of the earth.”vi<br /><br />“Barefoot and naked” and “deaf and dumb” are metaphors to describe in figurative<br />speech just how depraved the new leaders would be. “Barefoot and naked” relates to people of the desert, and implies their utter ignorance in matters pertaining to organized society.vii “Deaf and dumb” implies that they would fail to use common sense in anything concerning religion, though they are perfectly sound in mind and limb.viii Implied as well is the notion that the extremists’ ultimate goal is world domination, to be “kings of the earth.”<br /><br />The traditions reveal another of the signs of the extremists’ onset is “the affectation of eloquence by the rabble and their betaking to palaces in big ities.”ix <br /><br />Prophet Muhammad predicted a reversal in society whereby these depraved leaders would take over the rule of every region by force. They would become extremely rich and their primary concern would be to erect the tallest buildings, rather than maintain order or care for the common welfare.x<br /><br />2.0 A Reversal of Values<br /><br />Sadly, we have witnessed the realization of the Prophet’s prediction in the dominance of extremist ideology in the Middle East and its increasing influence in the West. Because of their influence and their reversal of values, we now see doctrinal, political, and physical wars of exclusion being waged everywhere in the name of Islam. In the United States, extremist ideologues have waged a fifty-year long campaign to exclude moderate, traditional Muslims from political arenas as well as the mosque. The effect has been to create the impression that the 200 Years of New Kharijism – The Ongoing Revision of Islam Islamic Supreme Council of America<br />extremists are the majority whereas they are simply the most vociferous, having made it more comfortable for the majority of Muslims to stay at home, away from their doctrinal wrangling.<br /><br />These two phenomena, depraved leadership and exclusionism, are the mainstays of<br />New Kharijism in our time. What clearer proof of this than what took place in Makka on November 20, 1979, when hundreds of armed men seized the Holy Mosque under the 36-year old Juhayman al-‘Utaybi and proclaimed him as the new leader of the country? They held the mosque for two weeks during which they practiced lewd sexual behavior with the women they held captive and those they had brought with them.<br /><br />According to the New York Times, “There were hundreds of casualties on both sides<br />before Saudi forces were able to drag out the last remnant of what by then was a bunch of filthy, bedraggled young men.” Al-‘Utaybi and sixty-three of the captured were later executed by public beheading. According to As Sayyid Yusuf al-Rifa‘i, these wild young people learned their ways from the same teacher as Abdel Aziz Ibn Baz (d. 2000), a famous Wahhabi scholar.<br /><br />3.0 The Original Khawârij<br /><br />Before we speak of the modern phenomenon of New Kharijism it is important to define<br />the principal constituents of Khariji doctrines. The name “Khawârij” was applied to those who, in the time of the Successors of the Companions to the Prophet (one generation after Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime), parted ways with other Muslims and declared them disbelievers, just as the followers of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, “Wahhabis” (also known as the “Salafis”), do today.xi<br /><br />The Khawârij or “Kharijites” were tens of thousands of Muslims mostly comprised of<br />Qur’an memorizors and devoted worshippers who prayed and fasted above the norm. Yet, they declared every one of the Companions and all who associated with them to be apostate disbelievers and took up arms against them. The practices of declaring Muslims apostate (takfîr/tashrîk) and taking armed action (baghî) against the central Muslim authority – the Caliphate – became and continues to remain the hallmark of the Khawârij.<br /><br />In addition, the Khawârij altered the interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna, and used them to declare it lawful to kill and take the property of Muslims, as do their modern counterparts, the Wahhabis.xii<br /><br />The classification of the Wahhabis as Kharijis has been a leitmotiv of Sunni heresiography for the past 200 years. Only now has it become politically incorrect among the scholars of Islam (ulema).<br /><br />4.0 Three Principles of the New Kharijis<br /><br />The chief brand of New Kharijism, or Wahhabism, distinguishes itself from traditional<br />Islam by three main principles: <br /><br />1. Anthropomorphism of the Deity: Attributing a body to the object of Islamic worship. <br /><br />2. Disrespect of Prophet: Harming the Prophet through:<br /><br />200 Years of New Kharijism – The Ongoing Revision of Islam Islamic Supreme Council of America <br /><br />- Disrespect of his noble person, mosque, grave, vestiges, Family, or Companions.<br />- Disrespect of those who visit, love, and praise him.<br />- Disparaging or holding his status as an intercessor in disdain.<br /><br />3. Disregard for the schools and methods of the Sunni Imams including:<br />- The Imams of Sunni doctrine (‘aqîda): al-Ash‘ari and al-Maturidi.<br />- The scholars of traditional Sunni jurisprudence (fiqh): Abu Hanifa, Malik, ash-Shafi‘i, and Ahmad.<br />- The Imams of Sunni morals (akhlâq) known as the Polesxiii of the science of soulpurification (tasawwuf): al-Junayd, al-Gilani, al-Shadhili, al-Rifa‘i, al-Chishti, al- Suhrawardi, Shah Naqshband, and al-Tijani.xiv<br /><br />Since all sincere Muslims believe God is transcendent and love their Prophet, it follows that this third principle, disregard for the Sunni Schools and their jurisprudential authority, is by far the most harmful tenet of New Kharijism and its most devastating achievement. The attack on the schools of thought has resulted in the pollution of pure belief, the arrogant rejection of Islamic authority, and the discrediting of pious Muslims striving to follow the straight path.<br /><br />The traditional schools were immediately supplanted by extremist ideologues and<br />radical centers of education. Africans tell the story of a young man sent to study Shari‘a at great expense by his Sunni parents. Upon his return a few years later, he refused to eat a chicken slaughtered in his honor by his father stating, “my father is an apostate.” Scenarios like this one quickly caused a great rift between the generations of peace-loving Muslims and the chaosdriven youth who were their children.<br /><br />More ugly still is the violence wreaked by extremists on the Muslims of Syria, Egypt,<br />Algeria, Afghanistan, Daghestan, Chechnya, and within the Indian Subcontinent. Violence and societal upheaval were instilled at the new schools by radical ideologues like Egyptian ex- Communist Sayyid Qutb. Sayyid Qutb declared a Muslim is either a “revolutionist” or an infidel, and went so far as to declare all the Islamic societies of his time apostate and fit to be overthrown. He stated, “Islam is a force that runs to gift freedom to all people on the earth with no regard to the variety of their religious beliefs. When this force meets with aberrant forces, it is the duty of his so-called “Islam” to struggle and annihilate them.”xvi <br /><br />Invoking the memory of the original Kharijis, he also wrote, “Islam is a whole: its separated parts should be united and the differences removed.”xvii<br /><br />5.0 Prohibitions of the New Kharijis<br /><br />Today Sayyid Qutb’s spiritual children – such as the followers of Taqi al-Din al-<br />Nabahani, who are outlawed in most Muslim countries – tell Muslims not to:<br />- Participate in government.<br />- Sit on jury duty.<br /><br />- Vote.<br />- Collaborate with other faith groups.<br />- Recite the remembrance of God in collective gatherings of dhikr.xviii<br />- Commemorate the birthday of our Prophet (mawlid) nor read poetry in his honor.<br />- Wear turbans or attempt to revive Prophetic traditions concerning dress.<br />- Show deference or respect to religious scholars or pious elders.<br />- Visit the tombs of saints.<br /><br />5.0 The Ongoing Revision of Islam<br /><br />The Neo-Kharijis and their sponsors are mounting a worldwide offensive to convince<br />Muslims and the rest of the world that theirs is the only way. To this end, a vast publishing campaign to revise Islam has been under way since the early thirties, an effort that has been redoubled since the eighties. This campaign is waged on five fronts:<br /><br />5.1 Tampering with the Texts<br /><br />A wanton, unethical manipulation of the great books of Islam has removed words or<br />entire chapters from classical works by the great Imams such as al-Nawawi, al-Sawi, and Ibn ‘Abidin. Quranic exegeses such as Tafsir al-Jalalayn and the works of ‘Abd Allah Yusuf ‘Ali have all been reprinted with changes. This corrupt tampering of these guiding texts has been documented at length.xix<br /><br />5.2 “Improving” on the Foundational Books of Islam<br /><br />They have unabashedly published corrective comments on manuals whose contents<br />were long ago established as normative in the scholarly community of Islam. Many such<br />instances have also been documented. xx<br /><br />5.3 Revising Their Own Source Texts<br /><br />Not content to fiddle with historically accepted books, they also find fault with the<br />minor texts they publish and distribute in order to gainsay their own putative authorities. This is a patent illustration of the principle that each new generation of innovators rejects the previous one as too moderate.xxi<br /><br />5.4 Reprinting Discredited Works<br /><br />The Neo-Kharijis are supplementing their own works by re-circulating books that have<br />already been condemned by the majority of scholars. Though heretical and un-Islamic,<br />numerous books are now being promoted as the fundamental guides for the practice of Islam.xxii<br /><br />5.5 Promoting the Works of Unqualified, Self-styled Scholars to Attack Sufis and Asharis Including:<br />- Muhammad Ahmad ‘Abd al-Salam,<br />- Muhammad al-Shuqayri,<br />- Ibn Abi al-‘Izz,<br />- Muhammad Nasiruddeen al-Albani,<br />- Abdul Aziz Bin Abdullah Bin Baz,<br />- Muhammad bin Saleh Al-'Uthaymin,<br />- Dr. Abu Ameenah Bilal Phillips,<br />- Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din al-Hilali,<br />- Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan,<br />- And many others. xxiii<br /><br />Their dismissal of the traditional schools of thought, their development of schools as incubators for radical ideology, their attack on the source texts of Islam and generations of recognized scholars, and their financing by ideological counterparts worldwide, have truly enabled the Neo-Kharajite movement to dominate the vision of Islam in the world. Finding roots in the Khawârij of ca. 750 CE, and given new life by Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab in the 19th century, these extremists have only really succeeded in their efforts to subvert Islam in the past 75 years.<br /><br />Traditional Muslims, the silent majority, remain numerous and confidant enough to<br />repel the Neo-Kharajite movement from within Islam, given the necessary support. However, backed by the oil-wealth of their ideological counterparts overseas, Neo-Kharajites have a definitive advantage over the majority of Muslims, who have only their own humble resources at their disposal. Only with real financial and political support can classical Muslim scholars and moderate, mainstream Muslims reclaim the banner of Islam from these usurpers, retake the podium they have hijacked, repel these extremists and discredit their heretical ideology. Truly, this is a battle worth fighting. And it is a battle which, with the help of Almighty God, we can<br />and must win.<br /><br />Truly we belong to Allah and to Him is our return, and there is no power nor might except in Allah the Exalted and Almighty Lord.<br /><br />NOTES:<br />i In al-Dhahabi, Siyar A‘lam al-Nubala’ (1997 ed. 13:598).<br /><br />ii Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and advice communicated through verifiable chains of transmission, known as the ahadith. The body of traditions are called the Sunna, and form the second basis for Islamic law, in addition to the Holy Qur’an.<br />iii The well-known hadith of Gibril in Sahih al-Bukhari.<br />iv Sahih Muslim.<br />v Ibid.<br />vi Ibid<br />vii see Al-Taymi, Sulayman.<br />viii Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari.<br />ix Related by Al-Tabarani, through Abu Hamza, on the authority of Ibn ‘Abbas.<br />x Al-Qurtubi.<br />xi Ibn ‘Abidin, Radd al-Muhtar ‘ala al-Durr al-Mukhtar (3:309), “Bab al-Bughat” [Chapter on Rebels].<br />xii Al-Sawi, Hashiya ‘ala Tafsir al-Jalalayn (v. 58:18-19) in the Cairo, 1939 al-Mashhad al-Husayni edition (3:307-8) repr. Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-‘Arabi in Beirut.<br />xiii Aqtâb, sing. qutb<br />xiv The schools of tasawwuf are known as Paths, turuq, sing. Tarîqa.<br />xv Qutb, Sayyid, World’s Peace and Islam.<br />xvi The Future is Islaam (p. 203).<br />xvii Social Justice in Islam (p. 35).<br />xviii Dhikr is considered by traditional Muslims as the most excellent form of devotion for a servant of God, and is stressed over a hundred times in the Holy Qur’an. For the spiritually-inclined, it is polish for the heart, the essence of<br />the science of faith, and the key to all success. Nor are there any restrictions on the form, frequency, or timing of dhikr whatsoever.<br />xix Cf. Appendix, “Albani and Company,” in Struggle for the Soul of Islam: Exposing the Scholars of Najd and the Wahhabi/Salafi Movement, paragraph on Ibn Baz.<br />xx For example: Ibn Abi al-‘Izz’s commentary on al-Tahawi’s ‘Aqida. Al-Tahawi’s `Aqida is a normative classic of Islam but Ibn Abi al-‘Izz is unknown and nacceptable as a source for Ahl al-Sunna teachings. Examples of his unreliability are his rejection of al-Tahawi’s articles:<br />! §35: “The Seeing of Allah by the People of the Garden is true, without their vision being all-encompassing and without the manner of their vision being known” and<br />! §38: “He is beyond having limits placed on Him, or being restricted, or having parts or limbs, nor is He contained by the six directions as all created things are”.<br />Al-`Izz states, “Can any vision be rationally conceived without face-to-face encounter? And in it there is a proof for His elevation (‘uluw) over His reatures,” and “Whoever claims that Allah is seen without direction, let him verify his reason!” [Ibn Abi al-‘Izz, Sharh al-‘Aqida al-Tahawiyya, p. 195]. He also endorses Ibn Taymiyya’s view of the finality of Hellfire, in flat contradiction of the al-Tahawi’s statement, §83. “The Garden and the Fire are created and shall never be extinguished nor come to an end.” [Ibid. p. 427-430] There is also doubt as to Ibn Abi al-‘Izz’s identity and authorship of this Sharh.<br /><br />xxi Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqqi objects apoplectically to Ibn Taymiyya in his edition of the latter’s Iqtida’ al-Sirat al-Mustaqim in the section entitled “Innovated festivities of time and place.” He criticizes Ibn Taymiyya for saying that “some people innovate a celebration out of love for the Prophet and to exalt him, and Allah may reward them for this love and striving.” Al-Fiqqi writes a two-page footnote exclaiming, “How can they possibly obtain a reward for this?! What striving is in this?!”<br /><br />xxii Including:<br />! Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s Tawhid, which is replete with doctrinal errors such as: o Calling the Ash‘aris “Nullifiers of the Divine Attributes” (mu‘attila) [chapters 2, 16]<br />o Declaring the Lesser shirk an integral part of the Greater. [7]<br />o Misinterpreting the hadith “do not make my grave an idol” to mean: do not even pray near it whereas the agreed-upon meaning is: Do not pray towards or on top of it. [20]<br />o Stating: “The disbelievers who know their disbelief are better-guided than the believers.” (inna al-kuffâr al-ladhîna ya‘rifûna kufrahum ahdâ sabîlan min al-mu’minîn) [23]<br />o Stating: “Among the polytheists are those who love Allah with a tremendous love” [31].<br />o Stating that “the two opposites [belief and disbelief] can be found in a single heart” [41] in<br />violation of the verse [Allah has not assigned unto any man two hearts within his body] (33:4).<br />This and the previous four concepts are fundamental to understand their propagation of mutual suspicion among Muslims.<br />o Stating that Allah is explicitly said to have two hands: the right holds the heaven and the other holds the earth, and the other is explicitly named the left hand. [67]<br /><br />! ‘Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s al-Sunna, a foundational book of the Wahhabi creed. According to Shu‘ayb al-Arna’ut, “at least 50 percent of the hadiths are weak or outright forgeries” in this book. Its publication was sponsored by His Highness King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud and a Jedda businessman named Muhammad Nasif in Cairo in 1349/1930 at al-Matba‘a al-Salafiyya.<br /><br />The same Muhammad Nasif financed:<br />! an attack on Imam Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari and the Hanafi School by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mu‘allimi al-Yamani (d. 1386 H) entitled al-Tankil li Ma W arada fi Ta’nib al-Kawthari min al-Abatil.<br /><br />o the reprinting of al-Qari’s hapless fatwa against the parents of the Prophet.<br />o the dissemination in India of al-Khatib’s derogatory biography of Imam Abu Hanifa from Tarikh Baghdad.<br /><br />Also:<br />! Ibn Taymiyya: Fatwa Hamawiyya; ‘Aqida W asitiyya; Hadith al-Nuzul; Awliya’ al-Shaytan; Iqtida’ al-Sirat al- Mustaqim; Qa‘ida fi al-Tawassul; Ziyarat al-Qubur, etc.<br />! Ibn al-Qayyim: al-Qasida al-Nuniyya; Ijtima‘ al-Juyush al-Islamiyya.<br />! al-Harawi’s Dhamm ‘Ilm al-Kalam wa Ahlih<br />! al-Biqa‘i’s takfîr of Shaykh Muhyi al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi – may Allah have mercy on him – in his book Masra‘ al- Tasawwuf, Tanbih Al-Ghabi Ila Takfir Ibn ‘Arabi, ed. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil (Bilbis: Dar al-Taqwa, <1989>)<br />xxiii In Arabic:<br />! Muhammad al-Shuqayri who wrote the book al-Sunna wa al-Mubtada‘at<br />! Muhammad Khalil Harras wrote a commentary on Ibn Taymiyya’s ‘Aqida W asitiyya – distributed for free in the Arab world<br />! Al-Albani<br />! ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, al-Albani’s student and deputy in Kuwait, al-Fikr al-Sufi (“Sufi Thought”) and its abridgment Fada’ih al-Sufiyya (“The Disgraces of the Sufis”).<br /><br />! ‘Abd al-Rahman Dimashqiyya<br />! Mahmud ‘Abd al-Ra’uf al-Qasim al-Madkhali, al-Kashf ‘an Haqiqat al-Sufiyya (“Unveiling the Reality of the Sufis”), 1993. The book was refuted by Dr. ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Isa in his 700-page Haqa’iq ‘an al-Tasawwuf.<br /><br />! Al-Tuwayjiri (Hamd ibn ‘Abd al-Muhsin). With all respect to his person, he demanded that women caught driving in Saudi Arabia be labeled as prostitutes in the courts.<br />! Al-Jaza’iri (Abu Bakr)<br />! Al-Wadi‘i (Muqbil ibn Hadi), Nashr al-Sahifa fi Dhikr al-Sahih min Aqwal A’immat al-Jarh wa al-Ta‘dil fi Abi Hanifa. Fada’ih (“Disgraces”), 1999.<br />In English<br />! Ibn Baz, Sunnah and Caution against Innovation<br />! An anonymous tract entitled A Brief Introduction to the Salafi Da‘wah.<br />! Muhammad Ma‘soomee al-Khajnadee (d. 1961 ce), Blind Following of Madhhabs (Birmingham: al- Hidaayah Publishing, 1993).<br /><br />! A. A. Tabari, a fictitious name for the author of The Other Side of Sufism, abtract distributed in Wahhabi funded mosques and posted on the Internet.<br />! The Naqshbandi Tariqat Unveiled, al-Hidaayah, Colombo, Sri Lanka.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-74070669818509860092008-04-06T21:26:00.000-07:002008-04-06T21:30:38.922-07:00Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central AsiaHizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia<br />by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.<br />This article originally appeared in the Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1656, published May 30, 2003 <br /><br /><br />Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation) is an emerging threat to American interests in Central and South Asia and the Middle East. It is a clandestine, cadre-operated, radical Islamist political organization that operates in 40 countries around the world, with headquarters apparently in London. Its proclaimed goal is jihad against America and the overthrow of existing political regimes and their replacement with a Caliphate (Khilafah in Arabic), a theocratic dictatorship based on the Shari'a (religious Islamic law). The model for Hizb is the "righteous" Caliphate, a militaristic Islamic state that existed in the 7th and 8th centuries under Mohammad and his first four successors, known as the "righteous Caliphs."<br /><br />The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks taught the United States a painful lesson--that it must be alert to emerging threats, including terrorism and other destabilizing activities against its military assets, citizens, and allies. Some of these emerging threats, combined with the actions of terrorist jihadi organizations, such as al-Qaeda, may also generate political instability in key geographic areas and threaten friendly regimes. In Central Asia, the security situation has deteriorated because the war against Saddam Hussein's regime has intensified the resolve of anti-American forces already active in the region.1<br /><br />The United States has important national security interests at stake in Central Asia, including access to the military bases used to support operations in Afghanistan, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and technologies for their production, and securing access to natural resources, including oil and gas. The U.S. is also committed to spreading democracy, promoting market reforms, and improving human rights standards in the vast heartland of Eurasia.<br /><br />Therefore, to prevent Hizb ut-Tahrir from destabilizing Central Asia and other areas, the U.S. should expand intelligence collection on Hizb. The U.S. should encourage Central Asian governments to pursue reforms that will expand civil society and diminish the alienation on which Hizb and fundamentalist Islamist movements are preying. Specifically, the U.S. should condition security assistance on economic reform, encourage democracy and popular participation, discredit radical Islamist movements, and support religious and political moderation and pluralism.<br /><br />A MODERN FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT<br />Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami is an emerging threat to American interests and the countries in which it operates. It has 5,000-10,000 hard-core members, and many more supporters in former Soviet Central Asia (e.g., Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), and is expanding its operations to oil-rich Kazakhstan. Over 10,000 members are active in Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and Indonesia.2 At least 500 are already behind bars in Uzbekistan alone, and hundreds are in custody in the Middle East.3 By breeding violent anti-American attitudes, attempting to overthrow existing regimes, and preparing cadres for more radical Islamist organizations, Hizb poses a threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia and elsewhere in the Islamic world where moderate regimes are found.<br /><br />Sheikh Taqiuddin an-Nabhani al Falastini, the founder of Hizb, has written that every Muslim should strive to establish a Caliphate and that this religious imperative (fard) upon the Muslim nation (Umma) is so strong that Mohammad's close allies delayed burying his body until a new Caliph was appointed and the Caliphate established.4 The Caliphate would be led by a Caliph: a supreme, pious leader who would combine religious and political power.5<br /><br />A Caliph, an-Nabhani believes, is a substitute for Mohammad as both political and religious leader. The Caliph would appoint an Amir, or military leader, who would declare jihad and wage war against all non-believers, including the United States. According to Hizb's political vision, such an entity, if established, would not recognize existing national, regional, tribal, or clan differences and would include all Muslims.<br /><br />An-Nabhani has drafted the constitution of this future Caliphate. It is not the constitution of a democratic state. The Caliph would be appointed by acclamation by "prominent men," with male voters casting a vote of approval. The ruler would not be directly accountable to the people, and there would be no checks or balances between branches of government. Succession would be by designation of the Caliph or acclamation of the oligarchy.<br /><br />Thus, Hizb explicitly rejects democracy. In fact, one of an-Nabhani's books is titled Democracy: The Law of Infidels.6 Yet some regional observers have called for the legitimization of Hizb and its integration into the existing political model.7 In doing so, they ignore the obvious--Hizb's goal is to smash the existing state apparatus, not to become a player within it.<br /><br />Radical Islamic Roots<br />Since its inception in 1952 in Jordanian-occupied East Jerusalem, Hizb has gained tens of thousands of followers from London to Lahore.8 From its beginning, an-Nabhani's organization was influenced by the rabid anti-Semitism propagated by Sheikh Hajj Amin Al-Housseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who was a major Nazi war collaborator.9<br /><br />An-Nabhani, who was serving at the time on the Islamic appellate court in Jerusalem, was an associate and contemporary of Hajj Amin's.10 He also drew on the organizational principles of Marxism-Leninism, which were quite well-known among the middle- and upper-class Arabs in British Mandate Palestine. Khaled Hassan, one of the founders of the Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was also among the founders of Hizb ut-Tahrir, as was Sheikh Asaad Tahmimi, who became Islamic Jihad's spiritual leader.11 Hizb supported the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and backs the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria, a radical movement on the U.S. State Department's terrorism list.12<br /><br />An-Nabhani was also member of the radical Islamic Brotherhood (Al Ihwan al-Muslimeen), a secretive international fundamentalist organization founded in Egypt in 1928, which spread throughout the Islamic world and preaches the establishment of a Caliphate. He joined the Brotherhood while studying in Cairo's Al-Azhar University but later left the Brotherhood because he considered it too soft.13 It is likely that Hizb was supported initially by the Saudi-based radical Islamist Wahhabi movement, although the extent to which that support continues today is unclear.14<br /><br />A SHADOW GLOBAL ORGANIZATION<br />Hizb ut-Tahrir's spread around the globe, in Western Europe and often in authoritarian states with strong secret police organizations, is impressive. It could be accomplished only by applying 20th century totalitarian political "technology" melded with Islamic notions of the 7th and 8th centuries, as interpreted by medieval Islamic scholars. The genius of Hizb founder an-Nabhani was marrying Orthodox Islamist ideology to Leninist strategy and tactics.<br /><br />The Leninist Model<br />Hizb ut-Tahrir is a totalitarian organization, akin to a disciplined Marxist-Leninist party, in which internal dissent is neither encouraged nor tolerated. Because its goal is global revolution, a leading Islamic scholar has compared it to the Trotskyite wing of the international communist movement.15 Its candidate members become well-versed in party literature during a two-year indoctrination course in a study circle, supervised by a party member. Only when a member "matures in Party culture," "adopts the thoughts and opinions of the party," and "melts with the Party" can he or she become a full-fledged member.16 Women are organized in cells supervised by a female cadre or a male relative. After joining the party, the new recruit may be requested (or ordered) to relocate to start a new cell.<br /><br />When a critical mass of cells is achieved, according to its doctrine, Hizb may move to take over a country in preparation for the establishment of the Caliphate. Such a takeover would likely be bloody and violent. Moreover, its strategy and tactics show that, while the party is currently circumspect in preaching violence, it will justify its use--just as Lenin and the Bolsheviks did--when a critical mass is achieved.17<br /><br />Hizb's platform and actions fit in with "Islamist globalization"--an alternative mode of globalization based on radical Islam. This ideology poses a direct challenge to the Western model of a secular, market-driven, tolerant, multicultural globalization.18<br /><br />Where radicalization has taken hold in the Islamic world, Hizb has gained new supporters in droves. It operates clandestinely in over 40 countries around the world, with members organized in cells of five to eight members each. Only a cell commander knows the next level of leadership, ensuring operational security. "Representatives" in Great Britain and Pakistan claim to speak for the organization but have no official address or legal office. Leadership for large regions (e.g., the former Soviet Union), countries, and local areas is kept secret.<br /><br />Hizb's primary characteristics include the fiery rhetoric of jihad, secret cells and operations, murky funding sources, rejection of existing political regimes, rapid transnational growth, and outlook and goals that are shared with al-Qaeda and other organizations of the global jihadi movement.<br /><br />Anti-Americanism<br />Hizb has called for a jihad against the U.S., its allies, and moderate Muslim states. The purpose of the jihad is "to find and kill the Kufar (non-believers)," in fact rejecting the Islamic notion of Greater Jihad against one's own as a sin.19<br /><br />In documents drafted before 9/11, Hizb leaders accused the United States of imposing hegemony on the world. After 9/11, Hizb claimed that the U.S. had declared war against the global Muslim community (Umma), had established an international alliance under the "pretext" of fighting terrorism, and was reinforcing its grip on the countries of Central Asia. Hizb further claimed that the U.S. accused Osama bin Laden of being responsible for the 9/11 attacks "without any evidence or proof."<br /><br />The party attempted to use its influence by calling upon all Muslim governments to reject the U.S. appeal for cooperation in the war against terrorism.20 It called for expulsion of U.S. and Western citizens, including Western diplomats, from countries in which it will take power and shredding diplomatic treaties and agreements with Western governments. It further declared:<br /><br />Muslims! You are religiously obliged to reject this American question which takes you lightly and despises you. America does not have the sublime values that entitle it to tell you what to support and whom to fight against. You possess a divine mission. You are the ones to bring guidance and light to mankind. God described you with the following words: "You are the best people brought forth for the benefit of mankind. You enjoin good and forbid evil. And you believe in God."<br />As for Jihad...it is legal, in fact it is an obligation, it is the apex of Islamic ethics, as Almighty God says, "Keep in store for them whatever you are capable of, force and equipment with which you can frighten those who are enemies of God and enemies of yourselves...." God's Messenger (Mohammed) said, "Islam is the head, prayer is the backbone and Jihad is the perfection."<br />Muslims! The law of religion does not allow you to give to America what it is trying to impose upon you. You are not allowed to follow its orders or to provide it with any assistance whatsoever, no matter whether it be intelligence or facilities of using your territory, your air space or your territorial waters. It is not permissible to cede military bases to the Americans, nor it is allowed to coordinate any military activities with them or to collaborate with them. It is not allowed to enter into an alliance with them or to be loyal to them, because they are enemies of Islam and Muslims. God said, "Believers, Do not befriend my enemy and your enemy.... They have rejected the truth that has come to you."21<br />In a June 2001 article published in the party's journal, Hizb ideologists claim that all methods are justified in the struggle against the unbelievers, including murder. They specifically mention that a pilot's diving a plane hit by enemy fire into a crowd of unbelievers without bailing out with a parachute is a legitimate form of armed struggle. Hizb also demands that Muslims come to the support of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.22<br />According to Hizb, the main targets of jihad--in addition to moderate Muslim regimes such as Jordan, Pakistan, Egypt, and Uzbekistan--are America and the Jews.<br /><br />[T]he war waged by America, the head of Kufr, and Britain and their allies from the Kafir states on Afghanistan is a crusade.... What America and Britain are doing is displaying their enmity for the Islamic Ummah. They are enemies; a state of war exists between them and all the Muslims that necessitates adopting an actual state of war as a basis for dealing with them according to the dictates of the Shari'ah rules. That position should be adopted with them and all those who ally themselves with them in their war against the Muslims.23<br /><br />The war of America and her allies against Islam and the Muslims has shown the corrupt nature of her civilization and her colonial world-view. The War on Iraq...has demonstrated that America and her allies only strive to colonize and plunder the resources of the Islamic world, not to bring about justice and security.... America is intending to deceive you.... [S]he is inherently weak as her ideology is false and corrupt.... The time has come for Islam not just in Iraq but in this entire Ummah. It is time for the Islamic State (Khilafah) to lead the world and save the world from the crimes and oppression of the capitalist system.24<br /><br />According to one of the Hizb Central Asian leaders, "we are very much opposed to the Jews and Israel.... Jews must leave Central Asia. The United States is the enemy of Islam with the Jews."25<br /><br />Anti-Americanism, extremism, and preaching the violent overthrow of existing regimes make Hizb ut-Tahrir a prime suspect in the next wave of violent political action in Central Asia and other Muslim countries with relatively weak regimes, such as Pakistan and Indonesia.<br /><br />Stages of Struggle, Jihad, and Violence<br />Hizb ut-Tahrir sees its struggle in parallel with the three stages that Mohammad experienced en route to the establishment of the Caliphate 1,400 years ago. These are spreading the word of God to the communities of Arabia; the flight from Mecca to Medina in order to establish the first Islamic community there; and, finally, the conquest of Mecca, jihad, and the establishment of the Caliphate.<br /><br />Similarly, Hizb divides its strategy into three stages:<br /><br />"Production of people who believe in the idea and the method of the Party so that they form the Party group" (recruitment and agitation, establishment of cells); <br />"Interaction with the Ummah; to let the Ummah embrace and carry Islam" (Islamization); and <br />"Establishing government, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively, and carrying it as a message to the world" (revolutionary takeover and Jihad).26 <br />In the past, members of Hizb participated in coups against pro-Western regimes in the Middle East, such as the failed 1968 officers' coup against King Hussein II of Jordan.27 Despite its authoritarian and highly disciplined cadre structure, Hizb claimed that members who participated in the coup did so in an "individual capacity." However, more recently, Hizb representatives, together with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, participated in coordination meetings sponsored by al-Qaeda in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.<br /><br />Numerous Middle Eastern countries and Germany, where Hizb is establishing links with the neo-Nazis, have taken steps to outlaw its activities. Moreover, the Party clearly states that Jihad has to continue till the Day of Judgment. So whenever disbelieving enemies attack an Islamic country it becomes compulsory on its Muslim citizens to repel the enemy. The members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in that country are part of the Muslims and it is obligatory upon them as [it] is upon other Muslims (not resident in that country) in their capacity as Muslims, to fight the enemy and expel them. Whenever there is a Muslim amir who declares jihad to enhance the Word of Allah and mobilizes the people to do that, the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir will respond in their capacity as Muslims in the country where the general call to arms was proclaimed.28<br /><br />At this time, Hizb ut-Tahrir aims to seize power and supplant existing governments in Central Asia and elsewhere with an Islamist version based on Shari'a for the purpose of jihad against the West, which includes the following:<br /><br />"A struggle against Kufr (non-believer) states which have domination and influence over the Islamic countries. The challenge against colonialism in all its intellectual, political, economic, and military forms, involves exposing its plans, and revealing its conspiracies in order to deliver the Ummah from its control and to liberate it."29<br /> <br />"A struggle against the rulers in the Arab and Muslim countries by exposing them, taking them to task, acting to change them whenever they have denied the rights of the Ummah or neglected to perform their duty towards her, or ignored any of her affairs, and whenever they disagreed with the rules of Islam, and acting also to remove their regimes so as to establish the Islamic rule in its place."30 <br />Hizb also seeks to penetrate state structures and convert government officials and military officers to its creed. Its platform openly states that "the Party started to seek the support of the influential people with two objectives in mind:<br /><br />So that it could manage to continue its daw'ah (Islamic appeal) while secure from affliction <br />To take over the rule in order to establish the Khilafah and apply Islam."31 <br />Hizb has begun to penetrate the elites in Central Asia. Observers in the region have reported successes in penetrating the Parliament in Kyrgyzstan, the media in Kazakhstan, and customs offices in Uzbekistan.<br /><br />WHAT IS AT STAKE<br />U.S. strategic interests in Central Asia include both access to the military bases needed for operations in Afghanistan and deterring the establishment of safe havens for terrorist organizations. The U.S. is seeking to prevent a country, a group of countries, or a transnational movement or organization from establishing hegemonic control in the region. This includes barring transnational Islamic fundamentalist organizations and drug cartels from emerging as ruling bodies or dominant regional power centers.<br /><br />The U.S. must also prevent Central Asia from becoming an arsenal of dangerous weaponry and should prevent the development and production of weapons of mass destruction in the region, to preclude them from falling into the hands of rogue regimes or terrorists. Furthermore, the U.S. needs to ensure equal access to the energy resources of the region, primarily in the Caspian Sea area, and encourage development of the East-West transportation and economic corridors, also known as the Silk Road. Finally, the U.S. should encourage economic reform, expansion of civic space, democratization, and development of open society in the region.32<br /><br />The secular regimes of Central Asia have little to no democratic legitimacy. Most of their rulers are Soviet-era communist party leaders. Almost no political space is left for secular opposition in these states. U.S. objectives are thus jeopardized not only by the authoritarian parties of radical Islamic revolution such as Hizb, but also by the authoritarian nature of these Central Asian regimes themselves, with their rampant corruption, declining living standards, poor delivery of public goods and services, and stagnant or declining economies. By governing so poorly and being intolerant and undemocratic, these regimes inadvertently breed religious extremism.33<br /><br />In this environment, Hizb ut-Tahrir has captured a protest niche that otherwise would be occupied by a legitimate political opposition. Despite this, the U.S. government, along with the policy analysis and expert communities as well as governments in the region and around the world, has yet to attain a clear picture of Hizb's real size and strength and threat it poses.<br /><br />WHAT THE U.S. DOES NOT KNOW<br />While reports of increasing Hizb activity abound, the extent to which local Hizb activities are part of a coordinated global plan is still unknown, just as the question of whether every region and country has an autonomous leadership that defines programs and sets deadlines remains unanswered. Hizb is rumored to be operating on a 13-year grand plan which, if it exists at all, is still unknown.<br /><br />At its inception, Hizb likely had strong connections to Saudi Wahhabism, but it is unclear whether these links remain today. It is equally unclear whether Hizb has one or more state sponsors and, if so, who they are. At various times, experts have speculated that Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan have been involved. The international intelligence community is also uncertain as to who finances the organization; who controls the funds internally; what the mode of financing is (e.g., regional self-sufficiency or centralized funding); and how funds are transferred (e.g., via the Hawala informal banking system or couriers).<br /><br />The current leader of Hizb is also unknown, as are where he resides and the identity of the senior officers of Hizb. Upon his death, an-Nabhani was succeeded by Sheikh Abd-el Qadim Zaloom, another Palestinian cleric and a former professor at Al-Azhar in Cairo.34 Zaloom was with Hizb for 50 years and died on April 29, 2003.35 While anecdotal reports place the organization's headquarters in London and indicate that many European converts to Islam are staffing mid- and senior levels of the organization, very little evidence confirms this. These questions need to be answered, and a joint international program of collecting intelligence on Hizb and countering its activities must be developed.<br /><br />WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD DO<br />The U.S. and its allies in the war on terrorism need to recognize that Hizb ut-Tahrir is a growing threat in Central Asia. Specifically, to develop a comprehensive strategy and counter Hizb's influence, the U.S. should:<br /><br />Expand intelligence collection on Hizb ut-Tahrir. This needs to be done both in Western Europe and in outlying areas, such as Central Asia, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Most important is information on state sponsorship, leadership, finances, intentions and capabilities, time lines, links with violent terrorist groups, and penetration of state structures. The U.S. intelligence community should work with the United Kingdom's MI5 and MI6 and with the intelligence services of Russia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Central Asian states. U.S. analysts and policymakers, however, should be aware that some of the regimes in question will attempt to portray Hizb as a terrorist organization with links to Osama bin Laden.36<br /> <br />Condition security assistance to Central Asia on economic reform. Hizb is growing in Central Asia due to the "revolution of diminishing expectations," increasing despair, and the lack of secular political space and economic opportunity in the region.37 While some are attracted to Hizb's harsh version of radical Islam, others see it is as an outlet for their frustration with the status quo and an instrument for upward mobility. U.S. assistance to Central Asian countries, which has doubled since 9/11, has not changed the economic dynamics in the region, and most of the funds were understandably earmarked for security cooperation and military assistance.<br /> <br />To jump-start economic development, the Bush Administration should condition Pentagon security assistance on the adoption of free market policies, strengthening property rights and the rule of law, encouraging transparency, and fighting corruption. These measures are likely to make the Central Asian economies more attractive to private investment, stimulate domestic economic growth, and increase prosperity and economic opportunity, thus diminishing the ability of Hizb to use economic decline as an engine for recruitment, as it does in the Ferghana Valley and Kyrgyzstan.<br /><br />Encourage democracy and popular participation. The scarcity of secular and moderate Islamic democratic politics and credible non-governmental organization (NGO) activities and the lack of freedom of expression may be driving thousands of young recruits to join Hizb in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan. There have been no democratic elections in the region for several years, and the opposition press is either nonexistent or severely curbed. Hizb, as well as jihadi organizations, recruits from among alienated students and urban youth, frustrated with the status quo and facing limited futures.<br /> <br />While economic opportunity, religious freedom, and freedom of expression are not a panacea against Islamist radicalism, as the swelling ranks of young Islamic fundamentalists in Western Europe demonstrate, expanding the civic space and allowing more political pluralism, media diversity, and grassroots initiatives may diminish Hizb's appeal. According to a representative of a major U.S. NGO, some liberalization of the nonprofit sector has been attained in the Central Asian countries since 9/11. This trend needs to be encouraged.38<br /><br />The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department should, however, coordinate their activities with the Pentagon, World Bank, and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, all of which are interested in political stability, reducing corruption, and development of property rights and a more investment-oriented environment. Together, they are more likely to convince the Central Asian regimes to undertake further political liberalization, including competitive, free and fair elections.<br /><br />Discredit radicals and encourage moderates. The U.S. should encourage local governments to not only crack down on radical Islam (as they already do), but also encourage alternatives. Uzbekistan has reportedly jailed hundreds of Hizbi activists. The Union of Councils' Central Asian Information Network has documented disappearances, 14 deaths in detention, and over 500 political prisoners in Uzbekistan.39 Human Rights Watch claims that thousands of Central Asian prisoners could qualify as political, including many members of Hizb, who receive 15-17 year sentences for minor offenses such as leaflet distribution.40<br /> <br />The State Department and U.S.-funded NGOs should encourage more U.S. media exposure (e.g., Uzbek and other local language broadcasts by Radio Liberty and the Voice of American) and educational contacts, speaking engagements, and exchanges between local clergy and moderate Muslim leaders in the West.41 The Central Asian public needs to be directly exposed to traditional moderate local brands of Islam, Sufi mystical branches (Tariq'at), and reformist moderate Jadidi Islam.<br /><br />Beyond that, secular regimes in Central Asia should stop persecuting new evangelical Christian denominations, Buddhists, and Zoroastrians. Development of independent media and activities aimed at youth, women, the business community, and ethnic and religious minorities--groups more likely to be discriminated against by Hizb and other radical Sunni groups--should be encouraged and supported.42<br /><br />However, Hizb, as well as Salafi/Wahhabi and other radical Islamic schools that preach jihad against America and the West, should not be allowed to operate. The U.S. should provide support to local media to cover negative examples of the application of Shari'a law, such as amputations for minor offenses or alcohol possession in Chechnya, Afghanistan under the Taliban, Saudi Arabia, and other places. The consequences of jihad-type civil war, such as in Algeria, which left 100,000-200,000 dead, should also be covered. Positive coverage of the West should also be supported.<br /><br />CONCLUSION<br />Hizb ut-Tahrir represents a growing medium- and long-term threat to geopolitical stability and the secular regimes of Central Asia and ultimately poses a potential threat to other regions of the world. The party is transnational, secretive, and extremist in its anti-Americanism. It seeks to overthrow and destroy existing regimes and establish a Shari'a-based Caliphate.<br /><br />Hizb may launch terrorist attacks against U.S. targets and allies, operating either alone or in cooperation with other global terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. A Hizb takeover of any Central Asian state could provide the global radical Islamist movement with a geographic base and access to the expertise and technology to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. and its allies must do everything possible to avoid such an outcome.<br /><br />Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />1. "Hizb-ut-Tahrir s korichnevym ottenkom" (Hizb-ut-Tahrir with a brown tinge), Vecherniy Bishkek, April 4, 2003.<br /><br />2. Interview with Husain Haqqani, The Carnegie Endowment, May 2003; see also "Fourteen Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Caught," Anatolia Press Agency, March 6, 2000; "More Arrests Reported in Hizb ut-Tahrir Operations," Anatolia Press Agency, March 7, 2000; FBIS/World News Connection, March 7, 2000.<br /><br />3. Union of Councils Central Asian Information Network, "Uzbekistan: List of 14 Possible Political Prisoners Who Died in Jail, 5 Disappearances and 505 Possible Political Prisoners," at www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/links/uzrt916.html.<br /><br />4. Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, Khilafa, quoted in Alima Bissenova, "Hizb al-Tahrir Political Thought from the Pan-Islamic Perspective," paper presented at the 8th Annual Convention of the Association for Study of Nationalities, New York, April 2003, p. 6.<br /><br />5. Al-Mawardi, The Ordinances of Government (United Kingdom: Garnett Publishing, 1996). An-Nabhani based his judgment on the work of Al-Mawardi, the first Islamic scholar who decreed the necessity of establishing the Caliphate. See Bissenova, "Hizb al-Tahrir Political Thought from the Pan-Islamic Perspective," pp. 8-11.<br /><br />6. "Hizb-ut-Tahrir na `Svobode,'" (Hizb-ut-Tahrir at Radio Liberty); Vremia Po (Almaty, Kazakhstan), July 22, 2001; interview with Vitaly Ponomarev, coordinator of Central Asian program of the Moscow human rights group Memorial, available at FBIS.<br /><br />7. Alisher Khamidov, "Countering the Call: The U.S., Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Religious Extremism in Central Asia," draft, Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, April 2003.<br /><br />8. Ahmed Rashid, "Asking for Holy War," at iiccas.org/englsih/enlibrary/libr_22_11_00_1.htm.<br /><br />9. Michael R. Fischbach, "Biography of Taqyy al-Din an-Nabhani," in Phillip Mattar, ed., Encyclopedia of the Palestinians, at www.palestineremembered.com/Haifa/Ijzim/Story819.html.<br /><br />10. "While in Baghdad, al-Husseini aided the pro-Nazi revolt of 1941. He then spent the rest of World War II as Hitler's special guest in Berlin, advocating the extermination of Jews in radio broadcasts to the Middle East and recruiting Balkan Muslims for the infamous SS `mountain divisions' that tried to wipe out Jewish communities throughout the region." See "Who was the Grand Mufti, Haj Muhammed Amin al-Husseini?" at www.palestinefacts.org/pf_mandate_grand_mufti.php.<br /><br />11. Hashem Kassem, "Hizb- ut-Tahrir al Islami" (The Islamic Liberation Party), 2002, at www.eastwestrecord.com/get_articles.asp?articleid=219.<br /><br />12. Ibid.<br /><br />13. Fischbach, "Biography of Taqyy al-Din an-Nabhani."<br /><br />14. Ahmed Rashid, "Asking for Holy War," at iiccas.org/englsih/enlibrary/libr_22_11_00_1.htm.<br /><br />15. Personal interview with Husain Haqqani, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2003.<br /><br />16. Hizb ut-Tahrir, "The Reasons for the Establishment of Hizb ut-Tahrir," at www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english.<br /><br />17. Compare V. I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done (New York: International Publishers, 1988), pp. 111-113 and 122-123 on legal work, and pp. 126-129 on the spread of illegal cells and activities.<br /><br />18. Alexei Malashenko, "Musul'mane v nachale veka: Nadezhdy & ugrozy" (Muslims in the beginning of the century: Hopes and threats), Moscow Carnegie Center Working Paper No. 7, 2002, pp. 5-6.<br /><br />19. Sidik Aukbur, "The True Meaning of Jihad," Khilafah, May 2003, at www.khilafah.com/home/category.php?DocumentID=7059&TagID24.<br /><br />20. "Alliance with America Is a Capital Crime Prohibited by Islam," Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet, September 18, 2001, at www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org.<br /><br />21. "Alliance with America Is a Capital Crime Prohibited by Islam," Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet, September 18, 2001, at www.khilafah.com/home/category_list.php?<br /><br />22. Hizb ut-Tahrir, "America and Britain Declare War Against Islam and the Muslims," communiqu? October 14, 2001, at www.khilafah.com/home/category.php?DocumentID=2428&TagID=3.<br /><br />23. Ibid.<br /><br />24. Hizb-ut Tahrir Britain, "An Open Letter from Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain to the Iraqi Opposition Groups Conferring in Their Conference in London," December 13, 2002, at www.islamic-state.org/leaflets/021213_OpenLetterToIraqiOppositionConfLondon.pdf.<br /><br />25. Ahmed Rashid, "Asking for Holy War," International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, at iicas.org/english/enlibrary/libr_22_11_00_1.htm.<br /><br />26. "The Method of Hizb ut-Tahrir," at english.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/definition/messages.htm.<br /><br />27. Hashem Kassem, "Hizb- ut-Tahrir al Islami."<br /><br />28. "The Method of Hizb ut-Tahrir" (italics added).<br /><br />29. Ibid.<br /><br />30. Ibid.<br /><br />31. Ibid. (bullet points added).<br /><br />32. "U.S. Interests in the Central Asian Republics," Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 12, 1998, at commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0f.htm.<br /><br />33. Ariel Cohen, "U.S. Interests in Central Asia," testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific , March 17, 1999, at www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/Test031799.cfm.<br /><br />34. Ahmed Rashid, "Reviving the Caliphate," chapter 6 of Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 119.<br /><br />35. "Hizb ut-Tahrir Announces the Death of Its Ameer," at www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/leaflets/leaflet4.htm.<br /><br />36. Rashid, "Reviving the Caliphate," p. 135. Under the auspices of the Taliban, representatives of Hizb attended meetings in Kabul, Afghanistan, in which the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Al-Qaeda also participated.<br /><br />37. Ibid., pp. 135-136.<br /><br />38. Personal interview with a source who requests not to be identified, April 2003.<br /><br />39. Union of Councils Central Asian Information Network, "Uzbekistan: List of 14 Possible Political Prisoners Who Died in Jail, 5 Disappearances and 505 Possible Political Prisoners."<br /><br />40. "Uzbekistan: Harassment Before EBRD Annual Meeting," Human Rights Watch, May 2, 2003, at www.hrw.org/press/2003/05/uzbek050203.htm; see also "Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Uzbekistan," Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, May 1, 2003, at hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/uzbek050103-bck.htm.<br /><br />41. "Muslim Clerics Visit U.S.," Caspian Business News, December 16, 2002, p. 12, at www.caspianbusinessnews.com/NewSite/preview/sections/regional/docs/16-12-2002.pdf. However, USAID, which is funding visits to the U.S. by Central Asian clergy so they can learn how Islam functions in a democracy, should be careful not to expose them to U.S.-based Wahhabis, who are actively abusing the democratic system.<br /><br />42. Ariel Cohen, "Promoting Freedom and Democracy: Fighting the War of Ideas Against Islamic Terrorism," Comparative Strategy, June 2003, forthcoming.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-65108526836312424902008-03-31T20:58:00.001-07:002008-03-31T20:58:58.534-07:00On the Status, Method and Fallout of the Global Spread of WahhabismTRANSCRIPT: DR. SULAYMAN NYANG<br /><br />On the Status, Method and Fallout of the Global Spread of Wahhabism<br />An interview with Professor Sulayman Nyang<br /><br />DR. NYANG: The second point that you know which I think is very critical – so these are common grounds whether they are Muslims from India, Africa, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine – it doesn’t matter…<br /><br />The second point that I think is critical for Muslims in the United States and all over the world is to recognize the fact that in order for them to succeed in doing da`wah, and in promoting the word of Allah (swt) and the example of Prophet Muhammad (s) – they have to like each other, otherwise you cannot be impressive. How you going [to] tell a Christian or a Yahudi (Jew) or non-believer that Islam is very full when he can see that you don’t like your other Muslim brother. It doesn’t<br />make sense. You cannot be effective. The only way you can be effective is to prove to him or her –that listen – I disagree with my brother – just like in your own family you can disagree with your brother or your sister… So it’s just a difference of opinion. So this way the person looking at you will say ah ha, this person does not only have a message but he also has an example in himself or herself, and these two points are very critical…<br /><br />Q: How do one implement this here between the various organizations? Because this is the main issue. We don’t disagree with each other on the general level. For example when I sit with Dr. Muzammil Siddiqi or this one or with that one, you see that there is a mutual understanding. When it goes high to the – [person[] sitting on [top of] his organization, then the whole idea changes.<br /><br />DR. NYANG: You see, this is where the structures work against unity. Because the structures are institutionalization of narrow interests, you see, and then you see this is where the external forces become dangerous and this is what I keep telling the Muslims in America - if the Muslims are genuinely interested in planting the seeds of Islam in America they should not allow themselves to be controlled by the forces outside them. Like what you are saying… people will do things Islamically if it advances their interest. What does Islam do for me instead of what can I do for<br />Islam? That’s where we started the conversation. The external forces, sometimes governments, sometimes international Muslim organizations abroad – they feel that they can manipulate groups….<br /><br />Q: They have such bad ideas about Tasawwuf [Sufism]; … they brainwash them … that Tasawwuf is shirk (associating partners with Allah), so anyone that has a Sufi background – they come against him without trying to know why …because they learned that Tasawwuf is not existing in Islam, which is incorrect. So that’s what …many Muslims are facing in the United States. But in our countries if you say that you are of this Tariqa [spiritual path] or that Tariqa, they will be happy!<br /><br />TRANSCRIPT: DR. SULAYMAN NYANG<br />PAGE 2 OF 13<br /><br />On Wahhabization of the Islamic movement<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yeah, now you see what is happening– if you look at the intellectual history, the social history of the Muslim organizations in America, you can see the reason why this is the case. And again it’s because many of these people – if you take the MSA, which we started when we just came here. It started in ’64. I came maybe one year later after they started [with] Ahmad Sakr, and all the others.<br />You have three elements who were instrumental in bringing about the MSA. You have those people from the subcontinent who were followers of Mawlana Maududi. Anis Ahmad and all those people – Iqbal Yunus, and all those people. Then you have people who came from the Arab world who would identify with the Ikwan al-Muslimoon [Muslim Brotherhood]. You know, Abu Gideri, Tijani. We’re neighbors, you can name their names. And then those who came from Iran, who were the followers of Ayatollah Khoei, people like Mosadeq; [or the one] who became foreign minister after the [Iranian Islamic] Revolution - people like Ibrahim Yazdi. Those elements, they were students here. These groups, the followers of Ayatollah Khoei, those from Najaf in Iraq; the followers of Mawlana Maududi; and the followers of Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al- Banna and the Ikhwan [al-Muslimoon] – they were the ones who started the MSA in America.<br /><br />Many of those people, they have a version of Islam – even though Maududi himself has<br />some Tasawwuf connections, but they became very rigid in terms of their Islam, and to<br />some extent many of them had to deal with the Salafi people. So they turned against<br />Tasawwuf.<br /><br />…If one is to really write an article about American Muslims’ resistance to Tasawwuf, you have to trace the roots back to this. And then you see what happened is – because of the politics in Arab world, at the time these people were coming in, those people who were followers of Ayatollah Khoei – they were opposed to the Ba`ath Party in Iraq and Syria. So naturally those kids, our generation, they were older, I was the young… Many of those …so the Ba`athists were opposed by these Muslims, because in the 50’s and 60’s most of the Arab kids I went to school with in America<br />were secular…. They were Muslims, but Islam was not seen as progressive, because they<br />were all Arab nationalists – [saying,] “Nasser, Nasser, Nasser. “ That was the other thing.<br /><br />So the Ikhwan people were very marginalized among the Arab intellectual groups. And<br />those people who were followers of Ayatollah Khoei from Iraq and Iran, they were also<br />marginalized, because these were young Arab, Iranian, Pakistani, Indian Muslims who were Islamic.<br /><br />We used to pray – there are a lot of people I know, now many of them are active, but when we were students, many of them from Africa, and many from Pakistan – they didn’t want to pray. Many of them now, they are very active. And…their kids are now going to college. In those days they were just what I called “grasshopper” Muslims.<br />I want to say why Tasawwuf was rejected: most of those [Muslims] were secular…and…they came back to Islam after the Iranian Revolution. Many of them, they have kids, they’re now professionals in America. They moved from secularism into Islam. And the kind of Islam they know is ISNA. And the other thing – they come back from being grasshoppers to being ‘regular’ Muslims.<br /><br />Two things have taken place – in the Arab world, in the Muslim world. You have the Iranian Revolution – many of them were now beginning to be attacked by the non-Muslims for being Muslims. So even if you are a secularized Muslim, you are still attacked. And the Iranians learned the hard way. Even if you are a secular Iranian, because you are Iranian you are going to be attacked. So many of them now began to realize their Muslim identity. And this coincided with the oil embargo in the Arab world, and the rise of Saudi Arabia.<br /><br />So, you see, because Maududi and the Ikhwan al-Muslimoon people were supported by<br />the Arab Gulf States in Saudi Arabia. That’s why you have many of these people who are leaders now in Southern California here – they were living in the Arab world. They were doctors in the Arab world, they made money in Kuwait and in Saudi Arabia… because they fled from Egypt, from Nasser’s air forces. They went to Saudi Arabia, they helped King Faisal and King Khalid.<br /><br />Many of them made money, and then they came to America. They became very active in<br />Islamic work here. Those people now, while they were refugees from Nasser in Saudi<br />Arabia, in Qatar – they became Wahhabis. So if you’re really trying to understand the root of these anti-Tasawwuf [concepts], you have to [study]… the intellectual history and the social history of the Muslim groups.<br /><br />So those people who were Maududi supporters, those people who were Ayatollah Khoei<br />supporters, and those people who were supporters of the Ikhwan al-Muslimoon, who<br />became refugees in Saudi Arabia, they became influenced by the Wahhabis. And when<br />they came to America and they started doing da`wah they were getting money from Saudi<br />Arabia. So those people, they opposed Tasawwuf. That’s the intellectual history of what happened.<br /><br />On why American Islamist groups reject traditional Islam<br /><br />Q: …This is what MSA [and] those who put MSA together at the beginning [believe] – but now we are seeing more Muslims coming, immigrants …[who] know their backgrounds.<br />[Is it not correct] that the majority of them practice Tasawwuf?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: And they practice Islamic beliefs like Mawlid an-Nabi (birthday of Prophet Muhammad), like salaam; like praising [the Prophet (s)]; like na’at and so on [sending salams on the Prophet, praising him, and reciting beautiful poetry and ballads in praise of him]. If the MSA had that idea at the beginning and [among the] new people [who] are coming – is this [rejection of these an] effect of the old leaders of MSA still influencing the new generation?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: No, no, no. That’s why when you say the silent majority – they come from Muslim countries where you have Tasawwuf already [established]. So there’s a gap between the elites who have been influenced, as I described, and the masses… There’s a gap there. <br /><br />Most Muslim countries have been exposed to Tasawwuf – that’s a fact in our intellectual history. There is not a single Muslim country where Islam went without the Tasawwuf people.<br /><br />Q: And that Tasawwuf was a blessing that had helped to spread Islam…?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes, of course, that’s the way it happened all over the Islamic world. Of course, you know, some of our ulema (religious scholars), some of our people now, especially the Salafi and the Wahhabi intellectuals will say, “Well these were distortions of Islam because the march of Muslim traders and scholars who were going to these countries in Malaysia, in Indonesia, in Africa, in Central Asia – they had to deal with the culture, so they compromised with the culture.” But I think that’s false.<br /><br />Q: Yeah, because as you see, Ibn Taymiyya has clearly supported Tasawwuf … the correct Tasawwuf.<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: Which implements the state of ihsan? [“Ihsan” is a state of closeness to Allah Almighty about which the Prophet (s) said, “It is to worship Allah as if you see Him, and if you do not see Him, He indeed sees you.”]<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes. <br /><br />Q: And many of the Sufis, like Abu Yazid al-Bistami, like Rabi’a al-Adawiyya, Sulayman ad-Durrani [are mentioned by] Ibn Taymiyya [in] two volumes [about that] in his Fatawa, volumes 10 and 11 on Tasawwuf, and the necessity of Tasawwuf. And [Ibn Taymiyya] was a Qadiri himself?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: So, if we relate to what you said that the traders who conducted business in Central Asia or the Far East or Subcontinents – for their culture to compromise with the culture of the people there… we also find in the Islamic tradition that different scholars, like Ibn Taymiyya, [were] Sufi, who now … are being studied…?<br />DR. NYANG: Yes, that’s right, that’s right.<br /><br />Q: Even Imam Nawawi was a Sufi. Even Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani [and] Al-Haythami [were]<br />Sufi. As-Subki was a Sufi, Adh-Dhahabi, … were Sufi. <br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: The Four Schools of Islam…<br /><br />DR. NYANG: The major thinkers, yes. They all have Sufi ancestry.<br /><br />Q: Dr. Nyang, in your opinion – how we can … bring unity? Because we don’t want clashes between the ummah [Muslims of the world], especially in America…<br /><br />DR. NYANG: No, no.<br /><br />On clearing up the false understanding of Tasawwuf<br /><br />Q: How can we clear up the MSA understanding about Tasawwuf, that it is not something<br />other than Islam, but it is [part of] Islam?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes, this is where the dialogue has to be initiated. And I think two processes must take place. One is, there must be dialogue with the elites – not all of them will come. Some of them, they have vested interests. Because, see, if you are a Muslim in America and you are getting money from Saudi Arabia – I don’t expect you to… – you may know the truth but you will not come, because your interest is linked… They’re not going to accept that because they feel that if they do it, they will destroy their sources of funding. So those people, you don’t dismiss them. You still maintain the door open. Keep the door open, because their<br />circumstances could change, you know what I’m saying. They may fall out with the Saudis or whoever that is, and because you did not snub them or close the door against them, they may turn around and say, “Well you know brother you are right, what you were saying is correct.”<br /><br />I mean, self interest misguided them. It’s not that they don’t have the intellectual understanding - this is a human being, you know that. I mean if you have a son and he falls in love with a girl, because he sees her and he likes her, and we say, “That’s not good for you,” he’s not going to listen... Because that’s his interest. You see what I’m saying. Now, until he has intellectual conversion that what he wants – if he wants to buy a car, you tell him, “Don’t buy this car, it’s not good for you” – but if he’s emotionally attached to that car, you cannot tell him anything. Now, until he is influenced by an intellectual understanding that<br />“this is not good for me”, then you see that, “what daddy was saying or my friend was saying was correct”… Your interest blinds you to reality, you cannot see it.<br />There are people like that, those people who have vested interest in the way the Wahhabi hierarchy in Saudi Arabia doles out money to them. And that’s not only in America – it’s …all over the world. You see Rabita people – they give money to them. Those people are not going to accept. Intellectually they know that what you are saying is correct, but they are not going to accept it. You see this in every area, with politics and everything else… Once you know this, you understand their behavior. <br /><br />That’s of course, in knowledge, what we call the sociology of knowledge. Because you have higher interests that affects the manner in which human beings respond to knowledge; because of their interests.<br /><br />The Wahhabi – [and] people who are inspired by the Wahhabi, or influenced by the<br />Wahhabi – will never accept Tasawwuf, even if they are intellectually convinced about the validity and the strength of Tasawwuf because of their material interest. And this is very clear in the United States. So, that dialogue – you don’t shut the door, don’t close the door to them. You keep the door ajar, and if they want to come and dialogue, fine. If I see you [I say], “salaamu ’alaykum brother, how are you doing?” I will be very nice to you. That’s between you and me as a brother Muslim. Khalas [finished].<br /><br />On the causes for the rejection of Tasawwuf<br /><br />Q: Can I ask a question? As you are a professor in these issues, and you have more vision on these subjects, tell us why then this ideology - if they know that it is correct, and Tasawwuf has been correct all the time, and we know that now in Saudi Arabia, or in this country especially… the silent majority is Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama’at and few are not from Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama’at - why then, since they know this, is there that fear of the word “Tasawwuf”? What is in their heart that they are so irritated when the issue of Tasawwuf comes up?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: You know, the thing is this: I was a diplomat in Saudi Arabia in the 70’s, twenty-two years ago... What I observed over there in Saudi Arabia, is the fact that the Saudi ruling family itself is not united on this issue of Wahhabism.<br /><br />Q: Yes, that is correct. They have nothing to do with it, they don’t [even] care for it.<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes, you see what has happened is at one point in time, their father or grandfather, Abdul Aziz, was able to use the Ikhwan, which grew out of the movement created by, you know, like the amir, you know, so-called Saudi Greats, and Muhammad ibn Saud, [and] Abdul Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. That alliance between the crown and the pen, you know, in Saudi Arabia, has led to the Aali-Shaykh family...You see, and the Al- Saud family. That’s why the Aali-Shaykh, you know that very well, Aali-Shaykh family becomes the Minister of Education since the beginning of the kingdom.<br /><br />On rejection of Wahhabism in its homeland<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Now, what has happened really is the royal family may not care about Wahhabism any more. Because this is one of the reasons why – if you go to Riyadh or Jeddah, you take a taxi, they still listen to music. Whereas Wahhabis used to say, “no music.” [You see] cigars... They put it on TV. If they are Wahhabis, they are opposed to that. In the past, no music in Saudi Arabia. You see, you can see that even among the royal family, this old idea of Wahhabism, rigid Wahhabism, is fading away.<br /><br />OK, the silent majority, the first they are Ahl Jama’at was-Sunnah, that’s what they are in Saudi Arabia, especially in Hijaz. People they do Mawlid an-Nabi in Medina. [They celebrate the Prophet’s birthday, listen to music, smoke cigars, all of which is outlawed by Wahhabis.]<br /><br />Q: In Medina and Makkah?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes!<br /><br />Q: Jeddah, everywhere?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: They do! So the reality is really that the elites have a vested interest in keeping the facade – it’s all facade – there is no substance to it in Saudi Arabia. It’s facade because, you see, the prestige internationally depends on Wahhabism. The great irony in Saudi Arabia is that Wahhabism is more important as a tool of foreign policy than as an instrument of internal government policy. You see what I am saying! This is what is happening. And if we recognize this reality, we will know how to deal with them. You see where there is a political issue – because, you see they would like to use this political issue for international propaganda.<br />And you have some groups now from overseas who have a vested interest in clinging on to that. You see, because the groups that are in America, if they get money from the<br />Wahhabi’s government, they re-enforce the external policy, even though, domestically they didn’t have much substance to it. You see what I’m saying? This is where politics comes in, and it has nothing to do with Islam or anything else. It’s just mere power and how to get power and keep power.<br /><br />On Wahabi incitement to violence in Africa<br /><br />Q: And that’s what we see now – I’d like your opinion on another matter, also. Now we see that in many African countries like Kenya, Senegal, Djibouti, Somalia – they begin big fights and clashes between the Muslims. …We are seeing that Muslims are fighting each other there, because the majority there are following Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama’at and following Tasawwuf, because this is how they grew up. [Is this indeed correct?]<br /><br />DR. NYANG: That’s right.<br /><br />Q: And now with this new ideology that’s coming in from the Wahhabis – you are finding that this is going… clashes are increasing?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: We have some – one of our brothers sent me letters, that …in many masajid (mosques), there have been many killings there for who will be in authority between the Wahhabis or still in the hands of the Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama’at.<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes… I can understand this, you see because you have the so called the Islamic Party of Kenya. What’s his name again? You know, Ahmed Bilala. The problem you have, you know, in the Kenyan case, you have in Mombasa, you have many of those people – they call them – Europeans call them Afro-Arabs. These are people from Hadramut, you know, who migrated to Africa two hundred years ago, they settled, they intermarried with local people. People of Nazariya… You know, and others… So you have these people in Pimba, in Malindi, and you know, like and in Mombasa area.<br /><br />Those coastal city-states of Muslims have been there for almost about 800 years. Those families of Muslims, many of them historically came from Oman, or Hadramaut, and some other areas in Yemen. Now, some of them were Shi’a, but most of them were Sunni, Ahl as-Sunnah. So they settled in that region.<br /><br />In recent times what has happened is when the Rabita began to fight on behalf of the<br />Saudi family with Nasserites, they were looking for allies in the region. And these groups of people became actively involved. So these Wahhabis had their own people. You see, so those people, they get money. If you are an imam in Mombasa, for example, and the Rabita sends you a check - in Africa it’s a lot of money. They send them about $800 a month. It’s a lot of money over there. In America it’s nothing. Over there it’s a lot of money. So, you are on the payroll of Rabita. They send you $800 every month. I mean, it makes you live a middle-class lifestyle in Kenya. So, you are an imam and you know every month you get a check and then you may even be member of the Global Islamic Council of Imams or Mosques.<br /><br />They have a mosque in Saudi Arabia. Every year you go for this annual meeting of imams from around the world. And you meet there – you meet all the people from Pakistan, from Thailand, from Malaysia. You can then go for `umra [the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca]. It gives you prestige in your community. Because you see, they say the imam is going to see the Imam of Mecca. That’s prestige, you see, it’s prestige. The newspaper will say that Imam Ahmed Abdullah will be going to Mecca to attend the Global Council of Masjids (mosques).<br /><br />Prestige. If we have money, you do it in America, too… If they get an invitation, they come from Kenya, yea I’m going to America to join the Muslims. You see? Prestige for them. That’s what’s happening! This is what is happening! So those guys, they got caught up in this international network of Wahhabis, so when they come to Kenya, they will fight anybody who talks Tasawwuf…<br /><br />Even though in Saudi Arabia, the royal family is not united on Wahhabism anymore. These people are more holier than thou. Ha ha ha. This is what is happening! Politicization of Islam. And the creation of the profit motive in sectarianism. See what I’m saying? It becomes commercial.<br /><br />What you were saying earlier in the conversation. People will say, “What can I get from this Islam?” Islam now is good for them, it’s modernized. You see what I am saying? This is what is happening…?<br /><br />On how the Ikhwan al-Muslimoon and Wahabi interests became linked<br /><br />Q: What is your future vision of Islam in the world, Professor Nyang? With the power of money and political influence, will ideology overcome the whole world and become the effecting factor on Islamic belief? And will the belief of Muslims through fourteen hundred years be changed slightly toward the new ideology of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: No, I don’t think so. I don’t think so. You see, fortunately for Muslims – fortunately, I say this – the Saudis don’t have the intellectual ability to do that. If they had the intellectual ability, we’d be in serious trouble. You see, they don’t have the same intellectual clout that the Egyptians had under Nasser. You see, when Nasser… you see, if you look at what happened – in fact, I’ve been trying to encourage some of my students to write – one of the Egyptians scholars who retired from my department said he might write a book or, he said, will get me a grant – then I can write a book… I would like to get one of the graduate<br />students, you know, to really, to investigate this. Because, you see, I have written some articles about it, but I think it should be investigated thoroughly and a book should be written. And that is – because this will deal with the question that you are raising.<br /><br />The intellectual impact of what the late Malcolm Kerr, who was killed in Lebanon …he was the president of American University of Beirut… Malcolm Kerr wrote a book called The Arab Cold War... The royal families like the Wahhabis and King Faisal, King Hussein and all that… then later between the Hashemites and the Nasserites, and then, of course, later on it took a different character between the Saudis – Riyadh and Cairo. Because, you see, because of the tension that was going on between Nasser and his advocacy of radical Arab republicanism on the one hand and the traditional Arab monarchists – that tension between the two forces led to the migration of many<br />Muslim intellectuals from the Ihkwan to the Gulf countries.<br /><br />You know, in my research, which I wrote a long time ago, I wrote this paper many years ago “Saudi Foreign Policy in Africa,” which was published almost 20 years ago now. I mean, the argument I made there – some of the things I’m telling you now, I wrote that long …ago in that article.<br /><br />What happened really was when King Saud was fighting – at first, Saud was close to<br />Nasser, but then, because Saud was close to America and Nasser was close to the Soviet Union – the Arabs were split ideologically between the supporters of America and the West and the supporters of Russia. Nasser became the leader of the republican radicals, and then the Saudi family was supported by America. So, many of the Egyptian intellectuals who were with the Ihkwan al-Muslimoon of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb migrated to Saudi Arabia. And they are the ones – the intellectuals – that’s why I told you that the Saudis don’t have the intellectual ability – they are the ones who helped the Saudi Arabians to establish what? Rabita.<br />The Rabita was created only to fight the Egyptians Nasserites. Because you have Tawfiq Awwiyla, you know, who was the head of the Majlis, the Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs in Egypt, which was the strongest weapon used by Nasser to penetrate Africa and Asia. <br /><br />And Nasser gave scholarships to Pakistanis, Malaysians – at that time, Malaysia was not strong as it is today –and they were all going to Egypt, at Al-Azhar University, to study. And then the Saudis, benefiting from the Egyptian intellectuals, people like Mahmoud Tawfiq… [who] all went to Riyadh and they created the Rabita. And the Egyptians, the Lebanese, and the Syrians and Iraqi intellectuals who were Ikhwanis – they fled to Saudi Arabia. And they’re the ones who created the intellectual infrastructure for the royal family in Saudi Arabia.<br /><br />So, you have the Majlis in Egypt and you have the Rabita. And the Rabita would now<br />become a very important instrument for the royal family in Saudi Arabia, not only to fight the Nasserites, but to expand Saudi influence in the Muslim world. Then the Saudis’ businessmen, the Alureesha, Alamoodi, al-Wajhi, al-Suleyman, you know, al-Dilal – all those different families that are in Riyadh and in Jeddah – the Hijazis – they put their money together and they established Jami`at Abdul Aziz University, which was a private university, but then, later on, taken over. Because of the rivalry between the Egyptians and the Saudis, that private university became… It’s been widely written about. So when you talk about how Wahabi thought became dominant, this Saudi influence – they didn’t have intellectual know-how.<br /><br />You see, there are a lot of Saudis now who are educated – many of them are my students. They come to my classes. I have trained many Saudis. They went back now to Saudi Arabia. Some of them are big. But this is the problem. They don’t have the intellectual ability. If they had they had the intellectual ability of the Syrians, or the Egyptians, or the Lebanese, or to a certain extent the Tunisians or Moroccans, maybe they would be able to influence the world. But the Saudis don’t<br />have that.<br /><br />On Bilal Philips<br /><br />Q: Don’t you think through Rabita and through scholarships that they are giving in thousands and thousands and they are teaching the people in Medina and Mecca and Riyadh, and these people return to their countries as Bilal Phillips did, or …?<br />DR. NYANG: Hah! Bilal Phillips and all those guys!<br /><br />Q: Because I hear …people in Sri Lanka … have big problems there because Bilal Phillips was there and many others from Saudi Arabia were there, and beginning to make…<br />DR. NYANG: Attack.<br /><br />Q: Attack the whole belief [system] of Sri Lankan Muslims, because of their belief in<br />Tasawwuf?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: And then they are bringing now this new issue about the Muslims and they are supporting the government, so the government gave them the authority to run masajids [mosques]?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Ah! Now you’re talking. This is the politicization. This is what’s happening. This is what is happening. You see, now, you see this is the thing. This is why we have to analyze these things and you understand the political forces at work. Then you have a global understanding. See, what has to happen, really, is that the people, you know, who are committed to Tasawwuf have to recognize – they have to do this analysis. What we are doing now, they have to do it systematically, so they have a very solid intellectual understanding of what is on the ground, you see?<br /><br />Now… Bilal Philips, of course, you know, he left Saudi Arabia. He was there – he was with Dar al-Ifta. You know, Shaykh Bin Baz. He was a protégé of Shaykh Bin Baz. And Shaykh Bin Baz gave him thousands… hundreds of thousands of dollars from them… He’s a very young man, you know, like he went there and you know, ostensibly to study Arabic, and he did study Arabic very well. You have Imam Muhammad ibn Saud University in Riyadh and – so he became a protégé of Shaykh Bin Baz. Bin Baz has a lot of money so he gave him a lot of money, you know.<br /><br />When they had those problems with so-called “Islamic fundamentalists” in Saudi Arabia –that was when the secular forces – because in Saudi Arabia you have a strong group of people who were – they call them the Southern California Mafia. These are Saudi Arabians who are secular nationalists, and they are still here in America. And they went back home –they’re not interested in Tasawwuf, they’re not interested in Wahhabism – they’re interested in Saudi nationalism. Many of them were Ba`athists or Nasserites, and these guys – they saw people like Bilal Philips as troublemakers, because they are encouraging the radicals. That’s why they kicked him out – so he went to Dubai. That’s why he went to Dubai, and that’s why he ended up in the Philippines – even married to a Filipino girl…<br /><br />The thing is this, you see, the people who were Ahl at-Tasawwuf… must have an intellectual understanding of what is happening. Like we are doing now – what’s happening globally. And then you develop strategies.<br /><br />You see, in Sri Lanka, you’re right… with the Saudis. Because those people who are locals – they have their personal interests, what can Islam do for me in Sri Lanka? So those imams, those khatibs, and all those people in the masajids who have vested interests – they know that they may be outnumbered locally by the people who follow Tasawwuf, but they could use their government, where the government in Sri Lanka is now faced with a problem. You know, they have a problem with the… in Jafna and all those places in Sri Lanka. So what they try to do now is that – the Muslims are the middle group. The Sinhalese and the Tamil fight.<br /><br />The Muslims, they cut both groups. You have some Muslims who are Sinhalese, some who are Tamils. So the Muslims are the brokers between the two groups. So the leadership, who are mainly Sinhalese anyway in Sri Lanka – they would like the Muslims to be on their side. And if that is the case, the Muslims who are now struggling for power among themselves – those who are opposed to the Sufis, they try to get the Saudis to bring money to the Sri Lankans. That’s the game that they’re playing! So you see, if I want to win against the Sufis in Sri Lanka, I’d form<br />two alliances. I’d form an alliance with the Wahhabis, and I’d form an alliance with the government. And I’d tell my Wahhabi friends, “Send money to these guys, because they are fighting the war against the Tamils.” You see what I’m saying? And this way they benefit. This is what’s happening.<br /><br />So what has to happen really – they will not succeed. Because you know the Arab intellectual history. In the early part of Islam, when the Mu’tazila became dominant – the Khalifa tried to use state power to repress all the other groups. Is that true? But they did not succeed. They lost out.<br /><br />You see, they lost out. The disciples of Imam al-Ash`ari eventually won. The same thing is going to happen. Don’t worry about them.<br /><br />On correcting the Muslims understanding of doctrine<br /><br />DR. NYANG: The most important thing is to build structures. That’s why America becomes a very important theatre here. What has to happen here is the people who are interested in really promoting Islam and away from these government structures that have narrow blinders, you plant the seeds here among the young people. Get people like Shihab, Muhammad Zain and others. Get the… Pass it around. Give them the information.<br /><br />Q: How do you give them the information?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Well, books like this is one [Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine]. And then you organize seminars. And then you begin to create catalysts – you have regional seminars, you have annual seminars, conference – annual conference, regional seminars – East Coast, West Coast, southern part like Florida. And then you also begin to create catalysts for da’wah and reinforcement. Then you have dialogue. Because you see, in order for the Muslim groups that are genuinely interested in promoting Islam – they have to do da’wah and dialogue. But these are two different strategies.<br /><br />Da’wah is to teach those people who are within the community more about Islam, and to make sure that the division which is incurred is minimized. And at the same time to educate non-Muslims about Islam… Not every Muslim can dialogue with Nassaranis or Yahudis, no. You have to be secure. See, I feel adequate to dialogue with hristians, because if I sit down with Christians, I may know more about Christianity than they do. Because I have read their classical works. I know what their scholars have said. So when I sit down with them, I talk to them, and I tell them what their scholars have said. And I tell them what we Muslims believe in, and what our scholars have said, and then we’ll dialogue. Let’s talk, let’s find common ground. It’s because we live in America here.<br /><br />You will need to educate them. So they will go and they say, “Wow, now we have” – you know, if you are dialoguing with them, they say, “Yeah, … He’s secure as a Muslim, but he’s willing to dialogue with us.” Those people now you make them your emissaries. Because when they go and they talk with their own people, they will be ambassadors there. Because the ideas you leave with them, they will talk. But if you just put your stuff out like Muslims who are in their cocoon… these are kuffars [unbelievers]. What kind of message is that? If you don’t like kuffar why are you here? Go back to your Muslim world!<br /><br />People like Saddam Hussein are no good? Ha ha ha. I go every week to Muslims – every week I am speaking to Muslims. Last weekend this time, I was in Dayton, Ohio, and in Youngstown, Ohio. <br /><br />Q: One question … how far did you, here and there what you have discussed with other groups, but have these subjects about Tasawwuf and so on, have they been discussed or questioned…?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: The only – in fact that’s why I wrote an article one time – the ISNA people published one, because I write a lot of things and I give them. Omar Abdullah, who is the editor of the Horizon, he lives in Virginia there – when they called me, Khalid Griggs from The Message people in New York – they call me once in a while – when they want articles they call you. I just look up some of the things I have and I send it to them, and then they can publish what they want.<br /><br />But the question of Tasawwuf has not come up in the way we are discussing. It always<br />comes in the context of – they don’t deal with genuine Tasawwuf – they deal with what I call “distorted Tasawwuf” - you know, what I call “popcorn Sufis”… I coined this term 15 years ago. Because there’s a white American lady who is the head of a museum in Washington, D.C., and her sister called her one day – that’s how the name ‘popcorn Sufi’ came up. And she had a sister somewhere in the Western part of the United States here, I think in Oregon or Washington state or somewhere else, and she called her sister and said, “Guess what, guess what”. Her sister said, “Guess what, what’s happening?”… [they have a group] holding hands and saying “Allah, Allah, Allah”, and she’s not a Muslim – then she must be a ‘popcorn Sufi’.<br /><br />So you see, that trivialization of Tasawwuf has become the major instrument they use<br />against the Muslims, I mean against Muslims who are with Tasawwuf. Because this is the kind of Tasawwuf … they see in the United States. People who are followers of these different groups. And in California, there are many of them. If you go to the library, you look at the Encyclopedia of Religion in the United States and you look under Islam or Sufism, you look at the index – you will see these different groups. You know, they have these different groups. So this is where the problem is – you have these different who don’t really – like the Ibn al-Arabi Society, they may have their own journal…Sufis of the West and all these different groups… <br /><br />Now what has to happen, and this is where it has to be done, without being divisive – I think what has to be done very clearly, … You have to come out and say very clearly, we believe in Tasawwuf and we maintain our commitment to Tasawwuf in light of our commitment to ‘aqida of the Prophet (s), the Sunnah – we belong to Ahl as-Sunnah – you come out, and in a very conscious way separate yourself from ‘popcorn Sufis’. This way you solve the problem. They have to deal with you now intellectually – they cannot just marginalize you and put you there, because they now know that you are not a ‘popcorn Sufi’…. So intellectually now you force them to be honest.<br /><br />On Islamic acceptability of Tasawwuf and Mawlid<br /><br />Q: Professor Sulayman Nyang, do you think that Tasawwuf is correct Islamically?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Well, yes – there are various references in the Qur’an which suggest that you have the mystical dimension of Islam. I mean, you know, we can see that very clearly. You know, when the people who are Salafi or Wahhabi reinterpret nafs ul-ammara bi su, nafs ullawwamma, nafs ul-mutma’iyna, they may interpret these concepts in their own relative manner – but they cannot deny the fact that these are stages in the spiritual evolution of insan [humankind]. They cannot deny that.<br />And of course there are many other verses one can quote from the which suggest that there is that mystical understanding which is critical in the development of spiritual enlightenment and the elevation of the human being. You see that very clearly. In our intellectual tradition – Imam al-Ghazali is a classical example of someone who was well-grounded in terms of the intellectual currents of his time. But he was able to do what I just recommended. He was able to say, “OK listen, I don’t support some of these groups who are going one way.” And these people, you know, their intellectual practices deviate from our ‘aqida and the central beliefs we have. Now these other groups – I do not agree with them… That has to happen. That’s why I’m saying that this book [Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine] here will be part of that intellectual debate.<br /><br />Q: Insha’llah (God Willing). It has many references…<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes. What we have to discourage really is – and this is where as a minority we cannot afford it – we must reduce polemics in our community. You see, I can disagree with my brother, without going [to extremes]… Well, they call me Sufi! So I mean, you know, … these people call me Sufi anyway.<br /><br />Q: [Can you] say Sulayman Nyang accepts celebration of Milad an-Nabi (s)?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Well, I gave lectures to the Agha Khan people, celebrating Milad… So I would not have been there if I didn’t. So I mean the Agha Khan people will invite me to go and speak to them on Milad an-Nabi (S). And you know, interestingly enough, let me make just this point here – when I spoke in Toronto, lot of the Muslims who would not normally go to Agha Khan gatherings – hundreds of them, they came. They came! Many of the Muslims from Pakistan, because they know me, they know what I have written over the years, and they came…..<br /><br />But at least intellectually, I think they respect my opinion, to the point that many of these Pakistanis and Indian Muslims and Bangladeshis who knew my writings and who knew me personally, because I have spoken in their masajids in Canada before, you know, long before I was invited by the Agha Khan followers, the Isma’ilis in Toronto – so they came. And the Isma’ilis were very happy the other Muslims came to attend the event for the first time. So I mean, you know like, you have thousands – the whole place was packed. Over two thousand people – the whole convention place was packed full. You know, they had all their people, and I came, I spoke to them. Because the point is – my concern is they wanted me to talk on Islamic civilization. And of course the Agha Khan is very interested in architecture, and he has an award now – the “Agha Khan Award for Architecture”. The best building that resembles the<br />classical Islamic architecture constructed in any country, based on the reports of the judges, will be given an award. And they may get hundreds of thousands of dollars for that. That’s one of his contributions. And notice that King Fahd has also created one like that now…<br /><br />So I mean, this is the thing. They have done this, I mean the way I see it – the way I see myself intellectually – I want to be in a position to explain to Muslims their intellectual state of affairs. And I want to be a good ambassador of the Muslims to non-Muslims. So that when I meet Hindus, even the worst Hindu that doesn’t like us – when he meets me, he will walk away and say, “You know, I don’t like those Muslims, but I now know where they stand intellectually.”<br /><br />Ahh, then I have succeeded. I have done da’wah, because I have planted a seed in his mind, and with Allah’s blessing he could change his mind. This is what we have to do. This is the way I see it. Yeah, that’s how I see it.<br /><br />Q: If we can ask you for some articles…<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yeah, of course. I mean I can write whatever I like, you know like, I mean, you know, like in the areas that I am competent I will write articles.<br /><br />Q: We are launching a new magazine…The Muslim Magazine – Al-Muslimoon. The Board of the Advisory Committee are very well known people from here, overseas…<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Overseas, that’s good.<br /><br />Q: From al-Azhar, from Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan, Turkey, from here – and we are launching the first issue insha-Allah…lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-12829993820031973922008-03-31T20:44:00.000-07:002008-04-06T21:39:32.887-07:00200 Years of New Kharijism – The Ongoing Revision of Islam Islamic Supreme Council of America <br /><br />200 Years of New Kharijism: the Ongoing Revision of Islam<br />By Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani<br />Chairman, Islamic Supreme Council of America<br /><br />We live in a time when the enemies of Islam are attempting to destroy it from within.<br />Resourceful and determined, they announce new mode of leadership that pretends to restore the purity of the faith as a guise to gain the confidence of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The unwary observer is readily misled by their portrayal, which is eagerly disseminated by the media. In fact, it is these proponents of extremism who are themselves outside the realm of true Islam. “The Religion of God,” al-Khatib said, “lies between extremism and the laxity.”<br /><br />1.0 Prophetic Traditions<br /><br />The advent of these extremists was foretold by the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (s).<br />Prophet Muhammad’s authentic traditionsii detail for us the characteristics and behavior of the extremists, stating that their existence in our world would be revealed when “…the destitute (al-buhm) camel-herds compete in building tall structures,”iii or in another narration “…the barefoot, naked, indigent (al-‘âla) shepherds compete in building tall structures.”iv <br /><br />“…The barefoot and the naked are the heads of the people,”v or “…the barefoot and naked, the deaf and dumb are the kings of the earth.”vi<br /><br />“Barefoot and naked” and “deaf and dumb” are metaphors to describe in figurative<br />speech just how depraved the new leaders would be. “Barefoot and naked” relates to people of the desert, and implies their utter ignorance in matters pertaining to organized society.vii “Deaf and dumb” implies that they would fail to use common sense in anything concerning religion, though they are perfectly sound in mind and limb.viii Implied as well is the notion that the extremists’ ultimate goal is world domination, to be “kings of the earth.”<br /><br />The traditions reveal another of the signs of the extremists’ onset is “the affectation of eloquence by the rabble and their betaking to palaces in big ities.”ix <br /><br />Prophet Muhammad predicted a reversal in society whereby these depraved leaders would take over the rule of every region by force. They would become extremely rich and their primary concern would be to erect the tallest buildings, rather than maintain order or care for the common welfare.x<br /><br />2.0 A Reversal of Values<br /><br />Sadly, we have witnessed the realization of the Prophet’s prediction in the dominance of extremist ideology in the Middle East and its increasing influence in the West. Because of their influence and their reversal of values, we now see doctrinal, political, and physical wars of exclusion being waged everywhere in the name of Islam. In the United States, extremist ideologues have waged a fifty-year long campaign to exclude moderate, traditional Muslims from political arenas as well as the mosque. The effect has been to create the impression that the 200 Years of New Kharijism – The Ongoing Revision of Islam Islamic Supreme Council of America<br />extremists are the majority whereas they are simply the most vociferous, having made it more comfortable for the majority of Muslims to stay at home, away from their doctrinal wrangling.<br /><br />These two phenomena, depraved leadership and exclusionism, are the mainstays of<br />New Kharijism in our time. What clearer proof of this than what took place in Makka on November 20, 1979, when hundreds of armed men seized the Holy Mosque under the 36-year old Juhayman al-‘Utaybi and proclaimed him as the new leader of the country? They held the mosque for two weeks during which they practiced lewd sexual behavior with the women they held captive and those they had brought with them.<br /><br />According to the New York Times, “There were hundreds of casualties on both sides<br />before Saudi forces were able to drag out the last remnant of what by then was a bunch of filthy, bedraggled young men.” Al-‘Utaybi and sixty-three of the captured were later executed by public beheading. According to As Sayyid Yusuf al-Rifa‘i, these wild young people learned their ways from the same teacher as Abdel Aziz Ibn Baz (d. 2000), a famous Wahhabi scholar.<br /><br />3.0 The Original Khawârij<br /><br />Before we speak of the modern phenomenon of New Kharijism it is important to define<br />the principal constituents of Khariji doctrines. The name “Khawârij” was applied to those who, in the time of the Successors of the Companions to the Prophet (one generation after Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime), parted ways with other Muslims and declared them disbelievers, just as the followers of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, “Wahhabis” (also known as the “Salafis”), do today.xi<br /><br />The Khawârij or “Kharijites” were tens of thousands of Muslims mostly comprised of<br />Qur’an memorizors and devoted worshippers who prayed and fasted above the norm. Yet, they declared every one of the Companions and all who associated with them to be apostate disbelievers and took up arms against them. The practices of declaring Muslims apostate (takfîr/tashrîk) and taking armed action (baghî) against the central Muslim authority – the Caliphate – became and continues to remain the hallmark of the Khawârij.<br /><br />In addition, the Khawârij altered the interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna, and used them to declare it lawful to kill and take the property of Muslims, as do their modern counterparts, the Wahhabis.xii<br /><br />The classification of the Wahhabis as Kharijis has been a leitmotiv of Sunni heresiography for the past 200 years. Only now has it become politically incorrect among the scholars of Islam (ulema).<br /><br />4.0 Three Principles of the New Kharijis<br /><br />The chief brand of New Kharijism, or Wahhabism, distinguishes itself from traditional<br />Islam by three main principles: <br /><br />1. Anthropomorphism of the Deity: Attributing a body to the object of Islamic worship. <br /><br />2. Disrespect of Prophet: Harming the Prophet through:<br /><br />200 Years of New Kharijism – The Ongoing Revision of Islam Islamic Supreme Council of America <br /><br />- Disrespect of his noble person, mosque, grave, vestiges, Family, or Companions.<br />- Disrespect of those who visit, love, and praise him.<br />- Disparaging or holding his status as an intercessor in disdain.<br /><br />3. Disregard for the schools and methods of the Sunni Imams including:<br />- The Imams of Sunni doctrine (‘aqîda): al-Ash‘ari and al-Maturidi.<br />- The scholars of traditional Sunni jurisprudence (fiqh): Abu Hanifa, Malik, ash-Shafi‘i, and Ahmad.<br />- The Imams of Sunni morals (akhlâq) known as the Polesxiii of the science of soulpurification (tasawwuf): al-Junayd, al-Gilani, al-Shadhili, al-Rifa‘i, al-Chishti, al- Suhrawardi, Shah Naqshband, and al-Tijani.xiv<br /><br />Since all sincere Muslims believe God is transcendent and love their Prophet, it follows that this third principle, disregard for the Sunni Schools and their jurisprudential authority, is by far the most harmful tenet of New Kharijism and its most devastating achievement. The attack on the schools of thought has resulted in the pollution of pure belief, the arrogant rejection of Islamic authority, and the discrediting of pious Muslims striving to follow the straight path.<br /><br />The traditional schools were immediately supplanted by extremist ideologues and<br />radical centers of education. Africans tell the story of a young man sent to study Shari‘a at great expense by his Sunni parents. Upon his return a few years later, he refused to eat a chicken slaughtered in his honor by his father stating, “my father is an apostate.” Scenarios like this one quickly caused a great rift between the generations of peace-loving Muslims and the chaosdriven youth who were their children.<br /><br />More ugly still is the violence wreaked by extremists on the Muslims of Syria, Egypt,<br />Algeria, Afghanistan, Daghestan, Chechnya, and within the Indian Subcontinent. Violence and societal upheaval were instilled at the new schools by radical ideologues like Egyptian ex- Communist Sayyid Qutb. Sayyid Qutb declared a Muslim is either a “revolutionist” or an infidel, and went so far as to declare all the Islamic societies of his time apostate and fit to be overthrown. He stated, “Islam is a force that runs to gift freedom to all people on the earth with no regard to the variety of their religious beliefs. When this force meets with aberrant forces, it is the duty of his so-called “Islam” to struggle and annihilate them.”xvi <br /><br />Invoking the memory of the original Kharijis, he also wrote, “Islam is a whole: its separated parts should be united and the differences removed.”xvii<br /><br />5.0 Prohibitions of the New Kharijis<br /><br />Today Sayyid Qutb’s spiritual children – such as the followers of Taqi al-Din al-<br />Nabahani, who are outlawed in most Muslim countries – tell Muslims not to:<br />- Participate in government.<br />- Sit on jury duty.<br /><br />- Vote.<br />- Collaborate with other faith groups.<br />- Recite the remembrance of God in collective gatherings of dhikr.xviii<br />- Commemorate the birthday of our Prophet (mawlid) nor read poetry in his honor.<br />- Wear turbans or attempt to revive Prophetic traditions concerning dress.<br />- Show deference or respect to religious scholars or pious elders.<br />- Visit the tombs of saints.<br /><br />5.0 The Ongoing Revision of Islam<br /><br />The Neo-Kharijis and their sponsors are mounting a worldwide offensive to convince<br />Muslims and the rest of the world that theirs is the only way. To this end, a vast publishing campaign to revise Islam has been under way since the early thirties, an effort that has been redoubled since the eighties. This campaign is waged on five fronts:<br /><br />5.1 Tampering with the Texts<br /><br />A wanton, unethical manipulation of the great books of Islam has removed words or<br />entire chapters from classical works by the great Imams such as al-Nawawi, al-Sawi, and Ibn ‘Abidin. Quranic exegeses such as Tafsir al-Jalalayn and the works of ‘Abd Allah Yusuf ‘Ali have all been reprinted with changes. This corrupt tampering of these guiding texts has been documented at length.xix<br /><br />5.2 “Improving” on the Foundational Books of Islam<br /><br />They have unabashedly published corrective comments on manuals whose contents<br />were long ago established as normative in the scholarly community of Islam. Many such<br />instances have also been documented. xx<br /><br />5.3 Revising Their Own Source Texts<br /><br />Not content to fiddle with historically accepted books, they also find fault with the<br />minor texts they publish and distribute in order to gainsay their own putative authorities. This is a patent illustration of the principle that each new generation of innovators rejects the previous one as too moderate.xxi<br /><br />5.4 Reprinting Discredited Works<br /><br />The Neo-Kharijis are supplementing their own works by re-circulating books that have<br />already been condemned by the majority of scholars. Though heretical and un-Islamic,<br />numerous books are now being promoted as the fundamental guides for the practice of Islam.xxii<br /><br />5.5 Promoting the Works of Unqualified, Self-styled Scholars to Attack Sufis and Asharis Including:<br />- Muhammad Ahmad ‘Abd al-Salam,<br />- Muhammad al-Shuqayri,<br />- Ibn Abi al-‘Izz,<br />- Muhammad Nasiruddeen al-Albani,<br />- Abdul Aziz Bin Abdullah Bin Baz,<br />- Muhammad bin Saleh Al-'Uthaymin,<br />- Dr. Abu Ameenah Bilal Phillips,<br />- Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din al-Hilali,<br />- Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan,<br />- And many others. xxiii<br /><br />Their dismissal of the traditional schools of thought, their development of schools as incubators for radical ideology, their attack on the source texts of Islam and generations of recognized scholars, and their financing by ideological counterparts worldwide, have truly enabled the Neo-Kharajite movement to dominate the vision of Islam in the world. Finding roots in the Khawârij of ca. 750 CE, and given new life by Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab in the 19th century, these extremists have only really succeeded in their efforts to subvert Islam in the past 75 years.<br /><br />Traditional Muslims, the silent majority, remain numerous and confidant enough to<br />repel the Neo-Kharajite movement from within Islam, given the necessary support. However, backed by the oil-wealth of their ideological counterparts overseas, Neo-Kharajites have a definitive advantage over the majority of Muslims, who have only their own humble resources at their disposal. Only with real financial and political support can classical Muslim scholars and moderate, mainstream Muslims reclaim the banner of Islam from these usurpers, retake the podium they have hijacked, repel these extremists and discredit their heretical ideology. Truly, this is a battle worth fighting. And it is a battle which, with the help of Almighty God, we can<br />and must win.<br /><br />Truly we belong to Allah and to Him is our return, and there is no power nor might except in Allah the Exalted and Almighty Lord.<br /><br />NOTES:<br />i In al-Dhahabi, Siyar A‘lam al-Nubala’ (1997 ed. 13:598).<br /><br />ii Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and advice communicated through verifiable chains of transmission, known as the ahadith. The body of traditions are called the Sunna, and form the second basis for Islamic law, in addition to the Holy Qur’an.<br />iii The well-known hadith of Gibril in Sahih al-Bukhari.<br />iv Sahih Muslim.<br />v Ibid.<br />vi Ibid<br />vii see Al-Taymi, Sulayman.<br />viii Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari.<br />ix Related by Al-Tabarani, through Abu Hamza, on the authority of Ibn ‘Abbas.<br />x Al-Qurtubi.<br />xi Ibn ‘Abidin, Radd al-Muhtar ‘ala al-Durr al-Mukhtar (3:309), “Bab al-Bughat” [Chapter on Rebels].<br />xii Al-Sawi, Hashiya ‘ala Tafsir al-Jalalayn (v. 58:18-19) in the Cairo, 1939 al-Mashhad al-Husayni edition (3:307-8) repr. Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-‘Arabi in Beirut.<br />xiii Aqtâb, sing. qutb<br />xiv The schools of tasawwuf are known as Paths, turuq, sing. Tarîqa.<br />xv Qutb, Sayyid, World’s Peace and Islam.<br />xvi The Future is Islaam (p. 203).<br />xvii Social Justice in Islam (p. 35).<br />xviii Dhikr is considered by traditional Muslims as the most excellent form of devotion for a servant of God, and is stressed over a hundred times in the Holy Qur’an. For the spiritually-inclined, it is polish for the heart, the essence of<br />the science of faith, and the key to all success. Nor are there any restrictions on the form, frequency, or timing of dhikr whatsoever.<br />xix Cf. Appendix, “Albani and Company,” in Struggle for the Soul of Islam: Exposing the Scholars of Najd and the Wahhabi/Salafi Movement, paragraph on Ibn Baz.<br />xx For example: Ibn Abi al-‘Izz’s commentary on al-Tahawi’s ‘Aqida. Al-Tahawi’s `Aqida is a normative classic of Islam but Ibn Abi al-‘Izz is unknown and nacceptable as a source for Ahl al-Sunna teachings. Examples of his unreliability are his rejection of al-Tahawi’s articles:<br />! §35: “The Seeing of Allah by the People of the Garden is true, without their vision being all-encompassing and without the manner of their vision being known” and<br />! §38: “He is beyond having limits placed on Him, or being restricted, or having parts or limbs, nor is He contained by the six directions as all created things are”.<br />Al-`Izz states, “Can any vision be rationally conceived without face-to-face encounter? And in it there is a proof for His elevation (‘uluw) over His reatures,” and “Whoever claims that Allah is seen without direction, let him verify his reason!” [Ibn Abi al-‘Izz, Sharh al-‘Aqida al-Tahawiyya, p. 195]. He also endorses Ibn Taymiyya’s view of the finality of Hellfire, in flat contradiction of the al-Tahawi’s statement, §83. “The Garden and the Fire are created and shall never be extinguished nor come to an end.” [Ibid. p. 427-430] There is also doubt as to Ibn Abi al-‘Izz’s identity and authorship of this Sharh.<br /><br />xxi Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqqi objects apoplectically to Ibn Taymiyya in his edition of the latter’s Iqtida’ al-Sirat al-Mustaqim in the section entitled “Innovated festivities of time and place.” He criticizes Ibn Taymiyya for saying that “some people innovate a celebration out of love for the Prophet and to exalt him, and Allah may reward them for this love and striving.” Al-Fiqqi writes a two-page footnote exclaiming, “How can they possibly obtain a reward for this?! What striving is in this?!”<br /><br />xxii Including:<br />! Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s Tawhid, which is replete with doctrinal errors such as: o Calling the Ash‘aris “Nullifiers of the Divine Attributes” (mu‘attila) [chapters 2, 16]<br />o Declaring the Lesser shirk an integral part of the Greater. [7]<br />o Misinterpreting the hadith “do not make my grave an idol” to mean: do not even pray near it whereas the agreed-upon meaning is: Do not pray towards or on top of it. [20]<br />o Stating: “The disbelievers who know their disbelief are better-guided than the believers.” (inna al-kuffâr al-ladhîna ya‘rifûna kufrahum ahdâ sabîlan min al-mu’minîn) [23]<br />o Stating: “Among the polytheists are those who love Allah with a tremendous love” [31].<br />o Stating that “the two opposites [belief and disbelief] can be found in a single heart” [41] in<br />violation of the verse [Allah has not assigned unto any man two hearts within his body] (33:4).<br />This and the previous four concepts are fundamental to understand their propagation of mutual suspicion among Muslims.<br />o Stating that Allah is explicitly said to have two hands: the right holds the heaven and the other holds the earth, and the other is explicitly named the left hand. [67]<br /><br />! ‘Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s al-Sunna, a foundational book of the Wahhabi creed. According to Shu‘ayb al-Arna’ut, “at least 50 percent of the hadiths are weak or outright forgeries” in this book. Its publication was sponsored by His Highness King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud and a Jedda businessman named Muhammad Nasif in Cairo in 1349/1930 at al-Matba‘a al-Salafiyya.<br /><br />The same Muhammad Nasif financed:<br />! an attack on Imam Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari and the Hanafi School by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mu‘allimi al-Yamani (d. 1386 H) entitled al-Tankil li Ma W arada fi Ta’nib al-Kawthari min al-Abatil.<br /><br />o the reprinting of al-Qari’s hapless fatwa against the parents of the Prophet.<br />o the dissemination in India of al-Khatib’s derogatory biography of Imam Abu Hanifa from Tarikh Baghdad.<br /><br />Also:<br />! Ibn Taymiyya: Fatwa Hamawiyya; ‘Aqida W asitiyya; Hadith al-Nuzul; Awliya’ al-Shaytan; Iqtida’ al-Sirat al- Mustaqim; Qa‘ida fi al-Tawassul; Ziyarat al-Qubur, etc.<br />! Ibn al-Qayyim: al-Qasida al-Nuniyya; Ijtima‘ al-Juyush al-Islamiyya.<br />! al-Harawi’s Dhamm ‘Ilm al-Kalam wa Ahlih<br />! al-Biqa‘i’s takfîr of Shaykh Muhyi al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi – may Allah have mercy on him – in his book Masra‘ al- Tasawwuf, Tanbih Al-Ghabi Ila Takfir Ibn ‘Arabi, ed. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil (Bilbis: Dar al-Taqwa, <1989>)<br />xxiii In Arabic:<br />! Muhammad al-Shuqayri who wrote the book al-Sunna wa al-Mubtada‘at<br />! Muhammad Khalil Harras wrote a commentary on Ibn Taymiyya’s ‘Aqida W asitiyya – distributed for free in the Arab world<br />! Al-Albani<br />! ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq, al-Albani’s student and deputy in Kuwait, al-Fikr al-Sufi (“Sufi Thought”) and its abridgment Fada’ih al-Sufiyya (“The Disgraces of the Sufis”).<br /><br />! ‘Abd al-Rahman Dimashqiyya<br />! Mahmud ‘Abd al-Ra’uf al-Qasim al-Madkhali, al-Kashf ‘an Haqiqat al-Sufiyya (“Unveiling the Reality of the Sufis”), 1993. The book was refuted by Dr. ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Isa in his 700-page Haqa’iq ‘an al-Tasawwuf.<br /><br />! Al-Tuwayjiri (Hamd ibn ‘Abd al-Muhsin). With all respect to his person, he demanded that women caught driving in Saudi Arabia be labeled as prostitutes in the courts.<br />! Al-Jaza’iri (Abu Bakr)<br />! Al-Wadi‘i (Muqbil ibn Hadi), Nashr al-Sahifa fi Dhikr al-Sahih min Aqwal A’immat al-Jarh wa al-Ta‘dil fi Abi Hanifa. Fada’ih (“Disgraces”), 1999.<br />In English<br />! Ibn Baz, Sunnah and Caution against Innovation<br />! An anonymous tract entitled A Brief Introduction to the Salafi Da‘wah.<br />! Muhammad Ma‘soomee al-Khajnadee (d. 1961 ce), Blind Following of Madhhabs (Birmingham: al- Hidaayah Publishing, 1993).<br /><br />! A. A. Tabari, a fictitious name for the author of The Other Side of Sufism, abtract distributed in Wahhabi funded mosques and posted on the Internet.<br />! The Naqshbandi Tariqat Unveiled, al-Hidaayah, Colombo, Sri Lanka.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-24309288213784454892008-03-31T20:43:00.000-07:002008-03-31T20:44:17.048-07:00ISLAMIC RADICALISM: ITS WAHHABI ROOTS AND CURRENT REPRESENTATIONISLAMIC RADICALISM: ITS WAHHABI ROOTS AND CURRENT REPRESENTATION<br /><br /><br /><br />Radicalism, in various forms, has made significant inroads in several countries of Central Asia and in the Caucasus - in particular the three countries that share the Ferghana Valley, namely Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikstan, Chechnya, and the Russian Republic of Daghestan. Known as fundamentalism or "Wahhabism," it poses a direct challenge to the ideal vision of a state that the newly founded nations of the region have embraced. <br /><br />In addition, the broader ideology name "Wahhabism" represents a serious challenge to the theology and practice of the mainstream Sunni Islam to which most of these nations' populations adhere. Should this radicalized understanding of Islam continue to spread unchecked, radical interpretations could threaten social stability at the local, national, and regional levels and create serious geopolitical dangers to which neighboring powers, as well as the US and Europe, would have to react. <br /><br />Today, throughout the world, there has been a wave of radical movements, which sometimes turn militant, whose source can be traced to the Wahhabi movement. What is this movement and how did it spread throughout the Muslim world, and now the Western world? What are its ideological differences with traditional Islam and how are these differences influencing and supporting modern day radical movements? What can be done to diminish the power of these movements in vulnerable states such as those in Central Asia and the Caucasus? <br /><br />Traditional Islam views religion as a pact between man and God and therefore the domain of spirituality. In this belief, there can be no compulsion or force used in religion. From the time of the Prophet Muhammad (s), peace and tolerance were practiced between different religious groups, with respect to distinctions in belief. Contrary to this, the "Wahhabi" ideology is built on the concept of political enforcement of religious beliefs, thus permitting no differences in faith whatsoever. In "Wahhabi" belief, faith is not necessarily an option; it is sometimes mandated by force. <br /><br />Origins of the Wahhabi Movement<br /><br />The origins of nearly all of the 20th century's Islamic extremist movements lie in a new Islamic theology and ideology developed in the 18th and 19th centuries in tribal areas of the eastern Arabian Peninsula. The source of this new stream of thought was a Muslim scholar named Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab, hence the name "Wahhabism." <br /><br />The premise of this new, narrow ideology was to reject traditional scholars, scholarship and practices under the guise of "reviving the true tenets of Islam" and protecting the concept of monotheism. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's brand of "purification" of Islam consisted of prohibiting many traditionally accepted acts of worship, reverence of the person of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him and the pious saints, and burning books containing traditional prayers, interpretations of law and commentaries on the Qur'an and Hadith. He encouraged his followers to interpret the holy books for themselves and to act on their interpretations in light of their own understanding, regardless of their understanding of fundamental principles or lack thereof. Anyone who did not profess to this new ideology was considered outside of the realm of Islam - an apostate, disbeliever or idolater, thus making the shedding of their blood and confiscation of their wealth permitted. In this way, he was able to secure a significant following whose legacy continues in one form or another until today. <br /><br />Over time, Ibn Wahhab's ideas spread far and wide, being debated, called into question and sometimes supported. A struggle ensued between the staunchly orthodox Ottoman Empire and the "Wahhabi" tribes. The Wahhabis were put down until the eventual dismantling of the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s and the dissolution of its influence. Finding a new opportunity among the tribes, Wahhabis were able to reinstate their beliefs and assert their influence on Muslims of the Peninsula. <br /><br />Gradually from 1920 until today, they were very successful in establishing an "accepted" new ideology in Islam whose essential characteristic is extreme views and interpretations, as contrasted with traditional Sunni Islam. Coming under the guise of reform of the religion, the movement gathered momentum in the last three decades with support from a number of wealthy individuals. As it has grown, the movement mutated and splintered, with the eventual outcome that some groups went to the extreme in radicalization of their beliefs. <br /><br />Influence of Wahhabism Today <br /><br />The Wahhabi ideology is antagonistic to non-Muslims and to traditional practices including seeking intercession by means of the pious saints in Islam, accepted by traditional Sunni Islam for over 1400 years. By rejecting any form of hierarchy such as that followed by traditional Sunni schools, the Wahhabis rejected traditional rulings on a wide range of subjects, invalidated the four schools of thought and its accepted interpretations of law, as well as issued declarations of unbelief for those who disagreed. <br /><br />While this new ideology prohibited many traditional Islamic forms of worship, its followers did not become overtly militant until recently. Now "Wahhabi" followers have taken up an increasingly confrontational standpoint attempting to impose their ideology in many regions around the world. The Wahhabi mentality asserts that Islam may be reformed by means of the sword. Thus the movement has manifested itself as armed insurrections throughout the world, especially where governments are weak and unable to resist aggression effectively. <br /><br />Unfortunately, this narrow ideology has appeared and flourished in Islam, but not because of Islam. Previously, Islam was always presented in a peaceful, tolerant manner. The Prophet Muhammad (s) used to present his neighbors or friends that were not Muslim with gifts and flowers, never holding a sword against them, or ever instigating a struggle or a fight. There are many events in Muslim history where the Prophet made peace treaties with non-Muslims. Islam, despite its rapid spread in its first three centuries, never imposed its beliefs on anyone, as attested by the scrolls of history. <br /><br />Under this modern ideological extremism, Islam's essential principle of tolerance has been abolished. The Holy Qur'an mentions repeatedly that there is no compulsion in religion and that all people are free to practice any religion they like. Those of the Wahhabi ideology selectively apply verses of the Holy Qur'an to support their ideology, whose basis is to impose its beliefs upon everyone, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. <br /><br />Theory in Practice: Declaration of War against Governments <br /><br />Just as the spread of Wahhabism flourished outside of the Arabian Peninsula after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, it now poses a significant challenge to the region of the former Soviet Union. While these countries were "protected" from all types of religious influence under Soviet rule, the fall of the Soviet Empire and the vacuum of religious teaching made this area fertile ground for the spread of this new ideology. <br /><br />Wahhabi belief provides the religious and ideological underpinnings to enable militant movements to take up arms against existing governments if they deem the need arises. Though these movements are ideological in nature, they easily resort to armed struggle. While most governments are able to reconcile and reach compromises -- as one may easily compromise with a moderate Muslim -- extremists reject any kind of compromise, insisting on their way and no other. They have tunnel vision, believing in a duty and message to deliver. <br /><br />The extremists who have turned militant declare war against anyone with viewpoints contrary to theirs; thus, declaration of war against a government is commonplace. In Egypt, they oppose their government. Similarly in Jordan, they oppose their government. In Syria, Pakistan, Algeria, and many other countries "Wahhabi-minded" groups oppose their governments as they have begun to do in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The approach of these movements is to infiltrate mosques, Islamic teaching centers, and charitable organizations from where they indoctrinate religiously oriented people with their ideas and methods. They forcefully impose their views on weak societies, in hopes of conquering one and establishing a base for further control. They justify their militant acts and illegal means of financing their cause by claiming to wage a "jihad" for the preservation of Islam. <br /><br />Today, we have many examples of this phenomenon, whether it is individuals declaring war on America, or vigilante groups coming against their governments in Central Asia. This contradicts the explicit teaching of the Prophet Muhammad, not to oppose a ruler as long as he does not prevent the performance of prayer, even if he commits injustice. Thus, those of the Wahhabi mentality use Islam when it suits them and likewise, contravene it at their convenience. <br /><br />Using Islam to Justify Prohibited Actions <br /><br />The term "Islamic" is grossly abused by extremists who attribute to the religion all kinds of rulings, which in fact contradict the essence of the religion in spirit and in particulars. Among them is the fatwa that justifies the use of terror tactics such as suicide bombings of civilians and attacks against non-combatants in marketplaces, schools, offices, and places of worship. Similarly they have issued a fatwa legitimizing the use of drug money to finance their campaign, despite the fact that narcotics are strictly forbidden in Islam. <br /><br />Islamic extremists have ruled permissible and recommended the production of drugs and their sale on the streets of Muslim and non-Muslim nations. With such illicit monies, these extremist groups finance the development of their global network, purchase weapons and supplies, and build their front organizations, which represent them under the guise of Islamic activism. <br /><br />Containing the Spread and Growth of Extremism <br /><br />It is very well known that certain networks have flourished in many countries throughout the world. Small but well-financed militant movements arise, coming against their government and the common people, instigating conflict. The danger lies when an outside government supports such extremist movements under the false impression that this constitutes preserving religious freedom. <br /><br />In Uzbekistan, for example, rather than legitimize these vigilante groups as part of the religious fabric of the society, there should be system of checks to insure the government is not fostering the growth and spread of radical movements, whose stated goal is elimination of the legitimate government by any means, including armed struggle. There are known groups who are not permitted in many of the Middle Eastern countries, thus, it is unreasonable to single out Uzbekistan as being required to recognize these same groups as a legitimate religious party. There must be some type of code of ethics devised to differentiate legitimate religious groups from those who use the threat of force to impose their ideology. <br /><br />The problem of extremism exists not only in far distant countries, but in the US as well. It can be dealt with more effectively if the West better understands Islam and builds bridges with moderate Muslim individuals and nations. To support "religious freedom" abroad without having knowledge of whom one is supporting (i.e., an extremist movement) is an irrational misuse of the laws protecting the religious rights of individuals. <br /><br />To understand such movements, one must understand the scope of Islam and the psychology of Muslims, since what we are seeing today is an ideological movement turned militant. It is important to note that the Wahhabi ideology itself is extreme in its interpretation and can turn militant over time. Why is this form of thinking attractive to some Muslims? What are the political agendas behind "religious" movements? How are holy books used to justify illegal actions performed in the name of the religion? Education is a key factor in containing and countering the spread of this type of extremism and its associated movements. <br /><br />It would be highly beneficial if a think tank or research institute were to be formed in order that government officials, researchers, and media understand Islam on a deeper level, rather than making rash generalizations based on superficial understandings. To truly understand the world Islamist extremist movement, one must realize it is not just a social phenomenon as so many theorists mistakenly assume, but is a full-fledged ideological war of words and weapons alike.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-61514730229453547822008-03-28T06:35:00.000-07:002008-03-31T20:57:54.983-07:00On the Status, Method and Fallout of the Global Spread of WahhabismTRANSCRIPT: DR. SULAYMAN NYANG<br /><br />On the Status, Method and Fallout of the<br />Global Spread of Wahhabism<br />An interview with Professor Sulayman Nyang<br /><br />DR. NYANG: The second point that you know which I think is very critical – so these are common grounds whether they are Muslims from India, Africa, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine – it doesn’t matter…<br /><br />The second point that I think is critical for Muslims in the United States and all over the world is to recognize the fact that in order for them to succeed in doing da`wah, and in promoting the word of Allah (swt) and the example of Prophet Muhammad (s) – they have to like each other, otherwise you cannot be impressive. How you going [to] tell a Christian or a Yahudi (Jew) or non-believer that Islam is very full when he can see that you don’t like your other Muslim brother. It doesn’t<br />make sense. You cannot be effective. The only way you can be effective is to prove to him or her –that listen – I disagree with my brother – just like in your own family you can disagree with your brother or your sister… So it’s just a difference of opinion. So this way the person looking at you will say ah ha, this person does not only have a message but he also has an example in himself or herself, and these two points are very critical…<br /><br />Q: How do one implement this here between the various organizations? Because this is the main issue. We don’t disagree with each other on the general level. For example when I sit with Dr. Muzammil Siddiqi or this one or with that one, you see that there is a mutual understanding. When it goes high to the – [person[] sitting on [top of] his organization, then the whole idea changes.<br /><br />DR. NYANG: You see, this is where the structures work against unity. Because the structures are institutionalization of narrow interests, you see, and then you see this is where the external forces become dangerous and this is what I keep telling the Muslims in America - if the Muslims are genuinely interested in planting the seeds of Islam in America they should not allow themselves to be controlled by the forces outside them. Like what you are saying… people will do things Islamically if it advances their interest. What does Islam do for me instead of what can I do for<br />Islam? That’s where we started the conversation. The external forces, sometimes governments, sometimes international Muslim organizations abroad – they feel that they can manipulate groups….<br /><br />Q: They have such bad ideas about Tasawwuf [Sufism]; … they brainwash them … that Tasawwuf is shirk (associating partners with Allah), so anyone that has a Sufi background – they come against him without trying to know why …because they learned that Tasawwuf is not existing in Islam, which is incorrect. So that’s what …many Muslims are facing in the United States. But in our countries if you say that you are of this Tariqa [spiritual path] or that Tariqa, they will be happy!<br /><br />TRANSCRIPT: DR. SULAYMAN NYANG<br />PAGE 2 OF 13<br /><br />On Wahhabization of the Islamic movement<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yeah, now you see what is happening– if you look at the intellectual history, the social history of the Muslim organizations in America, you can see the reason why this is the case. And again it’s because many of these people – if you take the MSA, which we started when we just came here. It started in ’64. I came maybe one year later after they started [with] Ahmad Sakr, and all the others.<br />You have three elements who were instrumental in bringing about the MSA. You have those people from the subcontinent who were followers of Mawlana Maududi. Anis Ahmad and all those people – Iqbal Yunus, and all those people. Then you have people who came from the Arab world who would identify with the Ikwan al-Muslimoon [Muslim Brotherhood]. You know, Abu Gideri, Tijani. We’re neighbors, you can name their names. And then those who came from Iran, who were the followers of Ayatollah Khoei, people like Mosadeq; [or the one] who became foreign minister after the [Iranian Islamic] Revolution - people like Ibrahim Yazdi. Those elements, they were students here. These groups, the followers of Ayatollah Khoei, those from Najaf in Iraq; the followers of Mawlana Maududi; and the followers of Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al- Banna and the Ikhwan [al-Muslimoon] – they were the ones who started the MSA in America.<br /><br />Many of those people, they have a version of Islam – even though Maududi himself has<br />some Tasawwuf connections, but they became very rigid in terms of their Islam, and to<br />some extent many of them had to deal with the Salafi people. So they turned against<br />Tasawwuf.<br /><br />…If one is to really write an article about American Muslims’ resistance to Tasawwuf, you have to trace the roots back to this. And then you see what happened is – because of the politics in Arab world, at the time these people were coming in, those people who were followers of Ayatollah Khoei – they were opposed to the Ba`ath Party in Iraq and Syria. So naturally those kids, our generation, they were older, I was the young… Many of those …so the Ba`athists were opposed by these Muslims, because in the 50’s and 60’s most of the Arab kids I went to school with in America<br />were secular…. They were Muslims, but Islam was not seen as progressive, because they<br />were all Arab nationalists – [saying,] “Nasser, Nasser, Nasser. “ That was the other thing.<br /><br />So the Ikhwan people were very marginalized among the Arab intellectual groups. And<br />those people who were followers of Ayatollah Khoei from Iraq and Iran, they were also<br />marginalized, because these were young Arab, Iranian, Pakistani, Indian Muslims who were Islamic.<br /><br />We used to pray – there are a lot of people I know, now many of them are active, but when we were students, many of them from Africa, and many from Pakistan – they didn’t want to pray. Many of them now, they are very active. And…their kids are now going to college. In those days they were just what I called “grasshopper” Muslims.<br />I want to say why Tasawwuf was rejected: most of those [Muslims] were secular…and…they came back to Islam after the Iranian Revolution. Many of them, they have kids, they’re now professionals in America. They moved from secularism into Islam. And the kind of Islam they know is ISNA. And the other thing – they come back from being grasshoppers to being ‘regular’ Muslims.<br /><br />Two things have taken place – in the Arab world, in the Muslim world. You have the Iranian Revolution – many of them were now beginning to be attacked by the non-Muslims for being Muslims. So even if you are a secularized Muslim, you are still attacked. And the Iranians learned the hard way. Even if you are a secular Iranian, because you are Iranian you are going to be attacked. So many of them now began to realize their Muslim identity. And this coincided with the oil embargo in the Arab world, and the rise of Saudi Arabia.<br /><br />So, you see, because Maududi and the Ikhwan al-Muslimoon people were supported by<br />the Arab Gulf States in Saudi Arabia. That’s why you have many of these people who are leaders now in Southern California here – they were living in the Arab world. They were doctors in the Arab world, they made money in Kuwait and in Saudi Arabia… because they fled from Egypt, from Nasser’s air forces. They went to Saudi Arabia, they helped King Faisal and King Khalid.<br /><br />Many of them made money, and then they came to America. They became very active in<br />Islamic work here. Those people now, while they were refugees from Nasser in Saudi<br />Arabia, in Qatar – they became Wahhabis. So if you’re really trying to understand the root of these anti-Tasawwuf [concepts], you have to [study]… the intellectual history and the social history of the Muslim groups.<br /><br />So those people who were Maududi supporters, those people who were Ayatollah Khoei<br />supporters, and those people who were supporters of the Ikhwan al-Muslimoon, who<br />became refugees in Saudi Arabia, they became influenced by the Wahhabis. And when<br />they came to America and they started doing da`wah they were getting money from Saudi<br />Arabia. So those people, they opposed Tasawwuf. That’s the intellectual history of what happened.<br /><br />On why American Islamist groups reject traditional Islam<br /><br />Q: …This is what MSA [and] those who put MSA together at the beginning [believe] – but now we are seeing more Muslims coming, immigrants …[who] know their backgrounds.<br />[Is it not correct] that the majority of them practice Tasawwuf?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: And they practice Islamic beliefs like Mawlid an-Nabi (birthday of Prophet Muhammad), like salaam; like praising [the Prophet (s)]; like na’at and so on [sending salams on the Prophet, praising him, and reciting beautiful poetry and ballads in praise of him]. If the MSA had that idea at the beginning and [among the] new people [who] are coming – is this [rejection of these an] effect of the old leaders of MSA still influencing the new generation?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: No, no, no. That’s why when you say the silent majority – they come from Muslim countries where you have Tasawwuf already [established]. So there’s a gap between the elites who have been influenced, as I described, and the masses… There’s a gap there. <br /><br />Most Muslim countries have been exposed to Tasawwuf – that’s a fact in our intellectual history. There is not a single Muslim country where Islam went without the Tasawwuf people.<br /><br />Q: And that Tasawwuf was a blessing that had helped to spread Islam…?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes, of course, that’s the way it happened all over the Islamic world. Of course, you know, some of our ulema (religious scholars), some of our people now, especially the Salafi and the Wahhabi intellectuals will say, “Well these were distortions of Islam because the march of Muslim traders and scholars who were going to these countries in Malaysia, in Indonesia, in Africa, in Central Asia – they had to deal with the culture, so they compromised with the culture.” But I think that’s false.<br /><br />Q: Yeah, because as you see, Ibn Taymiyya has clearly supported Tasawwuf … the correct Tasawwuf.<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: Which implements the state of ihsan? [“Ihsan” is a state of closeness to Allah Almighty about which the Prophet (s) said, “It is to worship Allah as if you see Him, and if you do not see Him, He indeed sees you.”]<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes. <br /><br />Q: And many of the Sufis, like Abu Yazid al-Bistami, like Rabi’a al-Adawiyya, Sulayman ad-Durrani [are mentioned by] Ibn Taymiyya [in] two volumes [about that] in his Fatawa, volumes 10 and 11 on Tasawwuf, and the necessity of Tasawwuf. And [Ibn Taymiyya] was a Qadiri himself?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: So, if we relate to what you said that the traders who conducted business in Central Asia or the Far East or Subcontinents – for their culture to compromise with the culture of the people there… we also find in the Islamic tradition that different scholars, like Ibn Taymiyya, [were] Sufi, who now … are being studied…?<br />DR. NYANG: Yes, that’s right, that’s right.<br /><br />Q: Even Imam Nawawi was a Sufi. Even Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani [and] Al-Haythami [were]<br />Sufi. As-Subki was a Sufi, Adh-Dhahabi, … were Sufi. <br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: The Four Schools of Islam…<br /><br />DR. NYANG: The major thinkers, yes. They all have Sufi ancestry.<br /><br />Q: Dr. Nyang, in your opinion – how we can … bring unity? Because we don’t want clashes between the ummah [Muslims of the world], especially in America…<br /><br />DR. NYANG: No, no.<br /><br />On clearing up the false understanding of Tasawwuf<br /><br />Q: How can we clear up the MSA understanding about Tasawwuf, that it is not something<br />other than Islam, but it is [part of] Islam?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes, this is where the dialogue has to be initiated. And I think two processes must take place. One is, there must be dialogue with the elites – not all of them will come. Some of them, they have vested interests. Because, see, if you are a Muslim in America and you are getting money from Saudi Arabia – I don’t expect you to… – you may know the truth but you will not come, because your interest is linked… They’re not going to accept that because they feel that if they do it, they will destroy their sources of funding. So those people, you don’t dismiss them. You still maintain the door open. Keep the door open, because their<br />circumstances could change, you know what I’m saying. They may fall out with the Saudis or whoever that is, and because you did not snub them or close the door against them, they may turn around and say, “Well you know brother you are right, what you were saying is correct.”<br /><br />I mean, self interest misguided them. It’s not that they don’t have the intellectual understanding - this is a human being, you know that. I mean if you have a son and he falls in love with a girl, because he sees her and he likes her, and we say, “That’s not good for you,” he’s not going to listen... Because that’s his interest. You see what I’m saying. Now, until he has intellectual conversion that what he wants – if he wants to buy a car, you tell him, “Don’t buy this car, it’s not good for you” – but if he’s emotionally attached to that car, you cannot tell him anything. Now, until he is influenced by an intellectual understanding that<br />“this is not good for me”, then you see that, “what daddy was saying or my friend was saying was correct”… Your interest blinds you to reality, you cannot see it.<br />There are people like that, those people who have vested interest in the way the Wahhabi hierarchy in Saudi Arabia doles out money to them. And that’s not only in America – it’s …all over the world. You see Rabita people – they give money to them. Those people are not going to accept. Intellectually they know that what you are saying is correct, but they are not going to accept it. You see this in every area, with politics and everything else… Once you know this, you understand their behavior. <br /><br />That’s of course, in knowledge, what we call the sociology of knowledge. Because you have higher interests that affects the manner in which human beings respond to knowledge; because of their interests.<br /><br />The Wahhabi – [and] people who are inspired by the Wahhabi, or influenced by the<br />Wahhabi – will never accept Tasawwuf, even if they are intellectually convinced about the validity and the strength of Tasawwuf because of their material interest. And this is very clear in the United States. So, that dialogue – you don’t shut the door, don’t close the door to them. You keep the door ajar, and if they want to come and dialogue, fine. If I see you [I say], “salaamu ’alaykum brother, how are you doing?” I will be very nice to you. That’s between you and me as a brother Muslim. Khalas [finished].<br /><br />On the causes for the rejection of Tasawwuf<br /><br />Q: Can I ask a question? As you are a professor in these issues, and you have more vision on these subjects, tell us why then this ideology - if they know that it is correct, and Tasawwuf has been correct all the time, and we know that now in Saudi Arabia, or in this country especially… the silent majority is Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama’at and few are not from Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama’at - why then, since they know this, is there that fear of the word “Tasawwuf”? What is in their heart that they are so irritated when the issue of Tasawwuf comes up?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: You know, the thing is this: I was a diplomat in Saudi Arabia in the 70’s, twenty-two years ago... What I observed over there in Saudi Arabia, is the fact that the Saudi ruling family itself is not united on this issue of Wahhabism.<br /><br />Q: Yes, that is correct. They have nothing to do with it, they don’t [even] care for it.<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes, you see what has happened is at one point in time, their father or grandfather, Abdul Aziz, was able to use the Ikhwan, which grew out of the movement created by, you know, like the amir, you know, so-called Saudi Greats, and Muhammad ibn Saud, [and] Abdul Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. That alliance between the crown and the pen, you know, in Saudi Arabia, has led to the Aali-Shaykh family...You see, and the Al- Saud family. That’s why the Aali-Shaykh, you know that very well, Aali-Shaykh family becomes the Minister of Education since the beginning of the kingdom.<br /><br />On rejection of Wahhabism in its homeland<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Now, what has happened really is the royal family may not care about Wahhabism any more. Because this is one of the reasons why – if you go to Riyadh or Jeddah, you take a taxi, they still listen to music. Whereas Wahhabis used to say, “no music.” [You see] cigars... They put it on TV. If they are Wahhabis, they are opposed to that. In the past, no music in Saudi Arabia. You see, you can see that even among the royal family, this old idea of Wahhabism, rigid Wahhabism, is fading away.<br /><br />OK, the silent majority, the first they are Ahl Jama’at was-Sunnah, that’s what they are in Saudi Arabia, especially in Hijaz. People they do Mawlid an-Nabi in Medina. [They celebrate the Prophet’s birthday, listen to music, smoke cigars, all of which is outlawed by Wahhabis.]<br /><br />Q: In Medina and Makkah?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes!<br /><br />Q: Jeddah, everywhere?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: They do! So the reality is really that the elites have a vested interest in keeping the facade – it’s all facade – there is no substance to it in Saudi Arabia. It’s facade because, you see, the prestige internationally depends on Wahhabism. The great irony in Saudi Arabia is that Wahhabism is more important as a tool of foreign policy than as an instrument of internal government policy. You see what I am saying! This is what is happening. And if we recognize this reality, we will know how to deal with them. You see where there is a political issue – because, you see they would like to use this political issue for international propaganda.<br />And you have some groups now from overseas who have a vested interest in clinging on to that. You see, because the groups that are in America, if they get money from the<br />Wahhabi’s government, they re-enforce the external policy, even though, domestically they didn’t have much substance to it. You see what I’m saying? This is where politics comes in, and it has nothing to do with Islam or anything else. It’s just mere power and how to get power and keep power.<br /><br />On Wahabi incitement to violence in Africa<br /><br />Q: And that’s what we see now – I’d like your opinion on another matter, also. Now we see that in many African countries like Kenya, Senegal, Djibouti, Somalia – they begin big fights and clashes between the Muslims. …We are seeing that Muslims are fighting each other there, because the majority there are following Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama’at and following Tasawwuf, because this is how they grew up. [Is this indeed correct?]<br /><br />DR. NYANG: That’s right.<br /><br />Q: And now with this new ideology that’s coming in from the Wahhabis – you are finding that this is going… clashes are increasing?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: We have some – one of our brothers sent me letters, that …in many masajid (mosques), there have been many killings there for who will be in authority between the Wahhabis or still in the hands of the Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama’at.<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes… I can understand this, you see because you have the so called the Islamic Party of Kenya. What’s his name again? You know, Ahmed Bilala. The problem you have, you know, in the Kenyan case, you have in Mombasa, you have many of those people – they call them – Europeans call them Afro-Arabs. These are people from Hadramut, you know, who migrated to Africa two hundred years ago, they settled, they intermarried with local people. People of Nazariya… You know, and others… So you have these people in Pimba, in Malindi, and you know, like and in Mombasa area.<br /><br />Those coastal city-states of Muslims have been there for almost about 800 years. Those families of Muslims, many of them historically came from Oman, or Hadramaut, and some other areas in Yemen. Now, some of them were Shi’a, but most of them were Sunni, Ahl as-Sunnah. So they settled in that region.<br /><br />In recent times what has happened is when the Rabita began to fight on behalf of the<br />Saudi family with Nasserites, they were looking for allies in the region. And these groups of people became actively involved. So these Wahhabis had their own people. You see, so those people, they get money. If you are an imam in Mombasa, for example, and the Rabita sends you a check - in Africa it’s a lot of money. They send them about $800 a month. It’s a lot of money over there. In America it’s nothing. Over there it’s a lot of money. So, you are on the payroll of Rabita. They send you $800 every month. I mean, it makes you live a middle-class lifestyle in Kenya. So, you are an imam and you know every month you get a check and then you may even be member of the Global Islamic Council of Imams or Mosques.<br /><br />They have a mosque in Saudi Arabia. Every year you go for this annual meeting of imams from around the world. And you meet there – you meet all the people from Pakistan, from Thailand, from Malaysia. You can then go for `umra [the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca]. It gives you prestige in your community. Because you see, they say the imam is going to see the Imam of Mecca. That’s prestige, you see, it’s prestige. The newspaper will say that Imam Ahmed Abdullah will be going to Mecca to attend the Global Council of Masjids (mosques).<br /><br />Prestige. If we have money, you do it in America, too… If they get an invitation, they come from Kenya, yea I’m going to America to join the Muslims. You see? Prestige for them. That’s what’s happening! This is what is happening! So those guys, they got caught up in this international network of Wahhabis, so when they come to Kenya, they will fight anybody who talks Tasawwuf…<br /><br />Even though in Saudi Arabia, the royal family is not united on Wahhabism anymore. These people are more holier than thou. Ha ha ha. This is what is happening! Politicization of Islam. And the creation of the profit motive in sectarianism. See what I’m saying? It becomes commercial.<br /><br />What you were saying earlier in the conversation. People will say, “What can I get from this Islam?” Islam now is good for them, it’s modernized. You see what I am saying? This is what is happening…?<br /><br />On how the Ikhwan al-Muslimoon and Wahabi interests became linked<br /><br />Q: What is your future vision of Islam in the world, Professor Nyang? With the power of money and political influence, will ideology overcome the whole world and become the effecting factor on Islamic belief? And will the belief of Muslims through fourteen hundred years be changed slightly toward the new ideology of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: No, I don’t think so. I don’t think so. You see, fortunately for Muslims – fortunately, I say this – the Saudis don’t have the intellectual ability to do that. If they had the intellectual ability, we’d be in serious trouble. You see, they don’t have the same intellectual clout that the Egyptians had under Nasser. You see, when Nasser… you see, if you look at what happened – in fact, I’ve been trying to encourage some of my students to write – one of the Egyptians scholars who retired from my department said he might write a book or, he said, will get me a grant – then I can write a book… I would like to get one of the graduate<br />students, you know, to really, to investigate this. Because, you see, I have written some articles about it, but I think it should be investigated thoroughly and a book should be written. And that is – because this will deal with the question that you are raising.<br /><br />The intellectual impact of what the late Malcolm Kerr, who was killed in Lebanon …he was the president of American University of Beirut… Malcolm Kerr wrote a book called The Arab Cold War... The royal families like the Wahhabis and King Faisal, King Hussein and all that… then later between the Hashemites and the Nasserites, and then, of course, later on it took a different character between the Saudis – Riyadh and Cairo. Because, you see, because of the tension that was going on between Nasser and his advocacy of radical Arab republicanism on the one hand and the traditional Arab monarchists – that tension between the two forces led to the migration of many<br />Muslim intellectuals from the Ihkwan to the Gulf countries.<br /><br />You know, in my research, which I wrote a long time ago, I wrote this paper many years ago “Saudi Foreign Policy in Africa,” which was published almost 20 years ago now. I mean, the argument I made there – some of the things I’m telling you now, I wrote that long …ago in that article.<br /><br />What happened really was when King Saud was fighting – at first, Saud was close to<br />Nasser, but then, because Saud was close to America and Nasser was close to the Soviet Union – the Arabs were split ideologically between the supporters of America and the West and the supporters of Russia. Nasser became the leader of the republican radicals, and then the Saudi family was supported by America. So, many of the Egyptian intellectuals who were with the Ihkwan al-Muslimoon of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb migrated to Saudi Arabia. And they are the ones – the intellectuals – that’s why I told you that the Saudis don’t have the intellectual ability – they are the ones who helped the Saudi Arabians to establish what? Rabita.<br />The Rabita was created only to fight the Egyptians Nasserites. Because you have Tawfiq Awwiyla, you know, who was the head of the Majlis, the Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs in Egypt, which was the strongest weapon used by Nasser to penetrate Africa and Asia. <br /><br />And Nasser gave scholarships to Pakistanis, Malaysians – at that time, Malaysia was not strong as it is today –and they were all going to Egypt, at Al-Azhar University, to study. And then the Saudis, benefiting from the Egyptian intellectuals, people like Mahmoud Tawfiq… [who] all went to Riyadh and they created the Rabita. And the Egyptians, the Lebanese, and the Syrians and Iraqi intellectuals who were Ikhwanis – they fled to Saudi Arabia. And they’re the ones who created the intellectual infrastructure for the royal family in Saudi Arabia.<br /><br />So, you have the Majlis in Egypt and you have the Rabita. And the Rabita would now<br />become a very important instrument for the royal family in Saudi Arabia, not only to fight the Nasserites, but to expand Saudi influence in the Muslim world. Then the Saudis’ businessmen, the Alureesha, Alamoodi, al-Wajhi, al-Suleyman, you know, al-Dilal – all those different families that are in Riyadh and in Jeddah – the Hijazis – they put their money together and they established Jami`at Abdul Aziz University, which was a private university, but then, later on, taken over. Because of the rivalry between the Egyptians and the Saudis, that private university became… It’s been widely written about. So when you talk about how Wahabi thought became dominant, this Saudi influence – they didn’t have intellectual know-how.<br /><br />You see, there are a lot of Saudis now who are educated – many of them are my students. They come to my classes. I have trained many Saudis. They went back now to Saudi Arabia. Some of them are big. But this is the problem. They don’t have the intellectual ability. If they had they had the intellectual ability of the Syrians, or the Egyptians, or the Lebanese, or to a certain extent the Tunisians or Moroccans, maybe they would be able to influence the world. But the Saudis don’t<br />have that.<br /><br />On Bilal Philips<br /><br />Q: Don’t you think through Rabita and through scholarships that they are giving in thousands and thousands and they are teaching the people in Medina and Mecca and Riyadh, and these people return to their countries as Bilal Phillips did, or …?<br />DR. NYANG: Hah! Bilal Phillips and all those guys!<br /><br />Q: Because I hear …people in Sri Lanka … have big problems there because Bilal Phillips was there and many others from Saudi Arabia were there, and beginning to make…<br />DR. NYANG: Attack.<br /><br />Q: Attack the whole belief [system] of Sri Lankan Muslims, because of their belief in<br />Tasawwuf?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes.<br /><br />Q: And then they are bringing now this new issue about the Muslims and they are supporting the government, so the government gave them the authority to run masajids [mosques]?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Ah! Now you’re talking. This is the politicization. This is what’s happening. This is what is happening. You see, now, you see this is the thing. This is why we have to analyze these things and you understand the political forces at work. Then you have a global understanding. See, what has to happen, really, is that the people, you know, who are committed to Tasawwuf have to recognize – they have to do this analysis. What we are doing now, they have to do it systematically, so they have a very solid intellectual understanding of what is on the ground, you see?<br /><br />Now… Bilal Philips, of course, you know, he left Saudi Arabia. He was there – he was with Dar al-Ifta. You know, Shaykh Bin Baz. He was a protégé of Shaykh Bin Baz. And Shaykh Bin Baz gave him thousands… hundreds of thousands of dollars from them… He’s a very young man, you know, like he went there and you know, ostensibly to study Arabic, and he did study Arabic very well. You have Imam Muhammad ibn Saud University in Riyadh and – so he became a protégé of Shaykh Bin Baz. Bin Baz has a lot of money so he gave him a lot of money, you know.<br /><br />When they had those problems with so-called “Islamic fundamentalists” in Saudi Arabia –that was when the secular forces – because in Saudi Arabia you have a strong group of people who were – they call them the Southern California Mafia. These are Saudi Arabians who are secular nationalists, and they are still here in America. And they went back home –they’re not interested in Tasawwuf, they’re not interested in Wahhabism – they’re interested in Saudi nationalism. Many of them were Ba`athists or Nasserites, and these guys – they saw people like Bilal Philips as troublemakers, because they are encouraging the radicals. That’s why they kicked him out – so he went to Dubai. That’s why he went to Dubai, and that’s why he ended up in the Philippines – even married to a Filipino girl…<br /><br />The thing is this, you see, the people who were Ahl at-Tasawwuf… must have an intellectual understanding of what is happening. Like we are doing now – what’s happening globally. And then you develop strategies.<br /><br />You see, in Sri Lanka, you’re right… with the Saudis. Because those people who are locals – they have their personal interests, what can Islam do for me in Sri Lanka? So those imams, those khatibs, and all those people in the masajids who have vested interests – they know that they may be outnumbered locally by the people who follow Tasawwuf, but they could use their government, where the government in Sri Lanka is now faced with a problem. You know, they have a problem with the… in Jafna and all those places in Sri Lanka. So what they try to do now is that – the Muslims are the middle group. The Sinhalese and the Tamil fight.<br /><br />The Muslims, they cut both groups. You have some Muslims who are Sinhalese, some who are Tamils. So the Muslims are the brokers between the two groups. So the leadership, who are mainly Sinhalese anyway in Sri Lanka – they would like the Muslims to be on their side. And if that is the case, the Muslims who are now struggling for power among themselves – those who are opposed to the Sufis, they try to get the Saudis to bring money to the Sri Lankans. That’s the game that they’re playing! So you see, if I want to win against the Sufis in Sri Lanka, I’d form<br />two alliances. I’d form an alliance with the Wahhabis, and I’d form an alliance with the government. And I’d tell my Wahhabi friends, “Send money to these guys, because they are fighting the war against the Tamils.” You see what I’m saying? And this way they benefit. This is what’s happening.<br /><br />So what has to happen really – they will not succeed. Because you know the Arab intellectual history. In the early part of Islam, when the Mu’tazila became dominant – the Khalifa tried to use state power to repress all the other groups. Is that true? But they did not succeed. They lost out.<br /><br />You see, they lost out. The disciples of Imam al-Ash`ari eventually won. The same thing is going to happen. Don’t worry about them.<br /><br />On correcting the Muslims understanding of doctrine<br /><br />DR. NYANG: The most important thing is to build structures. That’s why America becomes a very important theatre here. What has to happen here is the people who are interested in really promoting Islam and away from these government structures that have narrow blinders, you plant the seeds here among the young people. Get people like Shihab, Muhammad Zain and others. Get the… Pass it around. Give them the information.<br /><br />Q: How do you give them the information?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Well, books like this is one [Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine]. And then you organize seminars. And then you begin to create catalysts – you have regional seminars, you have annual seminars, conference – annual conference, regional seminars – East Coast, West Coast, southern part like Florida. And then you also begin to create catalysts for da’wah and reinforcement. Then you have dialogue. Because you see, in order for the Muslim groups that are genuinely interested in promoting Islam – they have to do da’wah and dialogue. But these are two different strategies.<br /><br />Da’wah is to teach those people who are within the community more about Islam, and to make sure that the division which is incurred is minimized. And at the same time to educate non-Muslims about Islam… Not every Muslim can dialogue with Nassaranis or Yahudis, no. You have to be secure. See, I feel adequate to dialogue with hristians, because if I sit down with Christians, I may know more about Christianity than they do. Because I have read their classical works. I know what their scholars have said. So when I sit down with them, I talk to them, and I tell them what their scholars have said. And I tell them what we Muslims believe in, and what our scholars have said, and then we’ll dialogue. Let’s talk, let’s find common ground. It’s because we live in America here.<br /><br />You will need to educate them. So they will go and they say, “Wow, now we have” – you know, if you are dialoguing with them, they say, “Yeah, … He’s secure as a Muslim, but he’s willing to dialogue with us.” Those people now you make them your emissaries. Because when they go and they talk with their own people, they will be ambassadors there. Because the ideas you leave with them, they will talk. But if you just put your stuff out like Muslims who are in their cocoon… these are kuffars [unbelievers]. What kind of message is that? If you don’t like kuffar why are you here? Go back to your Muslim world!<br /><br />People like Saddam Hussein are no good? Ha ha ha. I go every week to Muslims – every week I am speaking to Muslims. Last weekend this time, I was in Dayton, Ohio, and in Youngstown, Ohio. <br /><br />Q: One question … how far did you, here and there what you have discussed with other groups, but have these subjects about Tasawwuf and so on, have they been discussed or questioned…?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: The only – in fact that’s why I wrote an article one time – the ISNA people published one, because I write a lot of things and I give them. Omar Abdullah, who is the editor of the Horizon, he lives in Virginia there – when they called me, Khalid Griggs from The Message people in New York – they call me once in a while – when they want articles they call you. I just look up some of the things I have and I send it to them, and then they can publish what they want.<br /><br />But the question of Tasawwuf has not come up in the way we are discussing. It always<br />comes in the context of – they don’t deal with genuine Tasawwuf – they deal with what I call “distorted Tasawwuf” - you know, what I call “popcorn Sufis”… I coined this term 15 years ago. Because there’s a white American lady who is the head of a museum in Washington, D.C., and her sister called her one day – that’s how the name ‘popcorn Sufi’ came up. And she had a sister somewhere in the Western part of the United States here, I think in Oregon or Washington state or somewhere else, and she called her sister and said, “Guess what, guess what”. Her sister said, “Guess what, what’s happening?”… [they have a group] holding hands and saying “Allah, Allah, Allah”, and she’s not a Muslim – then she must be a ‘popcorn Sufi’.<br /><br />So you see, that trivialization of Tasawwuf has become the major instrument they use<br />against the Muslims, I mean against Muslims who are with Tasawwuf. Because this is the kind of Tasawwuf … they see in the United States. People who are followers of these different groups. And in California, there are many of them. If you go to the library, you look at the Encyclopedia of Religion in the United States and you look under Islam or Sufism, you look at the index – you will see these different groups. You know, they have these different groups. So this is where the problem is – you have these different who don’t really – like the Ibn al-Arabi Society, they may have their own journal…Sufis of the West and all these different groups… <br /><br />Now what has to happen, and this is where it has to be done, without being divisive – I think what has to be done very clearly, … You have to come out and say very clearly, we believe in Tasawwuf and we maintain our commitment to Tasawwuf in light of our commitment to ‘aqida of the Prophet (s), the Sunnah – we belong to Ahl as-Sunnah – you come out, and in a very conscious way separate yourself from ‘popcorn Sufis’. This way you solve the problem. They have to deal with you now intellectually – they cannot just marginalize you and put you there, because they now know that you are not a ‘popcorn Sufi’…. So intellectually now you force them to be honest.<br /><br />On Islamic acceptability of Tasawwuf and Mawlid<br /><br />Q: Professor Sulayman Nyang, do you think that Tasawwuf is correct Islamically?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Well, yes – there are various references in the Qur’an which suggest that you have the mystical dimension of Islam. I mean, you know, we can see that very clearly. You know, when the people who are Salafi or Wahhabi reinterpret nafs ul-ammara bi su, nafs ullawwamma, nafs ul-mutma’iyna, they may interpret these concepts in their own relative manner – but they cannot deny the fact that these are stages in the spiritual evolution of insan [humankind]. They cannot deny that.<br />And of course there are many other verses one can quote from the which suggest that there is that mystical understanding which is critical in the development of spiritual enlightenment and the elevation of the human being. You see that very clearly. In our intellectual tradition – Imam al-Ghazali is a classical example of someone who was well-grounded in terms of the intellectual currents of his time. But he was able to do what I just recommended. He was able to say, “OK listen, I don’t support some of these groups who are going one way.” And these people, you know, their intellectual practices deviate from our ‘aqida and the central beliefs we have. Now these other groups – I do not agree with them… That has to happen. That’s why I’m saying that this book [Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine] here will be part of that intellectual debate.<br /><br />Q: Insha’llah (God Willing). It has many references…<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yes. What we have to discourage really is – and this is where as a minority we cannot afford it – we must reduce polemics in our community. You see, I can disagree with my brother, without going [to extremes]… Well, they call me Sufi! So I mean, you know, … these people call me Sufi anyway.<br /><br />Q: [Can you] say Sulayman Nyang accepts celebration of Milad an-Nabi (s)?<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Well, I gave lectures to the Agha Khan people, celebrating Milad… So I would not have been there if I didn’t. So I mean the Agha Khan people will invite me to go and speak to them on Milad an-Nabi (S). And you know, interestingly enough, let me make just this point here – when I spoke in Toronto, lot of the Muslims who would not normally go to Agha Khan gatherings – hundreds of them, they came. They came! Many of the Muslims from Pakistan, because they know me, they know what I have written over the years, and they came…..<br /><br />But at least intellectually, I think they respect my opinion, to the point that many of these Pakistanis and Indian Muslims and Bangladeshis who knew my writings and who knew me personally, because I have spoken in their masajids in Canada before, you know, long before I was invited by the Agha Khan followers, the Isma’ilis in Toronto – so they came. And the Isma’ilis were very happy the other Muslims came to attend the event for the first time. So I mean, you know like, you have thousands – the whole place was packed. Over two thousand people – the whole convention place was packed full. You know, they had all their people, and I came, I spoke to them. Because the point is – my concern is they wanted me to talk on Islamic civilization. And of course the Agha Khan is very interested in architecture, and he has an award now – the “Agha Khan Award for Architecture”. The best building that resembles the<br />classical Islamic architecture constructed in any country, based on the reports of the judges, will be given an award. And they may get hundreds of thousands of dollars for that. That’s one of his contributions. And notice that King Fahd has also created one like that now…<br /><br />So I mean, this is the thing. They have done this, I mean the way I see it – the way I see myself intellectually – I want to be in a position to explain to Muslims their intellectual state of affairs. And I want to be a good ambassador of the Muslims to non-Muslims. So that when I meet Hindus, even the worst Hindu that doesn’t like us – when he meets me, he will walk away and say, “You know, I don’t like those Muslims, but I now know where they stand intellectually.”<br /><br />Ahh, then I have succeeded. I have done da’wah, because I have planted a seed in his mind, and with Allah’s blessing he could change his mind. This is what we have to do. This is the way I see it. Yeah, that’s how I see it.<br /><br />Q: If we can ask you for some articles…<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Yeah, of course. I mean I can write whatever I like, you know like, I mean, you know, like in the areas that I am competent I will write articles.<br /><br />Q: We are launching a new magazine…The Muslim Magazine – Al-Muslimoon. The Board of the Advisory Committee are very well known people from here, overseas…<br /><br />DR. NYANG: Overseas, that’s good.<br /><br />Q: From al-Azhar, from Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan, Turkey, from here – and we are launching the first issue insha-Allah…lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-63862082801722833592008-03-28T06:25:00.000-07:002008-03-28T06:34:57.993-07:00Usama bin Laden Networkal-Qa'ida (The Base)<br />Qa魀dat al-Jihad<br />Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places<br />World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders<br />Islamic Salvation Foundation<br />Usama bin Laden Network<br /><br />Al-Qa'ida is multi-national, with members from numerous countries and with a worldwide presence. Senior leaders in the organization are also senior leaders in other terrorist organizations, including those designated by the Department of State as foreign terrorist organizations, such as the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian al-Jihad. Al-Qa'ida seeks a global radicalization of existing Islamic groups and the creation of radical Islamic groups where none exist. <br /><br />Al-Qa'ida supports Muslim fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Kosovo. It also trains members of terrorist organizations from such diverse countries as the Philippines, Algeria, and Eritrea. <br /><br />Al-Qa'ida's goal is to "unite all Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs." Bin Laden has stated that the only way to establish the Caliphate is by force. Al-Qa'ida's goal, therefore, is to overthrow nearly all Muslim governments, which are viewed as corrupt, to drive Western influence from those countries, and eventually to abolish state boundaries.<br /><br />Description<br /><br />Established by Usama Bin Ladin in the late 1980s to bring together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems 忛on-Islamic?and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries檏articularly Saudi Arabia. Issued statement under banner of 懀he World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders?in February 1998, saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens櫘ivilian or military㻡nd their allies everywhere. Merged with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al-Jihad) in June 2001. <br /><br />Activities<br /><br />In 2003, carried out the assault and bombing on 12 May of three expatriate housing complexes in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed 20 and injured 139. Assisted in carrying out the bombings on 16 May in Casablanca, Morocco, of a Jewish center, restaurant, nightclub, and hotel that killed 41 and injured 101. Probably supported the bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 5 August that killed 17 and injured 137. Responsible for the assault and bombing on 9 November of a housing complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed 17 and injured 100. Conducted the bombings of two synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey, on 15 November that killed 23 and injured 200 and the bombings in Istanbul of the British Consulate and HSBC Bank on 20 November that resulted in 27 dead and 455 injured. Has been involved in some attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.<br /><br />In 2002, carried out bombing on 28 November of hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killing 15 and injuring 40. Probably supported a nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia, on 12 October that killed about 180. Responsible for an attack on US military personnel in Kuwait, on 8 October, that killed one US soldier and injured another. Directed a suicide attack on the MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen, on 6 October that killed one and injured four. Carried out a firebombing of a synagogue in Tunisia on 11 April that killed 19 and injured 22. On 11 September 2001, 19 al-Qaida suicide attackers hijacked and crashed four US commercial jets, two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and a fourth into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, leaving about 3,000 individuals dead or missing. Directed the 12 October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 US Navy members, and injuring another 39. Conducted the bombings in August 1998 of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that killed at least 301 individuals and injured more than 5,000 others. Claims to have shot down US helicopters and killed US servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to have conducted three bombings that targeted US troops in Aden, Yemen, in December 1992.<br /><br />Al-Qaida is linked to the following plans that were disrupted or not carried out: to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his visit to Manila in late 1994, to kill President Clinton during a visit to the Philippines in early 1995, to bomb in midair a dozen US trans-Pacific flights in 1995, and to set off a bomb at Los Angeles International Airport in 1999. Also plotted to carry out terrorist operations against US and Israeli tourists visiting Jordan for millennial celebrations in late 1999. (Jordanian authorities thwarted the planned attacks and put 28 suspects on trial.) In December 2001, suspected al-Qaida associate Richard Colvin Reid attempted to ignite a shoe bomb on a transatlantic flight from Paris to Miami. Attempted to shoot down an Israeli chartered plane with a surface-to-air missile as it departed the Mombasa airport in November 2002. <br /><br />Strength<br /><br />Al-Qaida probably has several thousand members and associates. The arrests of senior-level al-Qaida operatives have interrupted some terrorist plots. Also serves as a focal point or umbrella organization for a worldwide network that includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, some members of al-Gama al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin. <br /><br />Location/Area of Operation<br /><br />Al-Qaida has cells worldwide and is reinforced by its ties to Sunni extremist networks. Was based in Afghanistan until Coalition forces removed the Taliban from power in late 2001. Al-Qaida has dispersed in small groups across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East and probably will attempt to carry out future attacks against US interests. <br /><br />External Aid<br /><br />Al-Qaida maintains moneymaking front businesses, solicits donations from likeminded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations. US and international efforts to block al-Qaida funding has hampered the group ability to obtain money.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-23874748225387012972008-03-28T05:43:00.000-07:002008-03-28T06:25:08.065-07:00Usama bin Laden:Usama bin Laden: <br />A Legend Gone Wrong<br />Researched and Compiled by Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani and Mateen Siddiqui<br />Published In The Muslim Magazine, Vol. 1 No. 4 <br /> <br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />By virtue of his unwavering support for the Afghan mujahideen during their protracted, devastating war against the Soviet Union, for more than a decade Usama bin Laden was an ally of the United States. It was during those years his own countrymen, and Arabs in general, thought of bin Laden as a philanthropist and noble hero of the fight against the atheist communists. <br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />The Making of a Legend<br /><br />More recently, in the aftermath of two terrorist incidents in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, governments across four continents—specifically: the US, England, India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and several former Soviet republics—have gone public with their concern that bin Laden is the most dangerous person in the world. Some terrorism experts recognize that he has stolen the spotlight from Carlos, the Venezuelan terrorist of global repute who eluded capture for more than 20 years, so cunning in fact that many world-class agencies which tracked him did not know his face. Milton Beardon, an American official who for six years directed support operations for the Afghans from inside in the late 80’s, says of bin Laden: "It all started when Usama bin Laden began to spend more time in Pakistan than in Saudi Arabia, going between the homeless refugees and the fighters. At that time he built refugee camps for the widows and children of the Afghan mujahideen. His Initiation in the Afghan War<br /><br />In a 1996 interview with Robert Fisk for British tabloid The Independent, bin Laden stated: When the invasion of Afghanistan started, I was enraged and went there immediately—I arrived within days of the outbreak, before the end of 1979. In fact, Laden went quickly from building refugee camps, clinics and schools for the children of the camps, to financing the mujahideen and outfitting them for the fight. He then began to assemble his own fighters, known as the Afghan Arabs, for which he recruited thousands of men—mainly from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf. He even paid for their passage to Afghanistan and set up the main guerrilla camp where they received military training—bin Laden style. Bin Laden often visited Peshawar, a Pushto-speaking city carved roughly into the Himalayan foothills which, for centuries, has been home to Pathans of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, a grassroots, hilly outpost which supports its own culture, tradition and language. Peshawar was a pivotal point for the Afghan freedom fighters through which the majority of money, weapons, and medicines were funneled from the outside world—and from all over the world—from clandestine government concerns as well as private efforts that endeavored to crush the Russian onslaught. From Philanthropy to Active Combat<br /><br />And so it was that bin Laden became a familiar sight in Peshawar, where he received reports of how his money had been spent, in addition to meeting regularly with his Arab legions. But these meetings inspired in him less desire to merely fund the charitable and military operations and more desire to actually direct the fight. It was then bin Laden began to concentrate everything he had—his resources, his mind, his heart—into the actual combat operations in Afghanistan. It was a decision that reshaped him and which, perhaps, was the greatest passage on his journey into the Usama bin Laden persona we know today. Time magazine's Scott Mcleod, who visited bin Laden in 1996, says of his early days in actual combat, He designed and constructed defensive tunnels and ditches along the Pakistani border, driving a bulldozer and exposing himself to strafing from Soviet helicopter gunships. Before long, he had taken up a Kalashnikov and was going into battle. In 1986 he and a few dozen Arab defenders fought off a Soviet onslaught in a town called Jaji, not far from the Pakistani border?A year later, bin Laden led an offensive against Soviet troops in the battle of Sha`ban. Vicious hand-to-hand fighting claimed heavy mujahideen casualties, but his men succeeded in pushing the Soviets out of the area.<br /><br />The report quotes Hamza Mohammed, a Palestinian volunteer fighter, He was a hero to us because he was always on the front line, always moving ahead of everybody else. He continues, He not only gave his money, but he also gave himself. He came down from his palace to live with the Afghan peasants and Arab fighters. He cooked with them, ate with them, dug trenches with them. That was bin Laden's way.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Battlefield Defeat of a Superpower<br /><br />Bin Laden became popular after the famous Ali Khal operation, reports Paris-based Al-Watan al-`Arabi. a popular Arabic-language monthly news magazine. Bin Laden and his Afghan Arabs, with only light weapons, no artillery and minimal military training, were far outgunned by a huge Soviet army contingent supported by massive airpower. Bin Laden and his ragtag troops defeated the Soviets and took back the area. About this battle, bin Laden is quoted as saying, [Ali Khal] destroyed the myth that a superpower cannot be defeated. It was after this operation that bin Laden’s fame spread far and wide, through a myriad of channels. Mercennaries and volunteers alike began to flow in from Arab states to join him. He paid them generously, supported their training and supplied them with arms. In a matter of months the ranks of his fighters had swelled to 10,000. His personal experiences on the battlefield were the stuff of legends. When interviewed by British reporter Robert Fisk, bin Laden said, I was never afraid of death. As Muslims, we believe that when we die, we go to heaven. Before a battle, God sends us sakina—tranquillity. Once I was only thirty meters from the Russians and they were trying to capture me. I was under bombardment, but I was so peaceful in my heart that I fell asleep....I saw a 120mm mortar shell land in front of me, but it did not blow up. Four more bombs were dropped from a Russian plane on our headquarters but they did not explode. Armed by the US<br /><br />The CIA reportedly began to funnel weapons to bin Laden as an ally against the Soviets, reports MSNBC—a report bin Laden strongly denies. Issam Daraz, who interviewed bin Laden in 1989 in the last months of the war, brought back photos and videos of bin Laden and his Afghan Arabs, armed with Stinger missiles supplied by the Reagan Administration. Family Background<br /><br />Usama bin Laden is one of 57 children of construction magnate Muhammad Awad bin Laden, a Saudi national of Yemeni origin. Reportedly the only child from his father's marriage to a Palestinian woman, one of ten wives, He has no full brothers or sisters, which is rare in the bin Laden clan, a senior US intelligence official said. He was not held in high standing in the family even before the allegations of terrorism arose. Even today the bin Laden family—whose businesses thrive throughout the Muslim world, particularly in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East, Europe and America—has many children studying in the US. Usama labored in his family's construction business until shortly after the January 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops. Of his first trip to Afghanistan as a 20-year-old, bin Laden only knew it was a Muslim country and that ‘it had great horses,’ says Issam Daraz. Flight to Sudan<br /><br />When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, bin Laden returned to work in the family’s Jeddah-based construction business, to discovere that he’d become a celebrity. But his star appeal swiftly faded when he began denouncing the Saudi regime. When he continued to affiliate with and support the militant Islamic groups he’d known in Afghanistan, less than five years after his return the Saudi government seized his passport. Bin Laden then fled to Sudan, embraced by Hassan al-Turabi, Sudan’s president. It is alleged that he thereafter financed as many as three terrorist training camps in Sudan over the course of his three-year stay. In his words, he voluntarily left for Pakistan in May 1996, afraid his presence was harming Sudan’s image in international circles. Some sources, however, say bin Laden was expelled. <br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Declaration of War on US<br /><br />Having tasted success in his support of the Afghans against the Soviets, bin Laden turned his military focus towards defeating the last remaining superpower the US. His tactic: kill as many Americans as possible, wherever they are in the world.<br /><br />"You [Americans] will leave when the youth send you wooden boxes and coffins, and you will carry in them the bodies of American troops and civilians, vowed bin Laden in an exclusive interview with ABC News correspondent John Miller in June of this year. Allah ordered us in this religion to purify Muslim land of all non-believers, and especially the Arabian Peninsula where the Ka’aba is, which he went on to proclaim can only be cleansed through jihad."<br /><br />[Read link to Usama bin Laden's formal declaration of war]<br /><br /><br />Proposed Formation of Terrorist Network<br /><br />Four months ago, bin Laden announced the formation of an umbrella organization to support extremist groups which have sprung up around the world, many of which share a rigid adherence to a literal understanding of Islam—one which rejects mainstream Muslim beliefs and invokes on them judgements of heresy, apostasy and unbelief. All these groups share the teaching that existing moderate Islamic governments are outside Islam and must be toppled by force. In the same ABC News interview, bin Laden eerily addressed his own government. We predict that the Riyadh leader and those with him that stood with the Jews and Christians and forfeited Al-Haramayn—the two holy shrines—to Jews and Christians with American identities or others, will disintegrate. They have left the Muslim nation. We predict [their] destruction and dispersal. These groups concur that America is the Great Satan responsible for the failure of Muslims. They see American hands behind every misfortune that afflicts the Muslim world. In line with this, bin Laden and his troops have their sights squarely set on the US and its global interests. In the same ABC News interview, bin Laden implied that the fight would soon come to American soil. The continuation of the tyranny will bring the fighting to America, like [through] Ramzi Yousef and others. This is my message to the American people. [Ramsi Yousef is the convicted World Trade Center bomber sentenced in absentia and captured last year in Pakistan.]<br /><br />Several months before the US Embassy blasts last August, Usama bin Laden held a press conference announcing the formation of an umbrella organization, The International Front against Jews and Crusaders. Al-Wasat al-`Arabi reports that at his side was the leader of Egypt’s notorious Jihad Movement, Dr. Ayman Rabi'a al-Zawahari. Al-Wasat reports that bin Laden’s network has in effect aligned an array of rebel groups from different nations who joined the Afghan fighters, including Egyptians (primarily comprised of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Group and the Jihad Movement) Saudis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Algerians, Gulf Arabs, Pakistanis, Afghans, Sudanese, Somalians, and a scattering from other nations. Even American-Muslim converts are reported among them. His trained killers work zealously in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia and in Europe, where their headquarters are located in Holland. While bin Laden did not appear publicly after the American retaliatory attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan, the Jihad Movement's leader, Dr. al-Zawahari, telephoned international media sources from Afghanistan, voicing threats to America and declaring war against its interests, wherever they are. He told journalists, bin Laden is alive and well, sitting right beside me. Anonymous American officials have revealed that al-Zawahiri was with bin Laden when the American attacks took place—miraculously they were both unharmed. <br /><br />New Friend – New Ideology <br /><br />According to al-Wasat, the story of the friendship between these two men goes back to their first meeting in the summer of 1989 during one of bin Laden’s visits to Peshawar. Sources say they have never separated since. Of the same generation, bin Laden now 40 years old and al-Zawahiri 47, an al-Wasat source says the pair were satisfied with the role the other played: the affluent Saudi using his millions stashed in the US and Switzerland to support the jihad in Afghanistan; and the Egyptian ideologue, the guiding intellect behind the strategems of war.<br /><br />Al-Wasat states that al-Zawahiri is the one who indoctrinated Usama bin Laden into following a rigid ideology: applying a restrictive reading of Shari`ah (Islamic Law), condemning mainstream Muslim governments, and implementing jihad against them. Furthermore, he persuaded Usama to move from charitable to militant work.<br /><br />Usama, who began to spend more and more time with Al-Zawahiri, came to accept his simplistic Egyptian Jihad Model. Originating within the cauldron of Egypt’s many movements, this methodology contends that militant work must precede propagation (da`wah) work. Al-Zawahiri's thinking reflects this. Edicts such as the Islamic Group's The Decisive Word, argue that Muslims must stand and fight existing governments and overthrow them. Through clever twisting of source texts interspersed with snippets from juristic rulings of later scholars, they build an apparently convincing justification for the Islamic nature of their cause. Enthusiastic Arab youth, uneducated and often unemployed, entirely disillusioned with the state of the Muslim community, easily fall for such adrenalin-soaked solutions, perhaps motivated by the sheer militancy of it all. Al-Wasat's sources state that bin Laden drank deeply from the fount of ideology and information provided by al-Zawahiri, absorbing his anti-government, anti-America doctrine. In fact, bin Laden's statement to ABC News echoes his total indoctrination by Al-Zawahiri. We don't differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians. They are all targets in this fatwa. Despite Islam's clear injunctions against harming civilians in war, particularly women and children, the Jihad Movement explicitly condones the use of terrorism, citing the Shari`ah's allowance for collateral killing of hostages if an attack is directed at a group of combatants. We must use such punishment to keep your evil away from Muslims, Muslim children and women, said bin Laden. To justify such violence in the name of Islam he cites American history. Americans, he retorted, does not distinguish between civilians and military, and not even women and children. They are the ones who used the bombs against Nagasaki.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Other Influential Associates<br /><br />Another influence on Usama was Al-Zawahiri's friend Ali Rashidi, a former Egyptian police officer, expelled from the force after being accused of establishing the Jihad Movement to topple the government, reports that facilitated his migration to Afghanistan. While al-Zawahiri swayed bin Laden's mind, Al-Wasat says, al-Rashidi captured his heart; a potent combination that resulted in bin Laden becoming more extreme than the extremists. Other friends from Egypt included Muhammad Shawki al-Islambouli, brother of Anwar Sadat's assassin, and Muhammad Hamza, accused of attempting to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa. Both were initial organizers of the Jihad Movement.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Disarming Contenders for Power<br /><br />Al-Zawahiri's self-serving political agenda surfaced years before meeting bin Laden, when he issued the infamous Fatwa of Leadership in Egypt. In this edict, he defined those eligible to lead the Islamic revolution and those who are not. Through this fatwa, al-Zawahiri was able to eliminate the chance for Shaykh Umar Abdur Rahman to lead the ultra-radical Jihad Movement, prior to his emigration to the US. In it he stated: There can be no leadership for a blind person. Al-Zawahiri derived this from the medieval scholar al-Mawardi's Conditions of Leading the Muslim Nation, which prescribes sound senses of hearing, sight and speech.<br /><br />Al-Zawahiri further declared, A prisoner cannot be a leader, thereby ruling out another contender, the Jihad Movement’s founder Aboud az-Zumar, imprisoned for the assassination of Sadat. This edict opened a deep rift between al-Zawhiri and az-Zumar whic split the group in two. By the time the Jihad Movement began sending volunteers to Peshawar, Umar Abdur Rahman had lost the chance to take its lead, and Usama bin Laden's loyalty had already been captured by al-Zawahiri. The Islamic Group was too late to assert its influence on bin Laden's heart and he declined to attach himself to their movement. Despite this, he continued to fund them, and left them to fight on their own, aligning himself with the Jihad Movement, over which al-Zawahiri exacted total command.<br /><br />Nonetheless, Umar Abdur Rahman is clearly someone whom bin Laden holds in esteem. He told ABC News , We also hold them [America] responsible for its attacks on Islamic symbols [such as] Shaykh Abdur Rahman, who is considered one of the most prominent Islamic scholars whom Allah gave the courage to speak the truth.<br /><br />However, the Islamic Group continued to regard bin Laden as simply a wealthy Arab sponsor while regarding themselves as the warriors and callers-to-religion, in effect giving him no credit for his own jihad work. In spite of this, an Egyptian source reveals, bin Laden helped the Islamic Group establish their own military base, al-Murabitoun, while he simultaneously established one for the Jihad Movement, named al-Khilafah.<br /><br />According to a member of the Afghan Arabs, bin Laden tried many times to get the Islamic Group and al-Zawahiri’s Jihad Movement to compromise. Each time the Islamic Group accused him of siding with al-Zawahiri. In fact, he supports them both. As Head of His International Family<br /><br />Bin Laden often sponsored large groups of mujahideen—their travel, food, financial needs, accommodations and weapons—and he brought them to the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan to train. Mr. Isawi Bassiouni Muhammad Tahrouj, one of bin Laden's Afghan Arabs, stated before the Egyptian court in 1992: Bin Laden was responsible for everything. As soon as I arrived at the safehouse in Egypt, a man met me, named Abu Abdullah, who used to work in the safehouse owned by bin Laden. Abu Abdullah got me a visa to Pakistan and reserved a plane ticket. I flew alone. He told me there would be people waiting for me at Islamabad International Airport. In the plane I saw many Egyptians that I had known before, going for the same purpose.<br /><br />When we arrived in Pakistan we went to bin Laden’s ‘Ansar House’, where I stayed with the rest for two days. I moved to the ‘Martyr's House’, also owned by bin Laden. Finally we went to the Baari military base, commanded by Abu Turkiyya from Libya. I stayed there 50 days, where I was trained in all types of weapons and artillery. Then I was sent to the front to fight in an area called Tarin Mar, about 100 miles from the Pakistani frontier. There I was introduced to the Jihad Movement. They asked me to join them, and I accepted. They gave me the unit name of Abu `Ubaidah al-`Abbasi. Then they transferred me to the military base 'Khilafah,' which is a training base. There I saw many military bases and homes which they said were financed, built and supported by bin Laden, but I never saw bin Laden.<br /><br />Another Egyptian fighter, Ashraf Ahmed Yusuf al-Badawi, 20 years of age, made the following statement: While bin Laden was sending people to Afghanistan, he was also sending people to Bosnia, with an Egyptian representative named Anwar Sha`ban, who ran the Islamic Center of Rome. He was able to fly many volunteer fighters to Bosnia. When Anwar Sha`ban died in 1994, one of the Gulf fighters became the leader of the Islamic Center. Bin Laden used to sponsor all the mujahideen from their homes to their bases and give each one 1000 Saudi riyals, (about $250) as pocket money.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Terrorist Training Bases<br /><br />According to visits by an occasional reporter, the Arab Afghans built their military bases in the steep mountainsides near the Pakistani border. This hilly area is surrounded by forests, and each hillock contains a complete, self-contained military base, developed for the intensive preparation of fighters. A fighter's life consists of constant physical and military training: climbing mountains, passing through barricades and doing clandestine advanced weapons training. Experts believe these bases provide the most arduous military training in the world, the most dangerous of which takes place at a base named ‘Kamikaze’, Japanese for human suicide mission. The Ultimate Training Ground<br /><br />The story of the ‘Kamikaze’ base is both strange and frightening indeed. Al-Watan reports that more than 5,000 youth ranging in age from 16 to 25 train there at any given time, coming from all parts of the world. The kamikazes, or suicide bombers are proud of their title. Their main objective is to fight on an international scale, wherever they are needed and whenever they are called, even if on a moment’s notice. According to al-Watan, the base is surrounded by signs and fiery slogans such as Jihad - Istishaad - Jannah (Holy War–Martyrdom–Paradise) and Kamikaze Islami (Islamic Suicide Bomber). This is not simple graffitti—surprisingly, one soon finds each sign has been lovingly carved, not only on walls, stones and wooden signs, but in the hearts of these young fighters. The base itself is enormous, containing several hundred divisions, set in an area that is nearly impossible to reach. It is biting cold in winter, scorched by the desert sun in summer—no one stays there but the toughest of men. The intense security which guards all approaches to the camp resembles that of an industrialized nation's intelligence service. The arsenal arrayed here is like a buffet of steel from the depths of hell: from a variety of light, medium and heavy weapons to tanks, howitzers, heavy artillery, anti-aircraft guns, RPG's, Stingers, Dushkas and other types of missiles, and even aircraft. According to al-Watan, what is more frightening even than this warmonger's candystore are its training techniques. Its drill instructors are markedly fierce and harsh. Mostly hired mercenaries with extensive experience in combat, the majority of trainers are from Egypt and are highly respected throughout the camps. The base is composed of multiple levels, each housing its own school. The first level consists of intensive physical training, religious indoctrination seminars and workshops.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Indoctrination<br /><br />Each group has a religious teacher responsible for initiating the youth in the highly restrictive doctrine that becomes the fuel for these young militants’ jihad. Using labels like idolatry, unbelief and fiery rhetoric, the teacher is a master of mind-manipulation. Through misapplication of verses of Qur’an and hadith, the teacher mentally brands idealistic and hotblooded youth with his ideology. In this view, everything ideologically different must be violently opposed and destroyed. This teaching is in fact more important than any weapons training they receive. Al-Watan reports, the period of indoctrination begins with initiation. The religious teacher secludes himself with small groups of youth, called `usar, meaning family. His teaching is built on the belief that anything not found in their ideology must be rejected—even if it is derived through established principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Therefore, the one performing any such act is an unbeliever, who must then repent and renew his or her testimony of faith or be killed. The followers of this ideology are trained to condemn and fight the majority of mainstream Muslims who comprise 97% of Islam's followers, and alihgning themselves with the 3% minority who adhere to their beliefs. This minority belief demands that all Muslims adopt their severe ideology—one created by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab who appeared in the 18th century under the guise of reforming and purifying Islam. Abdul Wahhab was sponsored by the British as a means of dividing the Arabs against the Ottoman caliphate. This ideology was suppressed for several decades, then sprang forth with a vengeance among newly-created Arab nations at the turn of the twentieth century. The religious trainer instills in the youth a most ungodly motto: The goal—martyrdom; the method—killing. They are taught they must cleanse Muslim regimes of infidelity. Ironically, those nations that presently stand condemned by this doctrine are those which launched them not long ago. <br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Levels of Terrorist Training <br /><br />The emotionally-charged youth continue initiation with intense physical training such as running, climbing, crawling, scaling walls, jumping through burning tires, carrying weights and hauling equipment. It is non-stop exercise for the youth; with their only rest a brief interval after each of the five prayers, and their sleep late at night.<br /><br />The second level of training focuses on weapons. The fighters learn to use semi-automatic and automatic weapons, beginning with handguns and rifles, then moving to Klashnikovs. They undergo live-fire exercises and continue with the strenuous physical training.<br /><br />At the third level the youth learn combat tactics such as house-to-house searches, advanced training in use of all heavy weapons and anti-aircraft weapons, RPGs, and Dushka missiles.<br /><br />The fourth level trains the fighters in all forms of explosives, traditional and modern, including the use of mines, how to build bombs with timers and remote controls, and how to assemble car bombs. <br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />The Making of a Killing Machine<br /><br />Only the most advanced fighters graduate to the fifth level, training in techniques of suicide bombing. In this final stage, hand-selected, readied troops become familiar with methods of self-destruction using bombs strapped to their backs or chests. Instructors in kamikaze training are extremely specialized in this art. Distinguished from other instructors in their day-to-day conduct, in their character and demeanor, they command the highest respect within the camps.<br /><br />The distinguishable navy-blue uniforms mark kamikaze trainees from the standard white issue of lower-ranking fighters. They speak to no one, return no greetings and behave robot-like, as if existing to achieve one thing: becoming martyrs in the way of God. This level of fighter is trained to be ready at a moment's notice, to go wherever ordered. They have mastered time-tested strategies of evading secret services, immigration, intelligence services and police anywhere in the world and under any circumstance. The graduate suicide-bombers then remain waiting in the mountains for their final orders.<br /><br />It is reported as high as 9% of the inductees successfully complete this last stage of intensive<br /><br />physical and psychological training, a statistic which is unverifiable. Kamikazes are sponsored by movements and organizations around the world, each with its unique political agenda and inclination, far removed from mainstream Islamic teachings of moderation, peace and goodwill.<br /><br />Joining the Network<br /><br />It is said that bin Laden operates as a venture capitalist for terror: groups apply for support and, if approved, are given a deposit account, and steady long-term financing begins. As these groups take on more radical overtones, reports al-Watan, they issue fatwas endorsing the destruction of Muslim governments and their infrastructure. Ordinary civilians who do not accept this rendition of Islam are deemed deviants, targeted for correction.<br /><br />The report states these groups have begun to send their indoctrinated and battle-trained youth all around the world, instigating confusion and political instability in nations where the central government is weak. The republics of the former Soviet Union and war-torn nations of the Balkans are currently affected by this devious brand of warfare. Nations already reporting attacks by outside groups include Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Daghestan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhastan, Turkmenistan, Bosnia, Kosova and Albania. In these countries kidnappings, car bombings and assassinations have become commonplace, carried out under the auspices of bin Laden’s web of violence. Interference in Affairs of State<br /><br />In Chechnya, where Muslim soldiers and civilians valiantly fought massive Russian army divisions for years to honor their Muslim ancestry and proclaim an Islamic republic, imported groups are now trying to overthrow the government established by the Chechen people themselves. After one battle between Chechen national troops and over 1,000 outside mercenaries, President Aslan Maskhadov said, "We are building a Chechen Islamic state, we shall have the Shari`ah courts [but] all Arabs, Tajiks, Pakistanis and others who came to Chechnya—not to establish the law of Allah, but to split Chechen society—will be ousted from the territory of Chechnya. President Maskhadov accused one Arab nation of trying to force its ideology, foreign to true Islam, on the whole Muslim world. These groups especially target Muslims who have good relations or interests in the West. Ironically, one of bin Laden's associates revealed to ABC News that his money is scattered among secret financial and commercial agencies in Europe and the Arab world. The movement, it appears, operates on the Marxist principle that the ends justifies the means.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />America's Greatest Fears<br /><br />Al-Watan cites evidence gathered by several Arab nations stating that America's greatest fear is not bin Laden's terrorist agenda or his plans to attack American interests, rather it is his political agenda. The information, gathered by various secret services, details plans by groups supported by bun Laden to attack the entire Gulf Area—whose governments and citizens they consider renegades from true Islam. The reports show that plans are to first take over Kuwait and establish a government based on the deviant ideology. Kuwait is targeted because it has many internal problems and because many wealthy Kuwaitis support the notion. The first stage of their mission is to force America to reduce its military presence in Kuwait.<br /><br />A Western investigator who specializes in the problems of the Gulf explained to al-Watan that information was gathered over a long time by tapping satellite conversations of Kuwaiti extremists. He claims that America’s concern for Kuwait's future intensified after well-known Gulf and Yemeni personalities assisted in the Dar Es-Salaam and Nairobi bombings. Intelligence analysts around the world have studied the political situation in Kuwait extensively. Analyses showed that after its takeover, the extremists would use Kuwait as a base for continued expansion into the remaining Gulf countries.<br /><br />Al-Watan reports that American intelligence has identified many radical organizations operating in Kuwait as genuine charities. These charities secretly assist the political and military agenda of the extremists, donating millions of dollars to groups that oppose the government and the West. Furthermore, the US has increased its preparedness in the Gulf and enhanced security around civil and military bases. US soldiers have been urged to remain in their barracks and to be heavily armed if they emerge, for fear of kidnapping or assassination.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />The seven principal Kuwaiti charities assisting the spread of extremist movements: <br /><br />The Organization of Rectification, led by Abdullah al-`Ali al Abdul Wahhab al-mutawwa` <br />Revivers of Culture, led by Tariq al`Isa <br />The Safety Charity ; <br />The Commission of Global Islamic Charity ; both are led by Yusuf al-Hajji <br />The Association to Assist Your Muslim Brother <br />The Women's Peaceful Harvest whose ideology is that of the Muslim Brotherhood <br />The Committee of Helping the Muslims of Asia and Africa , which collects and sends money to Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Sudan and other areas <br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />[source: al-Watan] <br /><br />Funding Sources Worry US Officials<br /><br />Americans also worry, states al-Watan al-`Arabi, about the financial organizations and institutions under the influence of extremists. One such institution, Kuwaiti Finance House, collects charity and sends it under the name Islamic Partnership Work to groups in many countries. According to one source, a two-year investigation into bank accounts and wire transfers showed these institutions poured huge sums of money into movements involved in terrorist actions all over the world.<br /><br />According to al-Wasat, bin Laden's support for HAMAS, established many years ago, has been continuous and plentiful. Funds go through the intelligence service of HAMAS, Majd whose office is in the al-Amaraat District of Khartoum. Bin Laden had also woven a relationship between himself, the Lebanese Hizbullah and al-Zawahiri which has proven of benefit to all parties.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Tracking Down bin Laden<br /><br />Al-Watan's US sources say that the two attacks by 79 Tomahawk missiles represent the beginning of a new kind of war against terrorist movements, and particularly bin Laden. A US intelligence service revealed that Clinton's apparently quick decision to launch missiles against Afghanistan and Sudan had in fact been decided and prepared long before the embassy bombings. The strategy to fight global terrorism and the steps to implement it had been put in place for some time. US officials revealed that most of intelligence gathered about bin Laden's terrorist network was through clandestine electronic monitoring by US spy satellites and ground facilities, with the assistance of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence Service.<br /><br />One intelligence official stated to MSNBC, I was amazed to find how easy it was to make the connection [to the East Africa bombings], noting the trace had been much harder to make after the bombings in Riyadh and Khobar in 1996, also attributed by the US to bin Laden's network. The ease was due to the US's bugging and surveillance of bin Laden’s network over the past few years since the Riyadh bombings which killed US troops. The official revealed that the US looked at it for a long time气nd this time, it was easier to make the connection. The East Africa bombings provided us with the opportunity. Further he said the information was obtained in the first few days after the August 7th explosions. He said the United States has been targeting the terrorist complex with spy satellites for some time and had long since prepared plans for attacking bin Laden, awaiting President Clinton’s order. US Plan to Eliminate bin Laden<br /><br />Official sources interviewed in Europe and the US told Al-Watan that the two American attacks might bring a halt to the terrorist actions for a time, but it will not be a permanent solution. For that reason, the American military have defined several options for eliminating bin Laden.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Military action<br /><br />This could lead to an attack, through bombing or missile attacks on terrorist bases, wherever they are located, in Afghanistan or other places, targeting bin Laden's dwelling. Such action might include commando raids by helicopter. This requires the assistance of a neighboring friendly country, which would have to be Pakistan. This is no longer possible, as most of the people of Pakistan like the Afghans, love bin Laden.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Striking a Deal With the Taliban<br /><br />The other option, which Al-Watan’s sources consider more acceptable to the US, is for Taliban and the US to make a deal to eliminate bin Laden. Inside speculation indicates the scheme most favored by US high-level officials would be to negotiate America’s recognition of the Taliban government and end US condemnation of alleged human rights violations as the price to eliminate bin Laden. These sources told Al-Watan that such an agreement has nearly been finalized and the term elimination has been mentioned in the proposed agreement many times. Some of Al-Watan’s sources imply that America does not want to kidnap or extradite bin Laden in order to put him on trial, as the US and other nations know it might uncover new information linking bin Laden with governments friendly to America and possibly with the US itself. This in turn would cause a serious problem at the highest diplomatic levels and would damage America's credibility as a champion of the fight against terrorism. The Pakistan Connection<br /><br />Al-Watan’s sources say that kidnapping bin Laden would require extensive collaboration with the Pakistanis, whose secret service supports the concept of the US and Taliban striking a deal. Sources in Islamabad told Al-Watan that a series of meetings are taking place between the US and Taliban, after the Taliban's recent victories in the north of Afghanistan gave them control of more than 90% of Afghan territory. A high official at USAID in Islamabad said that even after the two bomb blasts at the American embassies, the secret meetings are going forward in an area near the frontier tightly monitored by Pakistan's Inter-Intelligence Service. In these meetings, according to the same source, the US hopes to designate Taliban to represent American interests in the area, establishing a new government in Afghanistan allied with Washington.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Inciting the Muslims to Fight Each Other<br /><br />One aspect of any deal Washington hopes to make with Taliban is that they will stand against Iran in support of the US Another is that Taliban will incite strife within Russia's many interests in the Caspian region. Pakistani sources told Al-Watan that by supporting Taliban, Washington hopes to keep Iran in an incessant state of war, exhausting them in the region. Such bloodshed might last a very long time, as each nation—considered by America as fanatic in their own schools of thought—seeks to defeat the other. The same sources say that Washington predicts that Taliban's demands on the US will be minimal: to grant official recognition to their government and to drop the issues of civil and women's rights.<br /><br />The main complication in the deal, Al-Watan’s sources claim, is bin Laden himself. They state that Taliban is concerned about their money purportedly managed by bin Laden. Mullah Umar Mohammad, leader of the Taliban, is also alleged to be a close friend of Usama. Furthermore, it is believed Taliban is worried about stirring up an open fight with extremist Arab movements. Al-Watan states that US security experts say the deal with Taliban would specify that they attempt to set up an internal power struggle among bin Laden's own fighters. Alternatively, they would set up a fight between some of Taliban's fighters and the bodyguards of bin Laden—resulting in bin Laden being killed. The US of course hopes all these plans remain secret. Meanwhile, Afghan sources claim the US is encouraging the Afghan opposition commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, currently fighting Taliban outside Kabul, to attempt a covert mission to capture bin Laden. These sources state that much of Massoud’s support comes now from Iran. Iran’s currently improving relationship with America on one hand and the US’s alleged attempts to use Taliban to fight Iran’s interests in the region on the other make Afghans worry that the US may be playing a double game whose only result will be more fighting. Tracing bin Laden's Money<br /><br />Al-Watan reports another American plan currently under examination is to trace bin Laden logistically. The most complex aspect of this for the US administration is identifying his financial holdings and then paralyzing this huge financial behemoth. His is an extremely sophisticated network, with account holders and money transfers being a closely-guarded secret. These experts say that bin Laden’s financial infrastructure involves many banks and paper companies with no employees. All transactions of these institutions are legal and executed by businessmen who often have a minimal relationship with bin Laden. This makes tracing the flow of money extremely difficult. According to Al-Watan, Michael O'Hanlon, an expert on terrorism at the Brookings Institute in Washington DC, reported, Washington has advanced and perfected its ability to trace this group of people, their information and their money, and it is now able to acquire extremely detailed information in a very short time.<br /><br />Al-Watan also states US experts have information that a Luxembourg corporation moves bin Laden’s money without his name appearing. All profits of bin Laden's deals and transactions go to a secret account used to finance the Arab Afghans and their allies. Moreover, the American administration possesses information about European accounts (most set up in Amsterdam) under many names and corporate identities from different nations, many of which have nothing to do with Muslims. All the money in these accounts belongs to bin Laden and is used to finance bin Laden's Arab group in Europe. Freezing bin Laden’s Assets These experts say that Washington is ready to confiscate bin Laden's money, alleged to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars, believed the source of his great success in having kept thousands of fighters heavily armed and for many governments to have covered his trail. The report from Washington, according to Al-Watan, states that America has begun its operation against bin Laden’s financial machine and has put many of its diplomatic officers and internationally-based resources to work to identify how to achieve this. At the time of this writing, Germany had just arrested Mr. Mamduh Mahmud Salim on charges of handling most of bin Laden’s foreign investments and coordinating the logistics that support his violent campaigns against the US and other perceived enemies of Islam. Sources close to him claim bin Laden owns many factories, plantations and businesses in Sudan—all under others’ names. Salim is also alleged to be tied to the pharmaceutical plant struck by US cruise missiles in Sudan. Salim admits to knowing bin Laden, but denies any involvement in his guerrilla activities. The above-mentioned source says that in tracing back some of this money, it was found that bin Laden has deposited $500 million in his own name in the Central Bank of Khartoum. In addition to his own money, bin Laden manages funds deposited by many charity organizations, especially from the Gulf. The US administration believes that bin Laden also manages vast amounts of money for Taliban, amounting to no less than $8 billion, with derived profits going to the movement, reported in excess of $1 billion.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Money From Drugs?<br /><br />Al-Watan quotes American sources alleging that some of the money bin Laden invests comes from the business of selling Afghan-grown narcotics, particularly opium. However, Taliban vehemently denies these allegations and points to its record of destroying opium crops as evidence to the contrary. Recent reports in the New York Times support Taliban’s contention, showing that total tonnage of opium entering Europe has decreased significantly since Taliban took control of Afghanistan. Taliban has in turn requested that the West provide support for farmers, who, in destroying opium crops, often lose their sole source of income. Al-Watan’s sources say the Arab Afghans and other extremist organizations based in Europe are responsible for moving these drugs to the international market. Al-Watan alleges the benefit of selling drugs accrues to these organizations, including many well-known and established Muslim organizations. The money goes into complexed accounts through unlisted bank transfers. Charters of the banks involved prevent anyone tracing either incoming or outgoing masters, making tracking the source of funds extremely difficult for intelligence organizations. The money for these deals finally reaches bin Laden's account. The US is mustering all the resources it can command to stop this flow of money, hoping to paralyze the Arab Afghans in their guerrilla war. The question yet to be answered is: will that stop terrorism?<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Predicting Future Strikes<br /><br />Sources say American satellite data on bin Laden and movement of his network obtained after the attack on his bases in Afghanistan gives rise to major concerns. What the US fears most are retaliatory operations in unexpected places. Other information indicates that movement among covert extremist groups in Latin America has suddenly increased, and they fear attacks on US interests and personnel in Latin America, where security is lax. The American sources and reports say that the network has spread around the world like a huge octopus. And like an octopus, it is able to take aggressive action with its many tentacles despite attacks against its head.<br /><br />These sources say the system the Arab Afghans are using is highly specialized and perfected through years of trial-and-error. Similar to grapes on a branch, the movement is organized into small groups or cells spread around the world, and including the US. The grapes or cells which make up this huge cluster are completely independent from one another, none knowing the flavor of the other, but each receiving its nourishment from the same vine.<br /><br />American analysts, expecting a revenge surprise attack from the Arab Afghans anywhere in the world, sometimes describe the Tomahawk attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan as putting our hand in the wasp's nest, just waiting for the next sting to come. Thus arises a terrifying question before tolerant and peace-loving, moderate, mainstream Muslims and the Western nations: are we facing a third world-war between the military prowess of the West and the terrorists?<br /><br />Al-Wasat reports many Arab organizations have established their bases in the West, some of which have political leanings and some of which have extremist inclinations, believing in militant action as the only means of government reform. Other movements reject militant action, instead calling for a peaceful approach to change. Such Islamic movements represent the moderate viewpoint of the vast majority of Muslims. The minority who see militancy as the means for change, consist of less than 3% of all Muslims. Mainstream Muslims in the West often accuse these minority elements of giving an ugly image to Islam.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Al-Wasat says that according to one source, the following extremist organizations and movements have offices in England:<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-muslimoon) represented by Mr. Kamal al-Halbawi. This movement, though no longer as militant as it once was, has spun-off many groups, many of which tend to be highly extreme.<br /><br />The Jihad Movement, active under the other name International Committee for defending Egyptian Citizens lead by Mr. Adel Abdul-Majeed Abdul-Bari who had been sentenced to death in Egypt for his role in a machine-gun attack in the Khan al-Khalili District. The Egyptian government accused him of being a member of The Jihad Movement, under the leadership of al-Zawahiri. Another activist from The Jihad Movement, is Mr. Yasser al-Sirri, sentenced to death in 1994 for trying to assassinate former Egyptian Prime Minister, Dr. Atef Sudqi. He also runs an office under the name Islamic Media which Egypt considers a front for the Islamic Conquest, a division of the Jihad Movement.<br /><br />The Islamic Group is one of the largest militant movements in Egypt opposing the government. It is not known if they have representatives in London or the US. What is known is that they have connection to a movement that has many branches in the West: the Islamic League for Adherence to the Quran and Sunna led by Mr. Mustafa bin Mukhtar al-Muqri`.<br /><br />Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Algerian activist movement, This group allegedly consider the majority of citizens of Algeria to be unbelievers. It is led by Mr. Mustafa Kamil Abu Hamza.<br /><br />The Islamic Front for Salvation another Algerian activist group, led by Ja`afar al-Hawari. This group has split into many subgroups. Al-Hawari has been criticized by his own organization because he seeks a peaceful settlement with the Algerian government. His biggest opponent is Abdullah al-Mashi, who prefers militancy to peaceful methods.<br /><br />The National Front to Save Libya, which has a presence in London. The Middle East Movement. One of its main officers is Mr. Omar Bakri Muhammad, a Syrian citizen once active in the Hizb al-Tahrir movement.<br /><br />Hizb al-Tahrir —a rival to Ikhwan, this movement considers anyone other than themselves unbelivers to be fought. It was established in the 50's by the Palestinian Shaykh Taqi al-Din an-Nabahani.<br /><br />The Emigrants (al-Muhajiroun) —Omar Bakri, mentioned above was criticized by Hizb al-Tahrir from within, and therefore established this new movement during the 90's.<br /><br />HAMAS, which publishes a magazine called Palestine the Bequeathed.<br /><br />Committee for Defense of Legitimate Rights led by Dr. Muhammad al-Mass`ari.<br /><br />Committee for Advice and Reform, led by Sa`ad Al-Faqih of Saudi Arabia, recently named a Saudi, Mr. Khaled Abdul-Rahman Hamad al-Fawaz, a relative of bin Laden, as his spokesmen in the West.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Al-Watan reports that the story behind the divisions in Ikhwan al-Muslimoon is not something new. Ali Ashmawy, one of the leaders of Ikhwan said in his biography, The Muslim Brotherhood made a big mistake: they regard whoever doesn’t accept their ideology as either allied to a foreign government, allied to the local government, secular or communist. They harm him without thinking. They took this stand against some of the most respected former members of Ikhwan. They classified them in the same league as someone addicted to alcohol (i.e. fasiq). I say without fear, and without being considered by them a traitor, that they took this decision and they denounced first-rate shaykhs of Islam who work for the [Egyptian] government - a government considered infidel in their eyes. They include Dr. Mohammed al-Ghazali, Sayyid Sabiq, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Shaykh Mutawalli Sha'rawi, Dr. Kamal Abu Majd, Ahmad Faraj, some of whom were expelled and some of whom resigned. In this way many of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders have been expelled from the movement. Shaykh Ahmad Hassan al-Bakouri was also expelled from the movement when he accepted to become Minister of Islamic Affairs.<br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />[Note: The Muslim Magazine intends to report in full on the Ikhwan al-Muslimoon in a future issue].<br /><br />Activities of Omar Bakri's al-Muhajiroun focus primarily on the Pakistani Muslim community. His positions are so radical, that even other extremists say Bakri's ultra-tough approach gives Islam and Muslims a very bad image in the West. A recent al-Muhajiroun statement regarding the bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es-Salaam, is typical:<br /><br />Al-Muhajiroun views this incident as an expression of outrage against the dictatorial regimes in the Muslim world and the US, UK, France, Russia, etc. that support these tyrannical and oppressive governments.<br /><br />The Muslim Ummah is in a constant state of defensive Jihad. We view such incidents as the beginning of much more bloodshed and deaths, should the US continue to occupy Muslim land and to oppress Muslims in the Gulf and elsewhere. Al-Muhajiroun appeals to the Muslims all over the world to join us in an intellectual/ideological/political/ struggle.<br /><br />By denouncing those who gave him a free podium from which to speak many Muslims consider Bakri to be abusing the English government's hospitality. The British administration is now considering exiling him after his ostentatious efforts to collect money to support Usama bin Laden.<br /><br />Nations’ Attempts to Counteract Terrorism <br /><br />As England has sought to limit terrorist activities, it has focused on such groups and their individual members, particularly after the embassy bombings. Recently Scotland Yard made a number of arrests under the new Prevention of Terrorism Act, implicating a number of extremist group leaders as collaborating with terrorists. Among those arrested are: Mr. Adel Abdul-Majeed Abdul-Bari, an Egyptian who is head of the Committee for Defending Egyptian Citizens; Mr. Khaled Abdul-Rahman Hamad Al-Fawaz, the Saudi head of the Committee for Advice and Reform, who represents bin Laden in the West and who closed his London offices one day prior to his arrest following the rejection of his application for asylum; and Mr. Abdul-Majeed Fahmi, Egyptian head of the Islamic Information Centre.<br /><br />The US has enacted a similar Terrorist Prevention Act and, using similar extensive powers, has arrested and impounded bank accounts and assets of persons accused of involvement in the financing terrorist networks abroad through innocuous-seeming Islamic organizations. Among those so far affected are Salah Mohammad, a Bridgeview, Illinois resident. Accused of channeling funds from the Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI) to the terrorist arm of HAMAS, all of QLI's assets and accounts have been frozen by US authorities and are presently being subjected to intense scrutiny.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-74266733573639140432008-03-28T05:20:00.000-07:002008-03-28T05:27:21.378-07:00Abdullah, pemimpin BN biadab - ProwarisAbdullah, pemimpin BN biadab - Prowaris <br />Abdul Halim Mohd Rashid <br />Fri | Mar 28, 08 | 11:41:07 am MYT <br /> <br />KUALA LUMPUR, 28 Mac (Hrkh) -Perilaku pimpinan tertinggi Barisan Nasional (BN) yang diterajui oleh Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi yang tanpa segan silu menunjukkan penentangan kepada Sultan Terengganu adalah satu perilaku yang sangat biadab dan tidak bermaruah sama sekali, kata Pertubuhan Profesional Melayu dan Pewaris Bangsa (ProWaris). <br /><br />"Kemelut dan krisis perlantikan Menteri Besar Terengganu sebagai satu isu yang amat kritikal dan memalukan orang Melayu di seluruh dunia," kata pertubuhan itu dalam satu kenyataannya. <br /><br />Tindakan mengugut pihak istana untuk memboikot upacara angkat sumpah Menteri Besar adalah satu perbuatan yang secara terang-terangan cuba menconteng arang, memperlekeh dan menghina institusi di-raja. <br /><br />"Adalah satu perkara yang sangat mulia jika Datuk Seri Idris (Jusoh) dapat menunjukkan sifat budiman dan kesetiaanya kepada baginda Sultan serta rakyat Terengganu daripada dilihat sebagai seorang ahli politik yang mementingkan diri sendiri dan mempunyai agenda peribadi yang tersirat," kata pertubuhan itu lagi. <br /><br />ProWaris menuntut kesemua 22 Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri (Adun) BN berkenaan, Idris, Timbalan Perdana Menteri Malaysia Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, dan seluruh kepimpinan tertinggi BN yang diketuai oleh Abdullah yang telah sama ada secara langsung ataupun tidak langsung menunjukkan sikap dan peri laku penderhakaan supaya segera memohon menghadap dan seterusnya memohon ampun dan maaf kepada Sultan Terengganu yang juga Yang di-Pertuan Agong. <br /><br />Pertubuhan itu menasihatkan mereka suaya terus menjunjung lima prinsip Rukunegara dan berikrar untuk tidak mengulangi perilaku biadab mereka lagi di masa hadapan.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-8242635109462835652008-03-28T05:16:00.000-07:002008-03-28T05:20:38.857-07:00PM dikhabarkan pengaruhi Idris buat salah - Dr MPM dikhabarkan pengaruhi Idris buat salah - Dr M <br />Abdul Halim Mohd Rashid <br />Fri | Mar 28, 08 | 1:13:09 pm MYT <br /><br />KUALA LUMPUR, 28 Mac (Hrkh) -Rakyat Terengganu mengesyaki kesemua kontrak untuk melaksanakan projek-projek di negeri itu diberikan kepada orang tertentu yang mendapat sokongan anggota keluarga Perdana Menteri manakala Perdana Menteri pula dituduh mempengaruhi bekas Menteri Besar, Datuk Seri Idris Jusoh supaya "melakukan kesalahan", kata Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad. <br /><br />Bekas Perdana Menteri mengaitkan rasa tidak puas hati tersebut dengan keengganan Sultan Mizan Zainal Abidin menerima perlantikan semula Idris sebagai Menteri Besar seperti yang cuba dipaksakan oleh Perdana Menteri, Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi melalui pelbagai tindakan orang-orangnya yang disifatkan oleh Ketua Umno Bahagian Cheras sebagai "kurang ajar". <br /><br />Rabu lalu, Utusan Malaysia melaporkan Setiausaha Badan Perhubungan Umno Terengganu, Datuk Rosol Wahid berkata: "?Kita tunggu arahan daripada presiden (Abdullah). Apa saja yang presiden minta... apa yang dibuat sekarang pun adalah atas arahan presiden". <br /><br />Mengulas lanjut mengenai keengganan Sultan Terengganu itu, Dr Mahathir berkata: "Mesti ada sebab mengapa Sultan enggan menerima calon yang dinamakan oleh parti. Tetapi baginda memilih untuk tidak menyatakan sebab-sebabnya dan mendedahkan diri kepada perdebatan umum. <br /><br />"Baginda hanya menyatakan rasa tidak senang dengan keengganan baginda melakukan apa yang biasanya dilakukan oleh Sultan-Sultan". <br /><br />Rakyat yang prihatin, katanya, mesti bertanya apakah kesalahan yang dibuat calon Menteri Besar tertentu sehingga mencetuskan kemurkaan Sultan. <br /><br />Mengenai tindakan memberikan projek-projek kepada orang tertentu sahaja itu, bekas Perdana Menteri berkata, khabar angin juga menyatakan bahawa Idris bertanggungjawab ke atas apa yang berlaku itu dan "sudah tentu, mereka fikir beliau mendapat faedah kewangan". <br /><br />Malaysian Insider menyatakan, orang tertentu yang dimaksudkan oleh Dr Mahathir itu ialah Datuk Patrick Lim. <br /><br />Dr Mahathir sebelum ini pernah menyatakan Terengganu diperintah oleh menantu Abdullah, Khairy Jamaluddin dan Patrick yang dinamakannya sebagai Patrick Badawi. <br /><br />Khabar-khabar angin seterusnya menyatakan, kata bekas Perdana Menteri, Abdullah mungkin mempengaruhi Idris supaya "melakukan kesalahan". <br /><br />Dr Mahathir membayangkan kesemua itu berlaku sejak Barisan Nasional (BN) memerintah kembali Terengganu. <br /><br />Apabila BN memerintah kembali Terengganu, Wang Ehsan dibelanjakan secara berlebih-lebihan, kata Dr Mahathir. <br /><br />"Ia bukanlah jumlah yang kecil. Sejak beberapa tahun ini, Wang Ehsan berjumlah beberapa bilion," katanya dalam kenyataan yang disiarkan oleh The Sun. <br /><br />Sejak BN memerintah kembali Terengganu, katanya lagi, pelbagai jenis projek telah dilaksanakan di Terengganu termasuk Monsoon Cup, rumah-rumah mewah untuk dijual kepada orang asing, Masjid Kristal dan taman temanya, universiti dan lain-lain. <br /><br />"Sebahagian projek tersebut sangat baik tetapi banyak yang tidak perlu dan membazir," kata Dr Mahathir. <br /><br />Rakyat Terengganu pula, katanya, merungut kerana projek-projek yang berharga berbilion-bilion ringgit itu telah dikurniakan kontrak perlaksanaannya kepada orang-orang dari luar Terengganu. <br /><br />"Kontraktor-kontraktor Terengganu tidak mendapat apa-apa," katanya. <br /><br />Walaupun mengakui kesemua itu adalah khabar-khabar angin, tetapi dengan gaya menyindir Dr Mahathir berkata khabar-khabar angin angin itu tidak baik kepada kerajaan yang mahu menghapuskan rasuah dan bersifat telus. <br /><br />"Bagaimanapun rakyat tidak mudah menerima penyiasatan agensi-agensi dan jabatan-jabatan kerajaan. Malah Suruhanjaya Diraja pun tidak begitu dihormati. Rakyat percaya, memanglah tidak benar, bahawa kerajaan masuk campur dalam kerja-kerja Badan Pencegah Rasuah (BPR), polis dan Peguam Negara," katanya, sekali lagi dengan gaya menyindir. <br /><br />Apabila seorang Timbalan Menteri dituduh menerima wang untuk membebaskan orang yang ditahan, katanya, Peguam Negara berkata tidak ada kes. <br /><br />"Ia tidaklah mudah. Jika ada kes yang melibatkan seseorang (atasan), apa yang perlu dibuat oleh agensi penguatkuasa hanyalah bertanya sama ada beliau terlibat. Jika beliau berkata tidak, tidak ada keslah," katanya. <br /><br />Menjangkakan penentang-penentangnya akan menuduh beliau melakukan perkara yang lebih buruk lagi, Dr Mahathir berkata beliau sedia disiasat walaupun oleh agensi luar negara.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-41163320028693217662008-03-28T05:13:00.000-07:002008-03-28T05:16:15.436-07:00Usah dipertikai kontrak sosial orang Melayu - Ibrahim AliUsah dipertikai kontrak sosial orang Melayu - Ibrahim Ali <br />Muhammad Yusri Amin <br />Fri | Mar 28, 08 | 2:55:32 pm MYT <br /> <br />KOTA BHARU, 28 Mac (Hrkh) - Hak-hak keistimewaan orang Melayu di negara ini sudah menjadi kontrak sosial yang difahami rakyat berbilang agama dan bangsa. Dan ia tidak perlu dipertikaikan lagi. <br /><br />Ahli Parlimen Pasir Mas, Dato' Ibrahim Ali berkata, kedudukan agama Islam dan hak istimewa orang Melayu sudah dijamin dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan. <br /><br />"Bangsa lain tidak boleh mengganggu kedudukan agama Islam selaras dengan peruntukan agama Islam sebagai agama rasmi negara. Sebaliknya bangsa lain bebas menganuti agama mereka," katanya di sini baru-baru ini. <br /><br />Sebelum ini Ketua Menteri Pulau Pinang yang baru, Lim Guan Eng dilaporkan tidak lagi mahu menerima pakai Dasar Ekonomi Baru (DEB) yang hanya memberi keuntungan kepada segelintir orang Melayu sahaja. <br /><br />Ibrahim yang juga Presiden Majlis Tindakan Takyat Kelantan berkata, mana-mana pihak tidak wajar mempertikaikan kontrak sosial orang Melayu yang sedia wujud di Malaysia. <br /><br />"Kita sudah ada sosial kontrak. Oleh itu Islam diterima sebagai agama rasmi Persekutuan, demikian juga hak istimewa orang Melayu. Bahasa Melayu sepatutnya menjadi bahasa yang menyatukan semua bangsa," katanya. <br /><br />Ditanya mengenai kegagalan Umno dan Barisan Nasional mempertahankan penguasaan dua pertiga pada pilihan raya umum lalu katanya, kekalahan parti itu kerana rakyat tertekan dengan kenaikan harga barangan keperluan harian sekarang. <br /><br />Menurutnya, kenaikan harga barangan mempengaruhi pola pengundian kali ini. <br /><br />"Dan pilihan raya umum juga memperlihatkan imej Dato' Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi dan Dato' Seri Najib Razak terjejas teruk. Dan kalau Umno mahu kuat semula kena pinda perlembagaan Umno bagi membuka ruang demokrasi," katanya. - mj/ mrlexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-56249296484349490032008-03-28T05:11:00.000-07:002008-03-28T05:12:56.399-07:00Terima Ahmad Said, Umno jilat najis sendiriTerima Ahmad Said, Umno jilat najis sendiri <br />Salahuddin Ayub <br />Fri | Mar 28, 08 | 4:54:24 pm MYT <br /><br />DEWAN Pemuda PAS Pusat (DPP Pusat) tertarik dengan pendekatan politik terdesak Umno yang akhirnya terpaksa tunduk dengan kehendak Sultan Terengganu selepas penat 'bersilat' menderhakai istana Terengganu itu. <br /><br />Keputusan yang diambil oleh MT Umno semalam dipercayai selepas mempertimbangkan kemungkinan Umno/BN akan kehilangan kuasa di Terengganu dan krisis politik dengan Istana Negara di peringkat Pusat. <br /><br />Perdana Menteri menuduh tindakan sultan 'tidak mengikut Perlembagaan', manakala Peguam Negara cuba digunakan untuk 'mengajar' Sultan Terengganu. Apapun, Umno telah menjilat najisnya sendiri yang sebelum bertegas mahu menolak Ahmad Said sehingga mencemarkan nama baik istana <br /><br />Kerana bimbangkan kehilangan kuasa tersebut, Umno terpaksa menjilat najisnya sendiri yang selama ini cuba dicampakkan ke muka Tuanku Sultan Terengganu. <br /><br />Umno semenjak kemenangan pilihan raya pada 8 Mac 2008 telah bersikap kurang ajar, biadap dan derhaka terhadap Sultan Terengganu apabila menamakan Idris Jusoh sebagai Menteri Besar walaupun istana telah memberi isyarat untuk tidak menerimanya. <br /><br />Apabila istana menamakan Dato' Ahmad Said sebagai Menteri Besar, para pemimpin Umno dari Pusat dan negeri terus-menerus menyerang tindakan sultan, sehingga ada yang mengeluarkan ugutan. <br /><br />Perdana Menteri menuduh tindakan sultan 'tidak mengikut Perlembagaan', manakala Peguam Negara cuba digunakan untuk 'mengajar' Sultan Terengganu. <br /><br />Setiausaha Agung dan Presiden Umno pula mengancam untuk memecat Ahmad Said, manakala Umno Terengganu sudah memecatnya. <br /><br />Lebih biadap lagi apabila para pemimpin Umno yang menolak pilihan sultan mahu mengenakan undi tidak percaya terhadap Ahmad Said, selain mengugut untuk meletakkan jawatan. <br /><br />Tindakan MT Umno semalam untuk mengiktiraf Ahmad Said memang akan menyelesaikan kemelut politik di Terengganu, tetapi ia tidak akan dapat menyembuh luka di hati Sultan dan rakyat Terengganu seluruhnya. Selepas dua minggu melancarkan serangan ke atas istana Terengganu dan pengikut-pengikut mereka mula biadap dengan menggelarkan Sultan Terengganu sebagai 'natang' (binatang), akhirnya Setiausaha Umno Terengganu mengakui bahawa semua tindakan biadap dan derhaka mereka ini adalah atas arahan Presiden Umno, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. <br /><br />Selepas dua minggu melancarkan serangan ke atas istana Terengganu dan pengikut-pengikut mereka mula biadap dengan menggelarkan Sultan Terengganu sebagai 'natang' (binatang), akhirnya Setiausaha Umno Terengganu mengakui bahawa semua tindakan biadap dan derhaka mereka ini adalah atas arahan Presiden Umno, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. <br /><br />Abdullah sebagai Presiden Umno dan ketua kerajaan telah melakukan satu tindakan yang amat memalukan bagi rakyat negara ini kerana mengarah satu perbuatan biadap terhadap Sultan Terengganu yang juga Yang di-Pertuan Agong. <br /><br />Bagi DPP Pusat, tindakan MT Umno semalam untuk mengiktiraf Ahmad Said memang akan menyelesaikan kemelut politik di Terengganu, tetapi ia tidak akan dapat menyembuh luka di hati Sultan dan rakyat Terengganu seluruhnya. <br /><br />Tidak pernah dalam sejarah orang Melayu bersikap begitu biadap terhadap sultan sedangkan baginda bertindak demikian untuk membela keadilan bagi pihak rakyat. <br /><br />Kita biasa mendengar raja-raja ditentang kerana kezaliman mereka, tetapi hari ini raja yang adil cuba diderhakai oleh pemimpin zalim BN. <br /><br />Akhirnya, hukum karma menimpa Umno apabila terpaksa mengalah di atas kezaliman mereka dan tunduk kepada kemahuan sultan. <br /><br />Apapun, Umno telah menjilat najisnya sendiri yang sebelum bertegas mahu menolak Ahmad Said sehingga mencemarkan nama baik istana. <br /><br />Ketua Dewan Pemuda PASlexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-71846938536370194942008-03-25T06:30:00.000-07:002008-03-25T06:33:13.092-07:00Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S.Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S.<br />Network of Wahhabi Mosques, Schools, Web Sites Probed by FBI<br /><br />By Susan Schmidt<br />Washington Post Staff Writer<br />Thursday, October 2, 2003; Page A01 <br /><br />On Aug. 20, 2001, Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen, a man who would soon be named a minister of the Saudi government and put in charge of its two holy mosques, arrived in the United States to meet with some of this country's most influential fundamentalist Sunni Muslim leaders. <br /><br />His journey here was to include meetings and contacts with officials of several Saudi-sponsored charities that have since been accused of links to terrorist groups, including the Illinois-based Global Relief Foundation, which was shut down by U.S. authorities last year. <br /><br />_____Graphic_____ <br /><br />• Web of Connections: The travels of a future Saudi government minister in the United States illuminate a network of Islamic organizations under investigation for possible links to terrorist activities. <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br />He met with the creators of Islamic Web sites that U.S. authorities contend promote the views of radical Saudi clerics tied to Osama bin Laden. And among the imams on his travel schedule was a leader of a small religious center tucked into a nondescript office building in Falls Church, the same site used for a time by the spiritual leader of a group of area men indicted in June as suspected jihadists. <br /><br />On the night of Sept. 10, 2001, Hussayen stayed at a Herndon hotel that also housed three of the Saudi hijackers who would slam an aircraft into the Pentagon the next day, though there is no evidence that he had contact with them. <br /><br />Hussayen, who was unavailable for comment, is accused of no wrongdoing. The purpose of his meetings remains, in fact, a mystery. <br /><br />But his travels form a road map to some of the religious and charitable groups in America dedicated to the spread of Wahhabism, the rigid and puritanical strain of Islam dominant in Saudi Arabia. In recent months, authorities have begun to focus on the role of radical Wahhabi clerics and organizations, including some that Hussayen came to see here, in exhorting followers to violence. <br /><br />Backed by money from Saudi Arabia, Wahhabis have built or taken over hundreds of mosques in North America and opened branches of Saudi universities here for the training of imams as part of the effort to spread their beliefs, which are intolerant of Christianity, Judaism and even other strains of Islam. <br /><br />"A growing body of accepted evidence and expert research demonstrates that the Wahhabi ideology that dominates, finances and animates many groups here in the United States, indeed is antithetical to the values of tolerance, individualism and freedom as we conceive these things," said Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), who has been holding hearings on Wahhabism. <br /><br />What began as discrete investigations in Idaho, Michigan, New York and Northern Virginia has coalesced in recent months into a cluster of interrelated probes. Prosecutors and FBI agents are trying to determine whether links among the groups suggest a network whose purpose is to incite violent jihad, or holy war, and recruit people to fight it, according to sources familiar with aspects of the investigation. <br /><br />To date, a variety of charges have been brought against 19 people associated with the groups, and seven have pleaded guilty. <br /><br />Authorities also are investigating the use of Internet sites, mosques, charities and Islamic conferences as possible venues for recruitment, the sources said. U.S. prisons, where several of the groups have mounted efforts to spread their brand of Islam with outreach programs that include distribution of Korans and other literature, have also come under scrutiny. <br /><br />The FBI opened a major case file on the suspected network last year, law enforcement sources said, though progress investigating it was initially slow. "The feeling was, 'we see the network, we know it's there, but it's out of our reach. It's so monumental nobody knew how to take it on," one law enforcement official said. <br /><br />The probe has mushroomed, with agents and prosecutors aided by new access to previously off-limits information gathered over years of noncriminal intelligence investigations, the result of powers gained in part through the USA Patriot Act, the anti-terrorism law approved after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. <br /><br />The investigation is heating up at a time when Washington's relations with Riyadh have been strained by allegations that the Saudi government has done little to rein in huge charities there that have been accused of funding terrorism. The Saudis strenuously deny funding terrorists and say they are cracking down on organizations accused of doing so. <br /><br />The Saudi government, through its embassy here, declined to discuss any aspect of the probe. Embassy officials agreed in August to forward a request for an interview to Hussayen, but provided no response. <br /><br />Salem Marayati, executive director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, an advocacy group, said in an interview that "if a person has recruited people to go commit violence against people abroad, he should be prosecuted." But he said law enforcement authorities cannot trample on constitutionally protected religious freedoms. "Groups should not be targeted for their beliefs, only for their activities if they are criminal," Marayati said. <br /><br />Wahhabism and Terrorists <br /><br />Wahhabism took root in the Arabian desert in the 1740s, promulgated by Mohammed ibn Abd Wahhab, who sought to purge what he saw as corrupting influences in Islam and return it to original orthodoxy. Under those principles, non-Wahhabis are considered infidels, and failure to adhere to the faith's tenets draws severe punishment; church and state are one. <br /><br />Wahhabism found a powerful ally in Mohammed ibn Saud, a Bedouin chief whose conquests spread Wahhabism throughout the Arabian Peninsula, the foundation for centuries of rule by the House of Saud. But when oil wealth opened Saudi Arabia to the West in the 20th century, some Wahhabi clerics became radical opponents of a royal family they no longer saw as keepers of the faith but as decadent apostates. <br /><br />Some U.S. officials describe Saudi-backed Wahhabism as a philosophical "platform" that terrorists have used to justify holy war. "Al Qaeda has taken advantage of state-supported proselytizing around the world," said senior Treasury Department official Juan Zarate, whose office has taken a leading role in designating terrorist financiers and is pressing the Saudi government to crack down on them, as well. <br /><br />One of the principal organizations under investigation in the United States is a group the Saudi Embassy has branded as Muslim extremists. It is the Michigan-based Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA), whose webmaster is Saleh Hussayen's nephew: Sami Omar Hussayen, a computer scientist jailed in Idaho on charges he failed to disclose his work for IANA on immigration forms. <br /><br />IANA, U.S. authorities have contended in Idaho court proceedings, is a powerful engine for groups that promote teachings and religious fatwas -- orders that advocate violence against the United States -- issued by two radical Saudi clerics. <br /><br />The clerics, Safar Hawali and Salman Ouda, were identified in the first World Trade Center bombing trial as spiritual advisers to bin Laden. Both were jailed for radicalism during the 1990s in Saudi Arabia. <br /><br />U.S. investigators are focusing on interlocking affiliations among organizations and individuals that have ties to IANA, which has created a dozen or more Web sites whose objective, prosecutors have stated in court papers in Idaho, was the "dissemination of radical Islamic ideology, the purpose of which was indoctrination, recruitment of members and the instigation of acts of violence and terrorism." <br /><br />According to FBI testimony in those proceedings, Hussayen visited Wahhabis and Salafis -- as non-Saudi adherents are known -- in New York, Michigan, Chicago, Canada and, most significantly, Northern Virginia, a hub for Saudi-backed religious organizations that have wide influence in promoting Salafi doctrine in mosques, at conferences and around the globe on the Internet. <br /><br />Hussayen met with IANA representatives in Ann Arbor, Mich., according to the court testimony of Idaho FBI agent Michael Gneckow. In court papers, the FBI has described Saleh Hussayen as a financial backer of IANA, an assertion confirmed by his nephew's lawyer in Idaho. <br /><br />In recent months, 19 individuals who have come under investigation as part of the probe have been arrested or indicted. They include Bassem K. Khafagi, a former IANA president, who pleaded guilty two weeks ago to bank fraud in federal court in Detroit. In Syracuse, five men tied to an IANA affiliate called Help the Needy are charged by federal authorities with sending money to Iraq in violation of U.S. economic sanctions. <br /><br />In Northern Virginia, 11 men were indicted in June, accused of training to wage jihad with a Pakistani terrorist group. Charges against seven of the men were upgraded last week to conspiring to support terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda. Four others have already pleaded guilty to lesser gun and conspiracy charges. <br /><br />The indictment also alleged that the men's spiritual leader, Ali Timimi, who has long been associated with IANA, told group members in September 2001 that the time had come for them "to . . . join the mujaheddin engaged in violent jihad in Kashmir, Chechnya, Afghanistan or Indonesia" and that "American troops were legitimate targets of the jihad." <br /><br />Defense lawyers in the case have argued that the men are being unfairly targeted because they are Muslims. <br /><br />Timimi has denied that he condoned killing Americans. He has not been indicted, though his attorney has said that he expects Timimi to be charged. <br /><br />When Timimi's Fairfax house was searched by the FBI this spring, items seized included Khafagi's personal papers, which Timimi was holding for safekeeping. The two had been IANA's representatives to the 1995 international women's conference in Beijing, where IANA argued against Western feminism and defended female circumcision, which is practiced in some Islamic societies. <br /><br />Investigators at multiple federal agencies are trying to sort out the network's seemingly innumerable links, some of which lead back to the same nondescript office building at 360 S. Washington St. in Falls Church. It is there that Timimi used to lecture at Dar al Arqam, the same religious center frequented by another internationally known Salafi imam, Jaafar Idris. His lectures, like Timimi's, are posted on extremist Web sites around the world, including IANA's. <br /><br />Idris is president of the American Open University in Fairfax, a "distance learning" center that uses the Web to promote Salafi teaching. The university has received funding from IANA, according to tax records. <br /><br />Neither Idris nor others at the university responded to requests for interviews, but they were among those in the United States whom Hussayen was scheduled to see, according to sources with knowledge of his trip. <br /><br />Those sources said Hussayen was also scheduled to visit officials at the Muslim World League, a multibillion-dollar, Saudi-based umbrella charity organization whose U.S. offices are at 360 S. Washington St. Muslim World League officials declined to be interviewed. <br /><br />The Muslim World League office was raided in March 2002 by Treasury Department agents as part of an investigation into a Herndon-based network of Saudi-financed charities and companies suspected of ties to al Qaeda, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The Muslim World League and its offshoot, the International Islamic Relief Organization, have been the subjects of terrorism financing inquiries in the United States and several other countries. <br /><br />Hussayen also was scheduled to meet with officials of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), another huge Saudi-based charity headed by the Saudi government's minister of Islamic affairs, according to sources knowledgeable about the investigation. WAMY's U.S. office on Leesburg Pike in Falls Church was incorporated by bin Laden's nephew, Abdullah bin Laden, and operated by him until the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. <br /><br />Bush administration officials have pressed the Saudi government to clamp down on the Muslim World League and WAMY, according to federal law enforcement sources, and both are defendants in civil lawsuits filed by families of the victims of the attacks. <br /><br />Maher Hanania, attorney for WAMY in the United States, denied that WAMY has ties to IANA and said that Hussayen did not meet with WAMY officials while he was in the United States. WAMY has not been criminally charged in any country with supporting terrorism, he said. He acknowledged that WAMY's office here has been under FBI investigation, but said that thus far "the FBI has found no wrongdoing. . . . As to our understanding, the FBI has closed its file on WAMY." The FBI would not comment. <br /><br />Recent Senate testimony about Khalid Mishal, a Hamas leader who has praised suicide bombers, speaking at an October 2002 WAMY conference in Riyadh, has prompted demands on Capitol Hill that the Bush administration freeze the organization's assets. Hanania said that while Mishal spoke at the conference, that is evidence only that WAMY promotes free expression. WAMY, he said, does not "condone his thinking or policies." <br /><br />Other featured speakers at that conference included Ouda, Idris and Saleh Hussayen. <br /><br />IANA conferences in the United States began drawing the scrutiny of terrorism researchers a decade ago because of their heavy Wahhabi and Salafi bent. According to the Investigative Project, a terrorism research group that has monitored Islamic extremists, a senior al Qaeda recruiter, Abdelrahman Dosari, spoke at three IANA conferences in the early 1990s. <br /><br />FBI and Treasury officials said they believe some Islamic conferences, as well as Web sites that extol radical Islam, are vehicles in the United States for recruitment and fundraising by terrorist groups. <br /><br />Until it was modified this year, for example, IANA's Islamway.com Web site offered Arabic-language videos with graphic scenes of jihadist combat. "Martyrs of Bosnia" contains footage of al Qaeda members, and suspected al Qaeda members are featured in a second such film called "Operation Badr." <br /><br />The U.S. government has shut down numerous Web sites that promote terrorism, but new ones pop up quickly. <br /><br />IANA has received $3 million since 1995, according to FBI court filings, much of it from abroad, including $100,000 from Saleh Hussayen. Government officials are tracing the finances of IANA and related groups. <br /><br />"It's much more than about the money they raise. It's proselytizing, recruiting and radicalizing people in this country and other places across the globe," said Matthew Levitt, a former FBI counterterrorism official now with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. <br /><br />The Idaho visa fraud indictment against Sami Hussayen contends that he administered a Web site associated with IANA that expressly advocated suicide attacks and using airliners as weapons. Court papers filed by the government assert that an IANA Web site published a fatwa issued by Ouda on June 19, 2001, that "justified and advocated suicide bombings," and that two months later, on Aug. 16, an IANA Web site in Canada published an "invitation to jihad." <br /><br />"If Sheikh Ouda holds up a banner saying, 'Go Kill the Military,' a true believer takes that as an order to take action," one official involved in the investigation said. <br /><br />David Nevin, attorney for Sami Hussayen, said Ouda and Hawali are "observed figures" in Saudi Arabia, not proponents of violence. Nevin said Saleh Hussayen was a backer of IANA but not a principal in the organization. He declined to discuss Hussayen's visit to the United States, other than to say that "it was utterly and completely innocuous and without connection to anything improper." <br /><br />Within five months of his journey, Hussayen would assume the post of general president of the Grand Mosque and the Prophet's Mosque, a position that involves him in the administrative affairs of the kingdom's charities. <br /><br />Hussayen has a background in Saudi-backed charities. Virginia incorporation records show that during the 1990s, he was a director of the SAAR Foundation, a charitable organization that was at the center of a sprawling conglomerate of Muslim institutes, companies and religious groups that are under federal investigation for alleged ties to terrorist organizations. SAAR's offices in Northern Virginia were raided in 2002, kicking off the government's most wide-ranging probe to date into suspected terrorist financing. This week, Abdurahman Alamoudi, a prominent Muslim activist affiliated with the SAAR network, was charged with illegally doing business with Libya. <br /><br />Nancy Luque, attorney for two top officials of the defunct SAAR network, confirmed that a Saleh Hussayen had served as a SAAR director, but suggested that her clients did not know of his importance in Saudi Arabia. <br /><br />Saudi Embassy Donates Korans <br /><br />In his travels in Northern Virginia, Hussayen also scheduled a meeting with the leader of the Islamic Foundation of America (IFA), a Springfield organization that operates a school, a mosque and an active prison outreach program, at one time sending out about 40 Korans a day provided by the Saudi Embassy, according to spokeswoman Narmeen Slim. <br /><br />The group's founders include Idris and an austere and enigmatic Saudi cleric, Ibrahim Ibn Kulaib. The foundation has chosen a run-down warehouse just yards from the Interstate 395 Mixing Bowl from which to mount its stated mission of "spreading the message of Islam throughout the U.S. and all over the world." <br /><br />IFA's headquarters have been visited by well-known Wahhabi and Salafi leaders. Among those who have spoken there are Timimi and Sirhaj Wirhaj, a New York imam who was an unindicted co-conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. <br /><br />The most intriguing aspect of Hussayen's journey may be entirely coincidental: his brief proximity in a hotel near Dulles International Airport to three of the Sept. 11, 2001, hijackers the night before they crashed Flight 77 into the Pentagon. On the night of Sept. 10, Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi checked into the same hotel, a Marriott Residence Inn. <br /><br />The FBI has examined hotel videotapes and interviewed employees, but has found no indication that Hussayen and the hijackers interacted, law enforcement sources said. After the attack, an FBI agent interviewed hotel guests, including Hussayen and his wife, but did not get very far. <br /><br />According to court testimony from FBI agent Gneckow earlier this year, the interview was cut short when Hussayen "feigned a seizure, prompting the agents to take him to a hospital, where the attending physicians found nothing wrong with him." <br /><br />The agent recommended that Hussayen "should not be allowed to leave until a follow-up interview could occur," Gneckow told the court. But "her recommendation, for whatever reason, was not complied with," he said. <br /><br />On Sept. 19, the day air travel resumed, Hussayen and his wife took off for Saudi Arabia. <br /><br />Research editor Margot Williams contributed <br /><br />to this report.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-24031569894600556492008-03-25T06:29:00.000-07:002008-03-25T06:30:09.006-07:00World Assembly of Muslim Youth - WAMY - Operation Fits New UK Terror ModelWorld Assembly of Muslim Youth - WAMY - Operation Fits New UK Terror Model<br /><br />By Beila Rabinowitz - Director MilitantIslamMonitor.org & William A. Mayer - E&P PipeLineNews.org <br /><br />October 20, 2006 - San Francisco, CA - PipeLineNews.org - Indicating the more serious nature of America's approach to Islamist terror, WAMY's U.S. operations - as opposed to those centered in the UK - have been shut down. <br /><br />As a result, Britain is now facing the consequences of enabling Islamists. <br /><br />In 2004 the offices of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth in Virginia were raided by 50 agents from the FBI and affiliated law enforcement agencies. WAMY's Falls Church Virginia offices had been incorporated in 1992 by Osama bin-Laden's nephew Abdullah. <br /><br />When the branch moved to Alexandria, VA, Abdullah bin-Laden was listed as president and was so through 2002. Bin-Laden's name continued to appear on WAMY's tax forms until 1998. <br /><br />WAMY publications have singled out for admiration, terrorists who attacked Israelis. One in particular lists a man who drove 14 bus passengers off a cliff as a member of the "Heroes from Palestine." <br /><br />According to a Washington Post June 2, 2004 article, a federal affidavit alleges that WAMY has ties to Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist group. <br /><br />After the raid WAMY issued a statement cynically comparing themselves to the YMCA, saying their focus was on "youth education, youth development and serving the Muslim community." <br /><br />This is exactly the model that has alarmingly been employed in the UK, as detailed in our piece UK In Mortal Danger As Al-Qaeda Sleeper Cells Proliferate, which finds that al-Qaeda has seized upon a "youth group" model that seeks to identify and inculcate into the terror process impressionable young people. <br /><br />The shutting down of WAMY's Virginia operations as a terror enterprise, has not hindered its proliferation overseas, according to their website: <br /><br />"WAMY is the first 'International Islamic Organisation' dealing specially with youth affairs embracing over 450 Islamic youth/ students organization in the five continents." <br /><br />Though funded by the Wahhabists and based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia WAMY is flourishing in the UK where it still legally operates. Its London offices are located in the heart of the city where they pursue an "Islamic [read Islamist] Future." also the name of their monthly magazine. <br /><br />Regarding the July 7, 2005 London terror bombing plot, the UK's counter terrorism establishment views Mohammed Siddique Khan as the dominant senior planner. <br /><br />Khan a Pakistani, was employed as a primary school teacher for four years in a London suburb [Beeston] and using the newly discovered and above referenced "youth model" template, he identified, mentored and cultivated the three younger men in his terror cell. He also served as a go-between, providing liaison services between the UK and al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan. <br /><br />Khan therefore used his father figure status among the disenfranchised to seek, identify, radicalize and ultimately manipulate susceptible Muslim youth with the purpose of building the terrorist network which resulted in the death of 56 and the wounding of over 700 Londoners. <br /><br />Given WAMY's proven ties to al-Qaeda [a direct link to bin-Laden's nephew], its Islamist philosophy and long history of supporting violence and "martyrdom," one must view as extremely suspect its entire youth based facade. <br /><br />We see WAMY as a clear and present danger to the West and therefore recommend shutting it down immediately. At the same time its ties to the international Islamist terror network must be pursued and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-69808459724473685622008-03-25T06:26:00.001-07:002008-03-25T06:26:59.266-07:00Wahhabism & Islam in the U.S.Wahhabism & Islam in the U.S.<br />Two-faced policy fosters danger.<br /><br />By Stephen Schwartz<br /><br />EDITOR’S NOTE: This is the text of testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security on Thursday, June 26, 2003.<br /> <br /> <br /><br /> hairman Kyl, other distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation to appear here today. <br /><br />I come before this body to describe how adherents of Wahhabism, the most extreme, separatist, and violent form of Islam, and the official sect in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have come to dominate Islam in the U.S. <br /><br />Islam is a fairly new participant at the "big table" of American religions. The Muslim community only became a significant element in our country's life in the 1980s. Most "born Muslims," as opposed to those who "converted" — a term Muslims avoid, preferring "new Muslims" — had historically been immigrants from Pakistan and India who followed traditional, peaceful, mainstream Islam.<br /><br />With the growth of the Islamic community in America, there was no "Islamic establishment" in the U.S. — in contrast with Britain, France, and Germany, the main Western countries with significant Islamic minorities. Historically, traditional scholars have been a buffer against extremism in Islam, and for various sociological and demographic reasons, American Islam lacked a stratum of such scholars. The Wahhabi ideological structure in Saudi Arabia perceived this as an opportunity to fill a gap — to gain dominance over an Islamic community in the West with immense potential for political and social influence. <br /><br />But the goals of this operation, which was largely successful, were multiple.<br /><br />First, to control a significant group of Muslim believers. <br /><br />Second, to use the Muslim community in the U.S. to pressure U.S. government and media, in the formulation of policy and in perceptions about Islam. This has included liaison meetings, "sensitivity" sessions and other public activities with high-level administration officials, including the FBI director, that we have seen since September 11. <br /><br />Third, to advance the overall Wahhabi agenda of "jihad against the world" — an extremist campaign to impose the Wahhabi dispensation on the global Islamic community, as well as to confront the other religions. This effort has included the establishment in the U.S. of a base for funding, recruitment, and strategic/tactical support of terror operations in the U.S. and abroad.<br /><br />Wahhabi-Saudi policy has always been two-faced: that is, at the same time as the Wahhabis preach hostility and violence against non-Wahhabi Muslims, they maintain a policy of alliance with Western military powers — first Britain, then the U.S. and France — to assure their control over the Arabian Peninsula.<br /><br />At the present time, Shia and other non-Wahhabi Muslim community leaders estimate that 80 percent of American mosques are under Wahhabi control. This does not mean 80 percent of American Muslims support Wahhabism, although the main Wahhabi ideological agency in America, the so-called Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) has claimed that some 70 percent of American Muslims want Wahhabi teaching in their mosques.1This is a claim we consider unfounded.<br /><br />Rather, Wahhabi control over mosques means control of property, buildings, appointment of imams, training of imams, content of preaching — including faxing of Friday sermons from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia — and of literature distributed in mosques and mosque bookstores, notices on bulletin boards, and organizational solicitation. Similar influence extends to prison and military chaplaincies, Islamic elementary and secondary schools (academies), college campus activity, endowment of academic chairs and programs in Middle East studies, and most notoriously, charities ostensibly helping Muslims abroad, many of which have been linked to or designated as sponsors of terrorism.<br /><br />The main organizations that have carried out this campaign are the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), which originated in the Muslim Students' Association of the U.S. and Canada (MSA), and CAIR. Support activities have been provided by the American Muslim Council (AMC), the American Muslim Alliance (AMA), the Muslim American Society (MAS), the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences, its sister body the International Institute of Islamic Thought, and a number of related groups that I have called "the Wahhabi lobby." ISNA operates at least 324 mosques in the U.S. through the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT). These groups operate as an interlocking directorate.<br /><br />Both ISNA and CAIR, in particular, maintain open and close relations with the Saudi government — a unique situation, in that no other foreign government directly uses religion as a cover for its political activities in the U.S. For example, notwithstanding support by the American Jewish community for the state of Israel, the government of Israel does not intervene in synagogue life or the activities of rabbinical or related religious bodies in America.<br /><br />According to saudiembassy.net, the official website of the Saudi government, CAIR received $250,000 from the Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank, an official Saudi financial institution, in 1999, for the purchase of land in Washington, D.C., to construct a headquarters facility.2<br /><br />In a particularly disturbing case, the Islamic Development Bank also granted US$295,000 to the Masjid Bilal Islamic Center, for the construction of the Bilal Islamic Primary and Secondary School in California, in 1999.3 Hassan Akbar, an American Muslim presently charged with a fatal attack on his fellow soldiers in Kuwait during the Iraq intervention, was affiliated with this institution.<br /><br />In addition, the previously mentioned official website of the Saudi government reported a donation in 1995 of $4 million for the construction of a mosque complex in Los Angeles, named for Ibn Taymiyyah, a historic Islamic figure considered the forerunner of Wahhabism.4 (It should be noted that Ibn Taymiyyah is viewed as a marginal, extremist, ideological personality by many traditional Muslims. In the wake of the Riyadh bombings of 2003, the figure of Ibn Taymiyyah symbolized, in Saudi public discourse, the inner rot of the regime. An article in the reformist daily al-Watan was headlined, "Who is More Important? The Nation or Ibn Taymiyyah"? Soon after it appeared, Jamal Khashoggi, editor of al-Watan and former deputy editor of Arab News, was dismissed from his post.) <br /><br />The same official Saudi website reported a donation of $6 million, also in 1995, for a mosque in Cincinnati, Ohio.5 The website further stated, in 2000, "In the United States, the Kingdom has contributed to the establishment of the Islamic Center in Washington DC; the Omer Bin Al-Khattab Mosque in western Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Islamic Center, and the Fresno Mosque in California; the Islamic Center in Denver, Colorado; the Islamic center in Harrison, New York City; and the Islamic Center in Northern Virginia."6<br /><br />How much money, in total, is involved in this effort? If we accept a low figure of control, i.e. NAIT ownership of 27 percent of 1,200 mosques, stated by CAIR and cited by Mary Jacoby and Graham Brink in the St. Petersburg Times,7 we have some 324 mosques.<br /><br />If we assume a relatively low average of expenditures, e.g. $.5 million per mosque, we arrive at $162 million. <br /><br />But given that Saudi official sources show $6 million in Cincinnati and $4 million in Los Angeles, we should probably raise the average to $1 million per mosque, resulting in $324 million as a minimum.<br /><br />Our view is that the number of mosques under Wahhabi control actually totals at least 600 out of the official total of 1,200, while, as noted, Shia community leaders endorse the figure of 80 percent Wahhabi control. But we also offer a number of 4-6,000 mosques overall, including small and diverse congregations of many kinds. <br /><br />A radical critic of Wahhabism stated some years ago that $25m had been spent on Islamic Centers in the U.S. by the Saudi authorities. This now seems a low figure. Another anti-extremist Islamic figure has estimated Saudi expenses in the U.S., over 30 years, and including schools and free books as well as mosques, near a billion dollars.<br /><br />It should also be noted that Wahhabi mosques in the U.S. work in close coordination with the Muslim World League (MWL) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), Saudi state entities identified as participants in the funding of al Qaeda.<br /><br />Wahhabi ideological control within Saudi Arabia is based on the historic compact of intermarriage between the family of the sect's originator, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and the family of the founding ruler, Ibn Saud. To this day, these families divide governance of the kingdom, with the descendants of Ibn al-Wahhab, known as ahl al-Shaykh, responsible for religious life, and the Saudi royal family, or ahl al-Saud, running the state. The two families also continue to marry their descendants to one another. The supreme religious leader of Saudi Arabia is a member of the family of Ibn al-Wahhab. The state appoints a minister of religious affairs who controls such bodies as MWL and WAMY, and upon leaving his ministerial post he becomes head of MWL. <br /><br />The official Saudi-embassy website reported exactly one year ago, on June 26, 2002, "The delegation of the Muslim World League (MWL) that is on a world tour promoting goodwill arrived in New York yesterday, and visited the Islamic Center there." The same website later reported, on July 8, 2002, "During a visit on Friday evening to the headquarters of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) [Secretary-General of the MWL Dr. Abdullah bin Abdulmohsin Al-Turki] advocated coordination among Muslim organizations in the United States. Expressing MWL's readiness to offer assistance in the promotion and coordination of Islamic works, he announced plans to set up a commission for this purpose. The MWL delegation also visited the Islamic Center in Washington DC and was briefed on its activities by its director Dr. Abdullah bin Mohammad Fowaj."8<br /><br />In a related matter, on June 22, 2003, in a letter to the New York Post, James Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute, a civic lobbying organization, stated that his attendance at a press conference of WAMY in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, had been organized by the U.S. embassy in the kingdom. If this is true, it is extremely alarming. The U.S. embassy should not act as a supporter of WAMY, which, as documented by FDD and the Saudi Institute,9 teaches that Shia Muslims, including even the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, are Jewish agents. <br /><br />This is comparable to Nazi claims that Jewish business owners were Communists, or Slobodan Miloševic's charge, in the media of ex-Yugoslavia, that Tito was an agent of the Vatican. The aim is to derange people, to separate them from reality completely, in preparation for massacres. We fear that official Saudi anxiety their large and restive Shia minority, aggravated by Saudi resentment over the emergence of a protodemocratic regime in Iraq led by Shias, and consolidation of popular sovereignty in Shia Iran, may lead the Saudi regime to treat Shias as a convenient scapegoat, making them victims of a wholesale atrocity. The history of Wahhabism is filled with mass murder of Shia Muslims.<br /><br />There is clearly a problem of Wahhabi/Saudi extremist influence in American Islam. The time is now to face the problem squarely and find ways to enable and support traditional, mainstream American Muslims in taking their community back from these extremists, while employing law enforcement to interdict the growth of Wahhabism and its financial support by the Saudis. If we fail to do this, Wahhabi extremism continues to endanger the whole world — Muslims and non-Muslims alike.<br /><br />Thank you for your attention.<br /><br />NOTES<br />1 Council on American Islamic Relations, The Mosque in America: A National Portrait, A Report from the Mosque Study Project, April 26, 2001.<br /><br />2 Saudi Embassy Press Archive, August 15, 1999.<br /><br />3 Islamic Development Bank; also, "IDB Allocates $202 Mln to Finance Islamic Development Ventures," Arabic News, 1/25/2000. <br /><br />4 Saudi Embassy Press Archive, July 8, 1995.<br /><br />5 Saudi Embassy Press Archive, November 10, 1995.<br /><br />6 Saudi Embassy Press Archive, March 5, 2000.<br /><br />7 "Saudi Form of Islam Wars With Moderates," St. Petersburg Times, March 11, 2003.<br /><br />8 Saudi Embassy Press Archive.<br /><br />9 Ali al-Ahmed and Stephen Schwartz, "Saudis Spread Hate Speech in U.S," Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Washington, copublished with Saudi Institute.<br /><br /><br />— Stephen Schwartz is director, Islam and Democracy Program at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-87700423771659649882008-03-23T22:27:00.000-07:002008-03-23T22:35:21.990-07:00The Truth About the Muslim BrotherhoodAssyrian International News Agency<br />The Truth About the Muslim Brotherhood<br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />Posted GMT 6-16-2006 15:58:50 <br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br />On October 28, 2005,[1] President George W. Bush denounced IslamoFascist movements that call for a "violent and political vision: the establishment, by terrorism, subversion and insurgency, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom."<br /><br />The Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun)[2] also known as the Ikhwan is a good example of what the President described and what he must protect us against.<br /><br />The Muslim Brotherhood ("MB") organization describes itself as a political and social revolutionary movement; it was founded in March 1928 in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna, who objected to Western influence and called for return to an original Islam.[3]<br /><br />The Brotherhood is an expansive and secretive society with followers in more than 70 countries, dedicated to creating a global Islamic order that would isolate women and punish nonbelievers. Its members and supporters founded al Qaeda, as well as one "of the largest college student groups in the United States."[4]<br /><br />The Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism, Juan Zarate, stated recently, "the Muslim Brotherhood is a group that worries us not because it deals with philosophical or ideological ideas but because it defends the use of violence against civilians."[5] In fact, The MB 1982 secret plan, (the Project) recently exposed, instructs all members locally and globally "To channel thought, education and action in order to establish an Islamic power [government] on the earth." [6]<br /><br />The Muslim Brotherhood has historically and continues to actively pursue the establishment of a Muslim regime that will serve as the basis to re-establish the Caliphate, not only by defending violence against civilians, The current leader of the international Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammad Mahdi Akef,[7] "recently issued a new strategy calling on all its member organizations to serve its global agenda of defeating the West. He called on individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood worldwide to not only join the "resistance" to the U.S. financially, but also through active participation."[8] In the MB Project (1982), Point of Departure[9] instructs members," To use diverse and varied surveillance systems, in several places, to gather information and adopt a single effective warning system serving the worldwide Islamic movement. In fact, surveillance, policy decisions and effective communications complement each other."<br /><br />In an interview to the London based Asharq Al-Awsat,[10] an international Arab newspaper on December 11, 2005, Akef stated that "the Muslim Brotherhood is a global movement whose members cooperate with each other throughout the world, based on the same religious worldview - the spread of Islam, until it rules the world."<br /><br />To that end, Akef said, "the Muslim Brotherhood… are an all-encompassing Islamic organization, calling to the adoption of the great religion that Allah gave in his mercy to humanity." Meanwhile, according to its leader, the MB is busily cementing its ties: "We are in the global arena, and we preach for Allah according to the guidelines of the Muslim Brotherhood. All the members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the international arena operate according to the written charter that states that Jihad is the only way to achieve these goals[11]. "Ours is the largest organization in the world," he said.<br /><br />Akef emphasized, "A Muslim in the international arena, who believes in the charter of the Muslim Brotherhood is considered part of us and we are considered part of him[12]."<br /><br />In earlier interviews, 'Akef called the U.S. "a Satan that abuses the religion." He said: "I expect America to collapse soon," declaring, "I have complete faith that Islam will invade Europe and America[13]." Although U.S. observers often view the Muslim Brotherhood as well as Hamas as less violent than al-Qaeda, the Brotherhood has long been actively supporting global jihadi efforts. "Prior to the U.S.-led attack on the Taliban regime, the Muslim Brotherhood actually had training camps in Afghanistan where it worked with Kashmiri militants and sought to expand its influence in Central Asian states, especially Tajikistan."[14] It is not surprising, therefore, that the Muslim Brotherhood reacted to Hamas' January 2006 electoral victory as not merely as a local achievement, but "a victory of the Islamic nation in its entirety,[15]" and as an expression of the concept that "the path of Islam is the true solution."<br /><br />As the parent of all Sunni and many other Islamist terrorist groups, the MB, to deflect attention, uses its long-term strategy, known as "flexibility"[16] (muruna[17] in Arabic). This chameleon-like adaptation is tactical moderation with the ultimate objective of complete Islamization of society.[18] Indeed, the MB's 1982 project calls on members "To reconcile international engagement with flexibility at a local level."[19]<br /><br />Today, when the West focuses on Islamist terrorism, the MB usually refrains from publicly advocating violence. The MB's 1982 Project, calls on its members "To master the art of the possible on a temporary basis without abusing the basic [Islamic] principles… we should not look for confrontation with our adversaries, at the local or the global scale, which would be disproportionate and could lead to attacks against the dawa or its disciples."[20]<br /><br />As stated on its charter and its website, the MB seeks to install an Islamic totalitarian empire, a worldwide Caliphate, through stages designed to Islamize [21] targeted nations by whatever means available.<br /><br />A principal danger of MB activities is that they are hidden behind "religious" ideology. Moreover, this ideology dictates concealment (Kitman).[22] In fact saying, "we should keep hush-hush on things that are still in preparation." This ideology controls every aspect of life and seeks to impose that control on everyone.<br /><br />In the end, the MB intends to overthrow all secular governments and impose Islamic law (Shari'a) worldwide, and it is diligently pursuing this goal. In July 2005, former Kuwaiti minister of education Dr. Ahmad Al-Rab'i,[23] wrote in the Arabic London daily, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: "The beginnings of all of the religious terrorism that we are witnessing today were in the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology." Thus, on its website,[24] the MB advocates, "Establishing the Islamic government."<br /><br />"Building the Muslim state…Building the Khilafa…Mastering the world with Islam,"[25]; however, would necessarily deprive Americans of their First Amendment, rights.[26] The first clause in the Amendment states there shall be "no law respecting an establishment of religion." The First Amendment also upholds an individuals' right to religious freedom. But as determined by its doctrine, the MB would exploit that right--along with First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly--to actively seek the imposition of laws that would deny religious freedom to everyone else.<br /><br />Moreover, the MB guiding principles celebrate its major [and continuing] role in the struggle to liberate Muslims lands. The ikhwan's bravery in the 1948 Palestine war has been recorded by all sides. The total number of volunteers from the ikhwan in 1948 numbered 10,000 from Egypt, Syria and other countries. In addition to participating in the battle to liberate Palestine, they served to raise the consciousness of Muslims all over the Islamic World and restore to them the spirit of struggle and dignity. The ikhwan have played a role in liberating Muslim lands from colonialist powers in almost every Muslim country. The ikhwan were active amongst Muslims in Central Asian Muslim republics since the '70s, and their involvement can be seen recently in such republics as Tajikistan. More recently they had a major role in the struggle for Afghanistan and Kashmir[27].<br /><br />Clearly, the MB strives for Muslim supremacy, often violently.<br /><br />The MB's readiness to use violence was demonstrated in the U.S., in 1993 with the bombing the World trade Center in NYC. Exiled MB leader, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, in U.S. prison for plotting this attack, also planned to blow up bridges and tunnels in Manhattan.[28] Since then, the MB affiliated groups in the U.S., focused their activities and agenda to condition American minds and behavior to create an Islamic foundation from which violence can spring when the time is right.<br /><br />And future violence is all but guaranteed: In 2004, MB leader Mohammad Mahdi Akef publicly promoted "Palestinian and Iraqi suicide bombers, called for the destruction of Israel and asserted that the United States has no proof that Al Qaeda was to blame for the Sept. 11 attacks."[29]<br /><br />Actively promoting its radical religious ideology, the MB may well meet the definition of a "terrorist organization," under the Patriot Act, even though it has not been so designated by the U.S. government. The law stipulates "terrorist organizations to potentially include terrorist organizations not designated by the Secretary of State …A group that is engaged in terrorist activities might not be designated as a terrorist organization because, inter alia, the group's activities escape the notice of U.S. officials responsible for designated organizations as terrorist; the group has shifting alliances; or designating the group as a terrorist organization would jeopardize ongoing U.S. criminal or military operations". [30]<br /><br />Terrorist organizations are legally defined as groups of two or more individuals that have "committed, incited, planned, prepared, gathered information or provided material support for terrorist activities." However, terrorist activity can in some instances include even "indirect" actions such as group membership and advocacy. [31]<br /><br />In addition, the REAL ID Act of 2005 significantly expanded the legal definition "terrorist organization" as it pertains to U.S. immigration law. "Terrorist organizations" now include any group that solicit funds or memberships for either terrorist organizations or activities, or otherwise provide them material support. The definition now covers groups with subgroups engaged in terrorist activities, too. [32]As we discuss below, the MB has many such subgroups and has spawned many offspring-- thus the MB and all its offspring now seem to fit these legal criteria.<br /><br />The definition of "engaged in terrorist activity" was also broadened under the Real ID Act, to include belonging to, associating with, soliciting or recruiting for, or giving material support to a terrorist organization or even a single member, including non-designated terrorist organizations. Furthermore, if they so claim, the burden is now on aliens to prove that they could not reasonably have known that their actions supported a terrorist group. [33]<br /><br />The Caricatures Riots<br /><br />The riots following the publication of 12 caricatures of the prophet Mohammed in the then obscure Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten, [34] in September 2005, should have surprised no one. In fact, the seeds of Islamic attacks against Denmark, as a stepping-stone to the Islamist takeover of Europe, in line with the MB agenda, were planted long before the cartoons were published.<br /><br />In April 15, 2005, five months before the cartoons ran, Palestinian preacher and leader of Hizb ut Tahrir (a radical group that works to establish the Caliphate), Sheikh Issam Amayra, from the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, called upon Muslims in Denmark to begin a holy war, according to his sermon translated from the Arabic by Jonathan Dahoah Halevi, director of Orient research Group in Toronto, Canada.<br /><br />Amayra's sermon warned that: "…the three percent of the Muslims in Denmark constitute a threat to the future of the kingdom of Denmark. And that should not be a surprise. After all, the Muslims in Yathrib [the city of Medina, before Mohammed moved there from Mecca] constituted less than three percent of the population there. Yet they managed to change Yathrib into Medina. Thus, it should not be a surprise that our Danish brothers manage to bring Islam to all the homes of the Danes. Allah will grant them the victory in their country in order to raise the Caliphate in Denmark."<br /><br />Amayra continued, "Afterwards the citizens of the Caliphate (which will be raised in Denmark) will wage war on Oslo, and after they change that city's name to Medina [for the Arabian holy city] they will fight their neighboring Scandinavian countries in order to join their lands to the territory of the Caliphate. In the next stage, they will wage a holy war and spread the message of Islam to the rest of Europe, until they reach the original city of Medina. Then they will join both cities under the banner of Islam."<br /><br />Clearly, the riots in Denmark and throughout the world were not spontaneous, but planned and organized well in advance[35] by Islamist organizations that support the MB, and with funding mostly from Saudi Arabia.[36]<br /><br />The MB and its offspring organizations employ the Flexibility strategy in the U.S. and wherever they operate. This strategy calls for a minority group of Muslims to use all "legal" means to infiltrate majority-dominated, non-Muslim secular and religious institutions, starting with its universities. As a result, "Islamized" Muslim and non-Muslim university graduates enter the nation's workforce, including its government and civil service sectors, where they are poised to subvert U.S. law enforcement agencies, intelligence communities, military branches, foreign services, and financial institutions.<br /><br />The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States<br /><br />The MB planted its roots in the United States with its 1963 [37] establishment of the Muslim Student Association (MSA).[38] Since then, it has used political developments, especially in the Middle East, to advance its strategic agenda and recruit more like-minded people to the cause of Islamizing the U.S., which, being non-Muslim, constitutes a part of the Dar al Harb - the "Land of Warfare." [39] In other words, it "is a country belonging to infidels which has not been subdued by Islam."<br /><br />This dogma, to which Muslims have adhered since at least the 9th Century, is based on the classical Islamic definition of non-Muslim territory. Egyptian MB spiritual leader Sayyed Qutb [40]expounded further on this ideology. Although he studied in the U.S. from 1948 to 1950 on a U.S.-funded scholarship, Qutb hated America and Western values. Upon his return to Egypt, he joined the MB and became its most influential ideologist and writer after MB founder Hassan al Banna. [41] The Egyptian government executed Qutb in 1966.<br /><br />Following Qutb's vitriolic criticism of the U.S., the MB made the U.S. a target for sedition. In the U.S. (as elsewhere), the MB utilizes its "concealment" strategy through "Political Activism"[42] and exploits U.S. "weaknesses" (istid'af)[43] at opportune moments. The organization also helped to establish mosques, Islamic schools, summer youth camps and prominent Muslim organizations, often with Saudi funds. According to a 2004 Chicago Tribune [44] investigative report, the MB has been "a major factor...in why many Muslim institutions in the nation have become more conservative in recent decades."<br /><br />Indeed, according to Lebanese-American Sufi leader Hisham Kabbani and Italian Muslim leader Sheik Abdul Hadi Palazzi, chief among the extremists controlling at least 80 percent of the more than 3,000 U.S. mosques is the Muslim Brotherhood, [45]or Ikhwan. According to the Tribune, the group even established a correspondence school called the Islamic American University (IAU), based in suburban Detroit, to train teachers and preachers. The IAU chairman and head of their board of trustees, according to MAS' press release in May 2005, is well-known Brotherhood leader Yusuf Al Qaradawi an Egyptian graduate of Al-Azhar Theological Seminary [46] and the rumored MB international chief, who resides in Qatar and was banned from the U.S. in 1999. Sheikh Qaradawi proclaimed in 1995, "We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America, not by the sword but by our Dawa [proselytizing]."[47]<br /><br />MB Network's "Flexibility" in the U.S.<br /><br />On its own website, the MB states its goals under the heading "Establishing the Islamic government." The MB notes that: "Preparing the society is achieved through plans for: spreading the Islamic culture, the possible media means, mosques, and Da'awa [inviting others to Islam, an obligatory duty for Muslims], [48]work in public organizations such as syndicates, parliaments, student unions." In stands to reason that the Brotherhood secretly cultivates new members at the mosques, madrassas and Islamic "Cultural Centers" it has helped to create, providing these recruits with moral and financial support.<br /><br />Today, the MSA advocates, in a Young Muslims of North America newsletter,[49] the collective obligations (fard) of all Muslims. "These include the spreading of the message of Islam (Da'awa), the establishment of the Islamic State (khilafah) and the defense of Muslim lands (jihad)." The Young Muslims of North America and the Alexandria, Virginia-based Muslim American Society (MAS) Youth Department note that these are required by the Shari'a and in "some of the Islamic Movement's texts on these subjects," including "the key books of any of the following: [MB founder] Hasan al-Banna, [Pakistani MB role model] Abul A'la Mawdudi, [50] Ahmad ar-Rashid, Assam al-Bashir and [Al-Qaeda co-founder] Abdullah Azzam)."[51]<br /><br />Brotherhood members rarely announce their affiliation, since they are sworn to secrecy when they join. But operating under the seemingly benign name of the "Cultural Society" to avoid detection, the American Muslim Brotherhood also created organizations such as the Muslim Youth of North America (MYNA),[52] the North American Islamic Trust [53] (NAIT), the Islamic Medical Association [54] (IMA), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) [55], and The Muslim American Society [56] (MAS) according to the Tribune, the Washington Post, [57] and the MAS website. [58]<br /><br />With help from the late MB member, Isma`il al-Faruqi, the group also established the International Institute of Islamic Thought [59] (IIIT) based in Herndon, Va., which publishes books and pamphlets resting on MB educational theory. This thesis is actually a plan advocating the Islamization of virtually all fields--from Economics [60] and Science and Technology [61] to The Islamization of Knowledge. [62] In Muslims and Islamization in North America: Problems and Prospects, [63] the group describes the hurdles it faces in its planned takeover of the U.S. and Canada. IIIT even envisions historical revisionism to erase non-Muslim scholarly documentation of the past and replace it with an Islamist perspective. The Treasury Department's Operation Green Quest [64] investigation also identified methods by which IIIT may have funded suspected terrorists. Furthermore, on the 2004 Form 990 filed with the IRS, the IIIT reported that it sent $17,849 to Rahim Ghouse, an Australian/Malay business associate of Yassin al Qadi, an al-Qaeda financier and a U.S. designated terrorist. The family refused to answer any questions about these and other funds regularly received from the IIIT. Moreover, the IIIT directors plead the Fifth Amendment on page 26 of the Form 990.<br /><br />Other organizations that openly support the MB dogma include The American Muslim Council (AMC),[65] the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC),[66] the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)[67], Islamic Center of Southern California (ICSC),[68] Islamic Society of Orange County, (ISOC) and many others.<br /><br />Many of these groups deny connections to or influence from the Muslim Brotherhood, but all of them mouth the same ideological goals, most often with the exact same words that appear on the MB's own websites. The MAS website, for example, describes itself as "a charitable, religious, social, cultural, and educational, not-for-profit organization" that seeks "an Islamic revival and reform movement that uplifts the individual, family, and society." Moreover, the official MAS publication, the American Muslim, [69] posts on its website the biography and "appreciation" of MB founder Hasan al-Banna. The American Muslim noted in its first issue: "Created in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood became the first mass-based, overtly political movement to oppose the ascendancy of secular and Western ideas in the Middle East. The Brotherhood saw in these ideas the root of the decay of Islamic societies in the modern world, and advocated a return to Islam as a solution to the ills that had befallen Muslim societies."<br /><br />Furthermore, former MAS Communications Director Ismail (Randall) Royer [70], who also worked for AMC and CAIR[71], pleaded guilty [72] to helping other Muslims reach a Pakistani training camp run by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a designated foreign terrorist organization and a MB offshoot.<br /><br />The AMC, established in 1990, similarly advertises itself [73] as a "movement for political and civil rights" and "justice for all Americans." The group also wants to increase "effective participation of American Muslims in the U.S. political and public policy arenas,"--but only to promote the ultimate MB goal of establishing an Islamic state. Former AMC founder and director Abdurrahman Alamoudi, [74] now imprisoned for 23 years [75] for his role in a 2003 Libyan plot to assassinate Saudi (then Crown Prince) King Abdullah, demonstrated in January 2001 [76] just how strongly he and his group felt about U.S. democracy when he served as the AMC delegate to a terrorists' "Jerusalem" Conference in Beirut, where he (and at least four other American Muslims) met with leaders from Al Qaeda, HAMAS, Hizballah and Islamic Jihad [77] as well as such state sponsors of terror as Syria, Sudan and Iran. The conference drew up a statement advocating "Jihad (holy war) in all its forms." It also stated: "America today is a second Israel." Indeed, these Islamist terrorists have for years advertised that the war against Israel and the war on America are one and the same. In January 2001,[78] when these terrorist chieftains met at the Beirut conference[79], they issued a communiqué saying: "Destroy Israel ... Boycott America." It also called for "Jihad in all its forms and resistance" against Israel and urged a boycott of American goods, since "American products are exactly like the Israeli products." [80]<br /><br />Despite all this, the AMC has had considerable access to U.S. leadership, thereby lending the group a facade of legitimacy. In 1991 and 1992, respectively, Imam Siraj Wahhaj [81] and Imam Warith D. Mohammed, made the first Islamic invocations at the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, according to the AMC website. Alamoudi's visits to both the Bill Clinton [82] and George W. Bush [83] White House received wide media coverage.<br /><br />The Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, Virginia., is the major MB mosque for the Washington DC area. Its former chief cleric, Anwar Aulaqi, called [84] on the faithful "to become 'shaheeds," or martyrs, and "die in the sake of Allah." The U.S.-born Aulaqi was educated in Yemen, and according to the 9/11 Commission report [85], he met on several occasions with two of the 9/11 attackers in San Diego.<br /><br />MPAC openly supports MB progeny in its obituary for HAMAS founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin,[86] whom Israel eliminated in March 2004. The article, still posted on the MPAC website, bemoans the loss of this terrorist leader, who is described as a harmless invalid. Furthermore, as Steven Emerson reported in American Jihad, the MPAC cosponsored an October 28, 2000 rally in Washington DC to support the "Al-Aqsa intifada." While AMC leader Alamoudi exhorted the crowd to cheer for HAMAS and Hizballah, MPAC political adviser Mahdi Bray "was seen jubilantly exclaiming his support for these two deadly terrorist organizations." MPAC senior adviser Dr. Maher Hathout, who also participated, later heralded the rally in an American Muslim article "as a marker of a 'new era." And in a 2003 position paper concerning counter-terrorism, the MPAC questioned [87] whether "alleged terror plots, such as those in Seattle, Buffalo, Portland, and Detroit, actually posed threats as serious as the government initially claimed them to be." In two of those cases, the suspects had gone to Afghanistan to join the Taliban and train in their terrorist camps.<br /><br />MB Infiltration into U.S. Academia<br /><br />Even a random examination of political positions on U.S. university campuses reveals the very same ideology dominated by anti-American attitudes, often directed by MSA chapters or Middle East Centers and departments.<br /><br />In February 2004, at an MSA West [88] conference at the University of California (Berkeley), Amir Abdel Malik Ali, the Oakland mosque imam, called for the establishment of an Islamic dictatorship [89] in the U.S., which would eliminate the Constitution, Bill of Rights and Declaration of Independence.<br /><br />On September 7, 2005, Carnegie Endowment [90] for International Peace awarded Mustafa Khalfi a three-month fellowship, as part of his yearlong Fulbright/American Political Science Association Congressional fellowship. He is now in Washington DC, where he is "studying U.S. policy in the Middle East, with a focus on democracy promotion efforts." Khalfi is the editor-in-chief of the Moroccan Islamist newspaper, at-Tajdid, [91] which in addition to printing pro-Islamist terrorist propaganda and anti-American articles, is raising money for HAMAS, and many other outlawed Islamist organizations, most of which are also offshoots of the MB, and are united under the umbrella organization "The Union of Good,"[92] which is represented by the London based Islamist organization Interpal. At-Tajdid, until February 2006, had a link directing its readers to the donation page of Interpal, which the U.S. Treasury department had identified in 2003 [93] as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for supporting HAMAS.<br /><br />Yet Khalfi was not the first Islamist with an avowedly anti-western agenda to study at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Earlier, in March 2005, SAIS appointed Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia's former deputy prime minister, as a visiting scholar at its Foreign Policy Institute. Ibrahim co-founded the Herndon, Virginia-based International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), which according to the Washington Post, "was set up in the 1980s largely by onetime Brotherhood sympathizers with money from wealthy Saudis." [94]<br /><br />Ibrahim also strongly supports al-Qaradawi's pro-Jihad doctrines. SAIS, however, recently lost Ibrahim to the newly renamed Prince Alwaleed bin Talal [95] Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, at Georgetown University, where he lectures "on several topics. [96]" It is ironic that this trustee of the World Association of Muslim Youth, which supports HAMAS and has been implicated [97] in funding al Qaeda and other Islamist organizations, has been assigned to teach Georgetown students "modernity in Islam, [and] interfaith understanding." [98]<br /><br />There are literally hundreds of similar examples of "Islamist thought at work" on U.S. campuses.<br /><br />MB "Flexibility" Exposed<br /><br />For its part, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) has been repeatedly linked to the MB-spawned HAMAS. According to investigative reporter Joe Kaufman[99] and counterterrorism expert Matthew Epstein[100], CAIR was founded in 1994 by former Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP) officials Omar Ahmad[101] and Nihad Awad[102]. The IAP is "a front organization for HAMAS,"[103] says former FBI counterterrorism chief Oliver "Buck" Revell. In 2004, a federal court found the IAP jointly liable (with an alleged HAMAS fund raiser and the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development) for $156 million in damages [104] for helping HAMAS to murder a 17-year-old U.S. citizen in the West Bank. After 9/11, CAIR was caught [105] raising funds for two HAMAS-linked fund raising "charities," the Holy Land Foundation (HLF)[106] and the Global Relief Foundation.[107] In 2003, CAIR also received funds from the Brotherhood-linked IIIT, according to Daniel Pipes.[108]<br /><br />CAIR's former communications director and civil-rights coordinator was sentenced to twenty years in prison, on April 9, 2004, for "using and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and carrying an explosive during the commission of a felony,"[109] and attempting to join Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani offshoot of the MB and an al Qaeda- linked organization. In addition, he pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting three Jihadists to obtain training in a terrorist camp in Pakistan in order to fight American troops in Afghanistan. All of Royer's activities occurred while working for CAIR.<br /><br />Bassam Khafagi who was a founding member and President of the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) was also community affairs director for CAIR when arrested in 2003, for founding and funding the Ypsilanti-based Islamic Assembly of North America, which the FBI suspected of financing terrorism. [110] According to a September 2003 testimony before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Khafagi headed IANA during the time senior al-Qaeda recruiter Abdelrahman Al-Dosari spoke at IANA's 1993, 1994 and 1995 conferences.[111]<br /><br />Finally, according to the Justice Department, Ghassan Elashi [112], who founded the Texas Chapter of CAIR and served as chairman of the Holy Land Foundation, a specially designated terrorist organization, was convicted [113] in April 2005, of knowingly dealing with HAMAS leader and designated terrorist Mousa Abu Marzook.<br /><br />In light of the fact that many senior officials in the above mentioned organizations have been convicted for a variety of terrorists' related offenses, one would expect that the organizations would be held responsible as well.<br /><br />Several key CAIR affiliates have also made comments mimicking MB ideology. CAIR board member [114] Ihsan Bagby stated [115] in the late 1980s that Muslims "can never be full citizens of [the U.S.]... because there is no way we can be fully committed to the institutions and ideologies of this country." CAIR spokesman [116] Ibrahim Hooper told the Minneapolis Star Tribune on April 4, 1993: "I wouldn't want to create the impression that I wouldn't like the government of the United States to be Islamic sometime in the future." And CAIR chairman Omar Ahmad [117], said in July 1998, "Islam isn't in America to be equal to any other faith, but to become dominant. The Koran . . . should be the highest authority in America, and Islam the only accepted religion on earth."<br /><br />MB Success in Europe as a Model for the U.S.<br /><br />While pursuing its goals in the U.S., the MB has conducted the same subversive program in Europe. In "The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe," in the Winter 2005, issue of Middle East Quarterly, researcher Lorenzo Vidino [118] documented:<br /><br />"Since the early 1960s, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. [Its] ultimate goal [is] to extend Islamic law throughout Europe and the United States. [119]<br /><br /><br />"Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student refugees who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their descendants now lead organizations that represent the local Muslim communities in their engagement with Europe's political elite. Funded by generous contributors from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans nearly every European country.<br /><br /><br />"These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they continue to embrace the Brotherhood's radical views and maintain links to terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German, Dutch, and French, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to engage them whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially, when they seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.<br /><br /><br />"When speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, however, they drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While their representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to raise money for HAMAS and other terrorist organizations. Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in Europe, not only because of its location at the heart of Europe, but also because it played host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood immigrants [to Europe] and is host to the best-organized Brotherhood presence…. "<br /><br />Munich's Islamic Center<br /><br />"The Ministry of Interior of Nordrhein-Westfalen states that the Islamic Center of Munich has been one of the European headquarters for the Brotherhood since its foundation. [120]The center publishes a magazine, Al-Islam, whose efforts (according to an Italian intelligence dossier), [121] are financed by the Bank al-Taqwa. According to the interior minister of Baden-Württemberg, Al-Islam shows explicitly how the German Brothers reject the concept of a secular state.[122] Its February 2002 issue, for example, states,<br /><br /><br />"'In the long run, Muslims cannot be satisfied with the acceptance of German family, estate, and trial law. … Muslims should aim at an agreement between the Muslims and the German state with the goal of a separate jurisdiction for Muslims….. With ample Saudi financing, the Muslim Brotherhood has managed to become the voice of the Muslims in Germany.'<br /><br /><br />"In parallel to European Union integration efforts, the Muslim Brotherhood is also seeking to integrate its various European proxies. Over the past fifteen years, the Muslim Brotherhood has created a series of pan-European organizations such as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, in which representatives from national organizations can meet and plan initiatives. [123] Perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood's greatest pan-European impact has, as with the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland, been with its youth organization. In June 1996, Muslim youth organizations from Sweden, France, and England joined forces with the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth to create a European Islamic youth organization. [124] Three months later, thirty-five delegates from eleven countries met in Leicester and formally launched the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO), which maintains its headquarters in Brussels. [125]<br /><br /><br />"According to its official publications, FEMYSO is "a network of 42 national and international organizations bringing together youth from over 26 different countries." FEMYSO proudly stated in 2003 that over the preceding four years it had become the de facto voice of the Muslim youth in Europe. It is regularly consulted on issues pertaining to Muslims in Europe. It has also developed useful links with: the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the United Nations, the European Youth Forum, and numerous relevant NGOs at the European level." [126]<br /><br />MB Globalization<br /><br />Aside from working through proxies noted above, the MB uses various global communications outlets to spread its ideology. Their website, "Muslim Brotherhood Movement Page (Hizb Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimoon)," boasts that it has established branches in "over 70 countries all over the world," including: Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Britain, Switzerland, Lebanon, Pakistan, Morocco, France, India, Jordan, Nigeria, Bangladesh.<br /><br />Wherever the MB operates, its program calls for active subversion and proselytizing. In the U.S., its message is heralded through many additional websites carried by American Internet hosts. For example, ummah.net [127] carries Sheikh Al Qaradawi's fatwa for boycotting Israeli and U.S. products. In the name of 'resistance,' Qaradawi has issued fatwas calling for the systematic killing of American servicemen in Iraq. The website Jannah.org, hosted by ENoor Creations, [128] in Lombard, Il., also carries Qaradawi's book: The Status Of Women In Islam, in which he recommends, among other domineering practices, how to beat your wife - "lightly." Qaradawi,[129] who publicly supports suicide bombing, and was the first to issue a fatwa allowing female bombers, also heads the London-based International Union [130] for Muslim Scholars, which on January 21, 2006, threatened to boycott Norwegian and Danish products due to the publication of caricatures of Mohammed. Qaradawi is also a member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research.[131]<br /><br />On August 23, 2004, [132] the London Arabic newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi published an MB ad calling on all Muslims to resist the U.S. Coalition's occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ad denounced the "the savage and destructive attacks of occupation, lead by the United States on Islam in general, and on Iraq especially... Spreading death, destruction and fear among its people in all its cities and villages." The ad went on to say that "In view of these savage crimes implemented in Iraq and Palestine by the Ziono-American pact not only against the Arabs and Islam but also against humanity in general, these events are also forthcoming in Darfur Sudan."<br /><br />For this reason, Yusuf al Qaradawi in Qatar, Leader--General of the Muslim Brotherhood League, the Egyptian, Muhammad Mahdi Akef--and ninety one other leaders of MB from countries such as Germany, India, Morocco, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the U.K., South Africa, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Tajikistan, Yemen and others--signed a petition calling "upon our Islamic and Arab nations along with all the religious authorities and the liberation powers, wherever they maybe: to resist the occupation and its savage crimes in Iraq and Palestine; to offer our moral and material support to the honorable resistance, its prisoners and their families; to be patient, strong and steadfast until Allah is victorious and the land of Islam cleansed from the filth of occupation. And this is drawing near by the grace of Allah."<br /><br />MB Utilizing Democracy in the Middle East<br /><br />The recent electoral victory of the outlawed Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which won 88[133] seats, up from 15 in the 454-member Parliament, should not be celebrated as an indication of liberalization, democracy and freedom. Neither should the 80 seats [134] of the 132-seat Palestinian parliament won by HAMAS ("The Islamic Resistance Movement")[135] - the MB's Palestinian branch [136]. Both the MB and HAMAS are exploiting the U.S. call for democratization in the Middle East, using free elections to gain legitimate political power. Indeed, neither [137] organization has changed its charter; both [138] seek to create a global Islamic state, where life would be dictated by the Shari'a. In December 2005 [139], in a series of statements, MB leader Mahdi Akef [140], not only denied the Holocaust [141] and called for the demise of Israel (a "cancer") from the Middle East, but also condemned the U.S. for forcing its will "with tanks and Hummer vehicles on the Iraqi people." And like his Palestinian constituency the HAMAS, he reiterated: "we will not recognize Israel which is an alien entity in the region. And we expect the demise of this cancer soon..."<br /><br />Although Article Two of the 1988 HAMAS Covenant reads: "The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine," [142] until recently, HAMAS portrayed itself as a nationalist organization, especially in the West. Yet, its Charter has always announced its global agenda. In pursuit of that goal, HAMAS publishes its website in many languages including, English, Urdu, Farsi, Malay, Bahasha Indonesia, French and Russian.[143] A HAMAS website for children even calls for the "return" to Islam of Seville.[144]<br /><br />To Mousa Abu Marzuk, Deputy Chief of HAMAS' Political Bureau in Damascus, HAMAS' triumph is an important springboard towards the establishment of the Caliphate. In a January 26 statement, following HAMAS' victory in the Palestinian legislative elections, Abu Marzuk said that HAMAS, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, is reaping the fruits of its efforts over the last six decades.[145] HAMAS was established in Palestine in 1936 (not in 1987, as many mistakenly think.)[146] Since then, the movement has carried out its political and social agenda, including Da'awa ("Prosetylization") and Jihad.<br /><br />Support of the Muslim/Arab World to the MB<br /><br />A United Arab Emirates government-operated "charitable" organization (whose board includes the UAE president), Human Appeal International (HAI),[147] funds HAMAS and its "martyrs," HAMAS terrorists in Israeli prisons and their families. The HAI's modus operandi is to transfer money to the Palestinian Red Crescent Organization whose West Bank and Gaza branches are operated by HAMAS. They, in turn, distribute the money to HAMAS "charities."<br /><br />According to a detailed report on March 25, 2005, in the Palestinian daily Al Hayat al-Jadeeda, the UAE Friends Society transferred $475,000, through the UAE Red Crescent, to West Bank "charitable" organizations in Hebron, Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarem to distribute to the families of "martyrs," orphans, imprisoned Palestinians and others.<br /><br />The Palestinian newspaper Al-Ayyam [148] reported on March 22, 2005, that in 2004 the UAE Red Crescent donated $2 million to HAMAS "charities" to be distributed to 3,158 terrorists' orphans.<br /><br />On February 15, 2005, the HAMAS website [149] reported on funds transferred from HAI to two HAMAS front organizations in the West Bank, IQRA and Rifdah, which Israel had outlawed. And last July, Osama Zaki Muhammad Bashiti [150] of Khan Younis in Gaza was arrested as he returned from the UAE, for transferring funds of as much as $200,000 at a time to the Gaza HAMAS branch. The suicide bombing and attacks, including one mortar attack on Gush Katif, caused the death of 44 Israeli civilians [151] and dozens of injuries.<br /><br />The UAE support of HAMAS is in line with the agenda promoted by the late Sheikh Zayed. His Zayed Center for International Coordination and Followup [152], founded in 1999 as the official Arab League think-tank, was shuttered under international pressure in 2003. It championed such Holocaust deniers as Thierry Meyssan and Roger Garaudy [153] and provided a platform for Muslim Brotherhood-inspired ideology, and anti-Western, anti-Christian and anti-Jewish extremists such as Saudi economist Dr. Yussuf Abdallah Al Zamel, who blamed the war in Iraq on "radical Zionist and right-wing Christian" influence. Like HAMAS, and its parent organization, the MB, the Zayed Center also promoted the many versions of Jihad.<br /><br />MB and Terrorist Groups<br /><br />Among the many permanent, negative features of Shari'a is a system that subjugates and oppresses non-Muslims. It requires non-Muslims to convert to Islam or pay the jizya [154] tax, a form of extortion, creating a "contract" (dhimma) that "guarantees" the infidels' lives and possessions. In a recent essay [155] Dr. Andrew Bostom quotes the Arabic scholar, E.W. Lane, who bluntly calls the tax on "free non-Muslim subjects …compensation for not being slain."<br /><br />The system's "obligations" institutionalize discrimination (dhimmitude) that targets Jews and Christians. Others, like such Hindus, and Buddhists ostensibly have a choice to convert or to be slaughtered, although historically, they were often offered an even more degrading dhimma than the "People of the Book." [156] These regulations prohibit dhimmis from possessing arms, ringing church bells, testifying in courts, building and restoring houses of worship while restricting many other civil rights as well. Like Nazi regulations, the Islamic rules also require non-Muslims to wear special, identifying clothes. These key features of the Shari'a and Islamic ideology are political, not merely religious.<br /><br />Given that political subjugation of non-Muslims is built into Islamic law, and that the MB desires to return to "classical Islam," it is not surprising that the organization was the fountainhead from which all Sunni terrorist organizations have flowed. Its offspring include Al-Qaeda,[157] HAMAS, [158] Palestinian Islamic Jihad, [159] Gamaat Islamiyyah, [160] the Philippine Abu Sayyaf group,[161] and the Algerian Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) [162]and Armed Islamic Group (GIA) [163]. Between 1992-1998, the Algerian terrorists murdered an estimated 200,000 people. [164] Today, according to Italian security agencies, and as reported by Kathryn Haahr-Escolano [165] of the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, GSPC cells in Italy not only target Italy, but "employ a dual-track approach to planning terrorist attacks and provide support infrastructure--safe houses, communications, weapons procurement and documentation--to GSPC networks in other European countries."<br /><br />The ties of all these terrorist groups to the MB are evident from their identical strategies and overall Islamist agenda, and they often carry out joint operations. The MB even influenced Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, [166] who developed the Iranian version of their ideology in the 1970s. Indeed, Khomeini adhered to the teaching of Egyptian MB leader Qutb [167]and followed the lead of Muhammad Navab-Safavi, [168] who was a guest of the MB in Egypt in 1953. [169] Navab-Safavi later formed the dreaded Iranian death squad, the Fedaiyon-e-Islam, or the 'Soldiers of Islam.'<br /><br />In Egypt, where the group was founded in 1928 and later banned, the Brotherhood worked under the Islamic doctrine of "concealment" (kitman) [170] in order to "Islamize" the country. In the 1930's and 1940's, the MB collaborated with the Nazis. Hajj Amin al-Husseini,[171] the MB chief in British Mandate Palestine, strongly supported Arab links with the Nazis, particularly in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, where he backed the short-lived pro-Nazi regime of Rashid Ali al-Gailani [172] in 1941. In Egypt too, the MB orchestrated riots, occupied police stations and attempted coups d'etat. Following their failed 1954 attempt to assassinate Gamal Abdel Nasser, [173] MB loyalists fled Egypt to the universities[174] of Saudi Arabia, where they were granted business monopolies to finance their future reemergence; in 1961 the sympathetic King Sa'ud [175] even funded their establishment of the Islamic University in Medina. In October 1981, an MB offshoot group assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. In the last decade alone, MB offspring including Gama'a al-Islamiya and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades repeatedly attacked Western tourists, killing hundreds and wounding many more.<br /><br />Since the history of the MB is full of instigating civil wars and committing atrocities in countries such as Egypt, Syria, Sudan and Algeria, their expansion and success elsewhere is destined to wreak more havoc and destabilize every nation in which they are allowed to operate freely.<br /><br />Conclusion<br /><br />The MB is a dangerous organization that spreads its tentacles throughout the world. Its goal is the establishment of the Caliphate ruled by Islamic law. Mostly Saudi and Gulf sources fund its activities.<br /><br />Recommendation<br /><br />The Muslim Brotherhood spawned and encouraged many Islamist proxies dedicated to the spread of Shari'a law around the world and the establishment of the Caliphate. In many countries it has also been linked to terrorist groups and activities. In others, its members support terrorist organizations verbally and financially. Moreover, in the U.S. as elsewhere it calls on its supporters to "To channel thought, education and action in order to establish an Islamic power [government] on the earth." Such form of government would deprive Americans of their rights as granted by the Constitution.<br /><br />In the interest of preserving freedom in the U.S. while advancing it globally, it is time for our government to thoroughly investigate the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots and consider designating it as a terrorist organization.<br /><br />In the same vein, the U.S should not allow foreign donations to U.S. organizations and institutions from Islamic countries that prohibit religious freedom.<br /><br />By Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld and Alyssa A. Lappen<br />FrontPageMagazine.com<br /><br />Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld is author of Funding Evil; How Terrorism is Financed--and How to Stop It, Director of American Center for Democracy and a member of the Committee on the Present Danger. Alyssa A. Lappen is a Senior Fellow at the American Center for Democracy.<br /><br />Endnotes:<br /><br /><br />[1]http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051028-1.html <br /><br />[2] http://www.thewahhabimyth.com/ikhwan.htm. The MB is often referred to by its Arabic name - "Ikhwan." <br /><br />[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_Brotherhood <br /><br />[4] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12823-2004Sep10.html <br /><br />[5] http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/704xewyj.asp <br /><br />[6] http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/readarticle.asp?ID=22416&p=1 <br /><br />[7] http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2004-01/14/article04.shtml - 50k <br /><br />[8] http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-22.htm <br /><br />[9] http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/readarticle.asp?ID=22416&p=1 <br /><br />[10] http://www.aawsat.com/english/ <br /><br />[11] http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Procedure.asp <br /><br />[12] http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ID=17600&SectionID=104 <br /><br />[13] "New Muslim Brotherhood Leaders: Resistance in Iraq and Palestine is Legitimate; America is Satan; Islam Will Invade America and Europe," MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, No. 655, February 4, 2004,<br /><br />[14] See British Intelligence document in Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 263-267. http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-22.htm<br /><br />[15] http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ID=17600&SectionID=104 <br /><br />[16] http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan/ <br /><br />[17] http://www.qatar.cmu.edu/~breilly2/US-Arab/ <br /><br />[18] http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=43 <br /><br />[19] http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/readarticle.asp?ID=22416&p=1 <br /><br />[20] http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/readarticle.asp?ID=22416&p=1 <br /><br />[21]http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:fYJQKYYuukkJ:ummah.org.uk/ikhwan/+http://www.ummah.org .<br /><br />[22] http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1123996016204&pagename=IslamOnline-English-AAbout_Islam/AskAboutIslamE/AskAboutIslamE <br /><br />[23]http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1138622536080&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull <br /><br />[24] http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan/ <br /><br />[25] http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan/ <br /><br />[26] http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment01/ <br /><br />[27] http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan/ <br /><br />[28] http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/algamaa.cfm <br /><br />[29] http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/chi-0409190261sep19,1,3910166.story?page=1&coll=chi-newsspecials-hed&ctrack=1&cset=true <br /><br />[30] Michael John Garcia, Margaret Mikyung Lee and Todd Tatelman, "Immigration: Analysis of the Major Provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress , Updated May 25, 2005, n. 86, pp. 21-22, <br /><br />[31] Ibid, p. 22.<br /><br />[32] Ibid. pp. 19-29.<br /><br />[33] Ibid. pp. 19-29<br /><br />[34] http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/008829.php <br /><br />[35] http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=21082 <br /><br />[36]http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.p?ref=/symposium/symposium200602070754.asp <br /><br />[37] http://www.cpt-mi.org/WahabbiOragnziationsNorthAmerica.pdf <br /><br />[38] http://www.msa-natl.org/ <br /><br />[39] http://www.secularislam.org/articles/wtc.htm <br /><br />[40] http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/thesis/loboda/home.html <br /><br />[41] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan_al_Banna <br /><br />[42] http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan/ <br /><br />[43] http://www.dawoodi-bohras.com/perspective/quran_ethics.htm <br /><br />[44] http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/chi-0409190261sep19,1,3910166.story?page=1&ctrack=1&cse <br /><br />[45] http://www.amislam.com/bush.htm <br /><br />[46] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Azhar_Theological_Seminary <br /><br />[47]http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/704xewyj.asp?pg=2<br /><br />[48] http://www.dawanet.com/concepts/dawaduty.asp <br /><br />[49]http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:Z8v1JKfiwR8J:forum.ymsite.com/article.php?a=3+%22Living+ <br /><br />[50] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maududi <br /><br />[51] http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=388 <br /><br />[52] http://www.myna.i-p.com/ <br /><br />[53] http://www.learningtogive.org/religiousinstructors/phil_in_america/islam_na.asp <br /><br />[54] http://www.aldaawah.com/1885/indexe-astudy.htm <br /><br />[55] http://www.isna.net/ <br /><br />[56] http://www.masnet.org/aboutmas.asp <br /><br />[57] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12823-2004Sep10_4.h <br /><br />[58] http://www.masnet.org/aboutmas.asp <br /><br />[59] http://middleeastinfo.org/article4735.html <br /><br />[60] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/156564218X/qid=1137553455/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/103-2317333-5985448?s=books&v=glance&n=283155 <br /><br />[61] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0912463422/qid=1137553455/sr=1-5/ref=sr_1_5/103-2317333-5985448?s=books&v=glance&n=283155 <br /><br />[62] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0912463759/qid=1137551920/sr=8-9/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i9_xgl14/103-2317333-5985448?n=507846&s=books&v=glance <br /><br />[63] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0915957914/103-2317333-5985448?v=glance&n=283155 <br /><br />[64] http://www.treas.gov/rewards/pdfs/Green_Quest_Brochure.pdf <br /><br />[65] http://www.discoverthenetwork.org/groupProfile.asp?grpid=6146 <br /><br />[66] http://www.mpac.org/home_article_display.aspx?ITEM=332 <br /><br />[67] http://www.cair-net.org/default.asp?Page=articleView&id=31956&theType=NB <br /><br />[68] http://www.islamctr.org/ <br /><br />[69] http://www.americanmuslim.org/1biography1.html <br /><br />[70] http://www.masnet.org/articlesandpapers.asp?id=33 <br /><br />[71] http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=9706 <br /><br />[72] http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/January/04_crm_030.htm <br /><br />[73] http://www.amcnational.org/ <br /><br />[74] http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=16606 <br /><br />[75] http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/insideice/articles/insideice_102504_Web4.htm <br /><br />[76] http://www.minaret.org/beirutconference.htm <br /><br />[77] http://www.acpr.org.il/cloakrm/clk109.html <br /><br />[78] http://www.zoa.org/pressrel2001/20010621a.htm <br /><br />[79] http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/6/23/164940.shtml <br /><br />[80] The other American Muslims who attended were United Association for Studies and Research director Ahmed Yusef, former Islamic Association for Palestine president Yasser Bushnaq, Minaret of Freedom President Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad and American Muslims for Jerusalem chief Khalid Turani, reportedly to represent a coalition of American Muslim groups including CAIR, MSA, MPAC, AMC, ISNA, the American Muslim Alliance (AMA) and Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA).<br /><br />[81] http://www.discoverthenetwork.org/individualProfile.asp?indid=716 <br /><br />[82] http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/527616/posts <br /><br />[83] http://lawnorder.blogspot.com/2005/08/terrorist-who-came-to-white-house.html <br /><br />[84] http://ads.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=34540 <br /><br />[85] http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch7.htm <br /><br />[86] http://www.mpac.org/home_article_display.aspx?ITEM=664 <br /><br />[87] http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=16606 <br /><br />[88] http://msa-west.net/archiveofevents.php <br /><br />[89] http://www.standwithus.com/news_post.asp?NPI=324 <br /><br />[90] http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17424 <br /><br />[91] http://www.attajdid.ma/def.asp?codelangue=6&po=2 <br /><br />[92] http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/2_05/funds.htm <br /><br />[93] http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js672.htm <br /><br />[94] http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A12823-2004Sep10?language=printer <br /><br />[95] http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/ai55/?PageTemplateID=75 <br /><br />[96] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/01/AR2005090102308.html <br /><br />[97] http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/winep/policy_2002/2002_673.html <br /><br />[98] http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20755 <br /><br />[99] http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=12470<br /><br />[100] http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=910&wit_id=2574 <br /><br />[101] http://www.cair-net.org/default.asp?Page=Board&person=Omar <br /><br />[102] http://www.pluralism.org/events/interfaculty2003/guest_bios/awad.php <br /><br />[103] http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=43805 <br /><br /><br />© 2008 2008, Assyrian International News Agency. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-37533648482364791922008-03-23T22:19:00.000-07:002008-03-23T22:27:49.124-07:00The Saudi Connection Stephen SchwartzThe Saudi Connection Stephen Schwartz <br />Spectator (The Dominion 13 Oct 2001)<br /><br />The first thing to do when trying to understand "Islamic suicide bombers" is to forget the cliches about the Muslim taste for martyrdom. It does exist, of course, but the desire for paradise is not a safe guide to what motivated last month's suicide attacks. Throughout history, political extremists of all faiths have willingly given up their lives simply in the belief that by doing so, whether in bombings or in other forms of terror, they would change the course of history, or at least win an advantage for their cause. Tamils blow themselves up in their war on the government of Sri Lanka; Japanese kamikaze pilots in World War II flew their fighters into United States aircraft carriers.<br /><br />The Islamic-fascist ideology of Osama Bin Laden and those closest to him, such as the Egyptian and Algerian "Islamic Groups", is no more intrinsically linked to Islam or Islamic civilisation than Pearl Harbor was to Buddhism, or Ulster terrorists - whatever they may profess - are to Christianity. Serious Christians don't go around killing and maiming the innocent; devout Muslims do not prepare for paradise by hanging out in strip bars and getting drunk, as one of last month's terrorist pilots was reported to have done. However, numerical preponderance of Muslims as perpetrators of these ghastly incidents is no coincidence. So we have to ask what has made these men into the monsters they are'? What has so galvanised violent tendencies in the worId's second largest religion (and, in the US the fastest-growing faith)?<br /><br />For Westerners, it seems natural to look for answers in the distant past, beginning with the Crusades. But if you ask educated, pious, traditional but forward-looking Muslims what has driven their umma, or global community, in this direction, many of them will answer you with one word: Wahhabism. This is a strain of Islam that emerged less than two centuries ago in Arabia and is the official theology of the Gulf states. It is violent, it is intolerant and it is fanatical beyond measure. Wahhabism is the most extreme form of Islamic fundamentalism, and its followers are called Wahhabis. Not all Muslims are suicide bombers, but all Muslim suicide bombers are Wahhabis - except, perhaps, for some disciples of atheist leftists posing as Muslims in the interests of personal power, such as Yasser Arafat or Saddam Hussein.<br /><br />Wahhabism is the Islamic equivalent or the most extreme Protestant sectarianism. It is puritan, demanding punishment for those who enjoy any form of music except the drum. and severe punishment up to death for drinking or sexual transgressions. It condemns as unbelievers those who do not pray, a view that never previously existed in mainstream Islam. It is stripped-down Islam, calling for simple, short prayers, undecorated mosques and the uprooting of grave- stones (since decorated mosques and graveyards lend themselves to veneration, which is idolatry in the Wahhabi mind. Wahhabis do not even permit the name of the Prophet Muhammad to be inscribed in mosques or his birthday to be celebrated. Above all, they hate ostentatious spirituality, much as Protestants detest the veneration' of miracles and saints in the Catholic Church. Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703-92), the founder of this totalitarian Islamism, was born in Uyaynah, in the part of Arabia known as Nejd, where Riyadh is today, and which Mohammed notably warned would be a source of corruption and confusion. (Anti-Wahhabi Muslims refer to Wahhabism as fitna an Najdiyyah or "the trouble out of Nejd".)<br /><br />From the beginning of Wahhab's dispensation, in the late 18th century, his cult was associated with the mass murder of all who opposed it. For example, the Wahhabis fell upon the city of Qarbala in 1801 and killed 2000 ordin- ary citizens in the streets and markets. In the 19th century, Wahhabism took the form of Arab nationalism versus the Turks. The founder of the Saudi kingdom, Ibn Saud, established Wahhabism as its official creed. Much has been made of the role of the US in "creating" Osama bin Laden through subsidies to the Afghan mujahedin, but as much or more could be said in reproach of Britain which, three generations before, supported the Wahhabi Arabs in their revolt against the Ottomans. Arab hatred of the Turks fused with Wahhabi ranting against the "decadence" of Ottoman Islam. The truth is that the Ottoman khalifa reigned over a rhultinational Islamic umma in which vast differences in local culture and tra- dition were tolerated. No such tolerance exists in Wahhabism, which is why the concept of US troops on Saudi soil so inflames bin Laden.<br /><br />Serious Christians don't go around killing and maiming the innocent; devout Muslims do not prepare for paradise by hanging out in strip bars and getting drunk, as one of last month's terrorist pilots was reported to have done.<br /><br />Bin Laden is a Wahhabi. So are the suicide bombers in Israel. So are his Egyptian allies, who exulted as they stabbed foreign tourists to death at Luxor not many years ago, bathing in blood up to their elbows and emitting blasphemous cries of ecstasy. So are the Algerian Islamist terrorists whose contribution to the purification of the world consisted of murdering people for such sins as running a movie projector or reading secular newspapers. The Iranians are not Wahhabis, which partially explains their slow, but undeniable, movement toward moderation. The Taleban practise a variant of Wahhabism. In the Wahhabi fashion they employ ancient punishments - such as execution for moral offences - and they have a primitive and fearful view of women. The same is true of Saudi Arabia's rulers. None of this extremism has been inspired by US fumblings in the world, and it has little to do with the tragedies that have beset Israelis and Palestinians.<br /><br />But the Wahhabis have two weaknesses of which the West is largely, unaware. The first is that the vast majority of Muslims in the world are peaceful people who would prefer the installation of Western democracy in their own countries. They loathe Wahhabism for the same reason any patriarchal culture rejects a violent break with tradition. Bin Laden and other Wahhabis are not defending Islamic tradition; they represent an ultra-radical break in the direction of a sectarian utopia. Thus, they are best described as Islamo-fascists. In the US, 80 per cent of mosques are estimated by the Sufi Hisham al-Kabbani, born in Lebanon and now living in the US, to be under the control of Wahhabi imams, who preach extremism, and this leads to the other point of vulnerability: Wahhabism is subsidised by Saudi Arabia, even though bin Laden has sworn to destroy the Saudi royal family. The Saudis have played a double game for years, more or less as Stalin did with the West during World War II.<br /><br />They pretended to be allies in a common struggle against Saddam Hussein while they spread Wahhabi ideology,, just as Stalin promoted an "antifascist" coalition with the US while carrying out espionage and subversion on US territory. The motive was the same: the belief that the West was or is decadent and doomed.<br /><br />ONE key question is never asked in US discussions of Arab terrorism: what is the role of Saudi Arabia? The question cannot be asked because US companies depend too much on the continued flow of Saudi oil, while US politicians have become too eosy with the Saudi rulers. Another reason it is not asked is that to expose the extent of Saudi and Wahhabi influence on American Muslims would deeply compromise many Islamic clerics in the US. But it is the most significant question Americans should be asking themselves today. If we get rid of bin Laden, who do we then have to deal with? The answer was eloquently Put by Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, professor of political science at the University of California at San Diego, and author of an authoritative volume on Islamic extremism in Pakistan, when he said: "If the US wants to do something about radical Islam it has to deal with Saudi Arabia. The 'rogue states' (Iraq, Libya, and so on) are less important in the radicalisation of Islam than Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the single most import- ant cause and supporter of radicalisation, ideologisation, and the general fanaticisation of Islam."<br /><br />From what we now know, it appears not a single one of the suicide pilots in New York and Washington was Palestinian. They all seem to have been Saudis, citizens of the Gulf states, Egyptian or Algerian. Two are reported to have been the sons of the former second secretary of the Saudi embassy in Washing- ton. They were planted in the US long before the outbreak of the latest Palestinian intifada; in fact, they seem to have begun their conspiracy while the Middle East peace process was in full, if short, bloom. Anti-terror experts and politicians in the West must now consider the Saudi connection. - The Spectatorlexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-71073296338209966812008-03-23T21:56:00.000-07:002008-03-23T22:19:52.623-07:00Muslim Group, Leader Charged: Ill.-based charity linked to Bin LadenMuslim Group, Leader Charged: Ill.-based charity linked to Bin Laden<br /><br /><br />John Mintz and Robert E. Pierre<br />Washington Post Wednesday, May 01, 2002<br /><br />CHICAGO, April 30 -- A large Muslim charity based in Illinois has been intimately connected to Osama bin Laden for years, moving large sums of money to fund the operations of his al Qaeda network around the world, authorities alleged in court papers today. <br /><br />A portrait of terror connections emerged in an indictment that charges the Benevolence International Foundation and its longtime executive director, Enaam Arnaout, with perjury. The accusations stem from sworn court statements that Arnaout made recently in which he denied that he and his group had ever provided aid to bin Laden or any other terrorists.<br /><br />U.S. officials said they filed charges against Arnaout and the $4-million-a-year charity today because they feared that Arnaout was planning to flee the country.<br /><br />A 35-page FBI affidavit outlining the case provides some of the most compelling details of the subterfuges employed to conceal the movement of alleged terrorist cash across international borders. It also alleges that the organization had contacts with terror operatives who tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction for al Qaeda.<br /><br />"Various persons involved in terrorist activities, specifically including persons trying to obtain chemical and nuclear weapons on behalf of al Qaeda, have had contacts with [Benevolence] offices and personnel," FBI Agent Robert Walker alleges in the affidavit.<br /><br />Arnaout's lawyer, Matthew Piers, said his client's arrest today is part of the government's continued "heavy-handed" treatmentof the charity. "We are extremely dismayed by the government's conduct not only today but throughout the investigation," Piers said.<br /><br />The government's affidavit alleges that the affiliation between the Benevolence foundation and bin Laden was demonstrated in 1998, when a top bin Laden associate, Mamdouh Salim, traveled to Bosnia using documents signed by Arnaout that described Salim as a director of the organization, officials said. <br /><br />Salim, who is awaiting trial in New York on charges of conspiring to kill Americans in the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, pleaded guilty last month to the attempted murder of a New York prison guard whom he had stabbed in the eye with a sharpened comb.<br /><br />"Arnaout has a relationship with Osama bin Laden and many of his key associates dating back more than a decade," Walker says. Benevolence "is an organization that al Qaeda has used for logistical support" and for transferring funds, he alleges.<br /><br />Arnaout was ordered held without bond after a hearing here today. A preliminary hearing on the case will be held on Tuesday.<br /><br />Arnaout, 39, and his group were charged after he made two sworn statements in recent weeks. They included assertions that Benevolence had "never provided aid or support to people or organizations known to be engaged in violence, terrorist activities or military operations of any nature."<br /><br />Arnaout made the statements in a lawsuit filed by the group in January challenging the U.S. Treasury's seizure of the group's assets a month earlier on the grounds that the charity aided bin Laden.<br /><br />But the FBI affidavit lays out in meticulous detail its findings that a tight connection exits between bin Laden and Benevolence, citing information provided by a number of unidentified al Qaeda associates; documents and computer disks seized in raids of the group's offices in Bosnia last month; and other papers taken in a search of its suburban Chicago headquarters in December.<br /><br />A "reliable" former al Qaeda member cooperating with the government said that "several al Qaeda members held positions" in Benevolence and that it was "one of the organizations utilized by al Qaeda" to move money, the FBI document says. The source told the FBI that such funds are "untraceable" because the charity fabricates records showing that the money is used to feed the poor or build mosques.<br /><br />The FBI cites another unnamed source who said that in 1989, while living in Pakistan, Arnaout picked up one of bin Laden's wives at the airport and took her to his home, from where bin Laden and his bodyguards picked her up a week later. The source said that "if Arnaout had not been a trusted associate" of bin Laden, he would not have been entrusted with the task.<br /><br />Arnaout helped transfer money and equipment -- at times including weapons -- for militant Muslim movements in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya, including some tied to bin Laden, the FBI says. Photographs found at Benevolence offices in Bosnia show him with rifles, a rocket and an antiaircraft gun.<br /><br />A bin Laden aide named Mohamed Bayazid, who tried to obtain uranium as part of al Qaeda's efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, listed Benevolence's Illinois address as his residence in securing a driver's license, the FBI affidavit says.<br /><br />Benevolence was founded in the 1980s by a wealthy Saudi national, Sheik Adil Abdul Galil Batargy, who the FBI document identifies as a bin Laden associate. The group set up shop in the Chicago suburb of Palos Hills in 1993, when Batargy transferred control of the group to the Syrian-born Arnaout, the FBI says.<br /><br />Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. attorney in Chicago, said that agents acted today because Arnaout was considered "a risk of flight." Last month, an FBI source reported to agents that Arnaout had discussed with him the idea of fleeing to Saudi Arabia.<br /><br />Piers denied that his client was about to flee.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-24617542627953962732008-03-23T21:45:00.000-07:002008-03-23T21:56:51.939-07:00'Wahhabi Lobby' Takes the Offensive'Wahhabi Lobby' Takes the Offensive<br /><br /><br />J. Michael Waller<br />Insight on the News Friday, July 12, 2002<br /><br />Totalitarian regimes in the Middle East have targeted the United States with a well-financed influence campaign that is being rooted in American politics. Veteran watchers of the "active-measures" programs of the former Soviet Union say this Islamist propaganda offensive bears an uncanny resemblance to the old Soviet international front operations and the broad parade of fellow travelers who used themes of peace, tolerance and civil liberties to advance Soviet strategic goals by weakening the United States at home and abroad.<br /><br />"Active measures" is a translation of aktivniye meropriyatya, a term of KGB tradecraft that spans the covert-action spectrum from disinformation and propaganda to assassination and sponsorship of terrorism.<br /><br />Numerous parallels are visible between the totalitarianism of Soviet communism and that of Wahhabism, a Saudi-funded movement to seize control of global Islam, notes Stephen Schwartz, a former leftist, prolific chronicler of communist strategy and tactics and author of the forthcoming book Two Faces of Islam. "Aside from their ideological similarities and the common elements in the struggle of each power," says Schwartz, "there is a striking matter of their identical tactics in penetration of the United States."<br /><br />In a column for FrontPageMag.com, Schwartz writes, "The Communist Party U.S.A. claimed to lead and, in effect, represent the entire labor and left movement when its constituency was restricted to a narrow band of fanatics and agents of a foreign regime." The same is true, he says, of campaigns that promote the Saudi brand of Islam, including U.S.-based Muslim political pressure groups he calls the "Wahhabi lobby."<br /><br />For example, he says, "the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the American Muslim Council (AMC) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) claim to lead and, in effect, represent the entire community of American Muslims. In fact, its constituency is restricted to a narrow band of fanatics and agents of a foreign regime, the Saudi kingdom."<br /><br />The U.S. government had a means of predicting, identifying and countering Soviet active measures both at home and abroad. But it is poorly equipped to deal with Saudi-sponsored (and smaller, noncentralized) political-influence operations of militant Islamists against U.S. interests overseas and against the public and decisionmakers domestically. Cold War concerns at least led U.S. officials to focus on Soviet fronts and covert operations, but little notice was taken of the Islamist propaganda development that began in the early 1960s.<br /><br />Now, with the Soviet Union long gone and the information revolution having empowered small, decentralized groups to battle the United States with methods short of all-out military warfare, researchers at the Rand Corporation's National Security Research Division have taken the lead in defining a new phenomenon they call "netwar." Rand's John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who coined the term "cyberwar" to discuss the military implications of the information revolution on warfare, also have coined the word "netwar" to define conflicts short of war involving actors who might or might not be military or even government.<br /><br />Netwar's distinguishing element, they write in their new book, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, takes advantage of the information revolution to empower small, networked organizations to battle hierarchical governments. Netwar, according to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, is "an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies and technologies attuned to the information age.<br /><br />"These protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed organizations, small groups and individuals who communicate, coordinate and conduct their campaigns in an Internetted matter, often without a precise central command." The United States barely is beginning to grapple with the problem, intelligence sources say.<br /><br />In its heyday, according to a CIA estimate provided to Congress, the Soviet Union spent an estimated $3.3 billion annually on active measures, including the Izvestiya, Pravda, New Times, Novosti and Tass propaganda vehicles; Radio Moscow and clandestine radio stations around the world; international Communist parties; more than a dozen international front organizations such as the World Peace Council; and the KGB's entire operating budget for foreign rezidentura outposts. The budget included support for guerrilla and terrorist organizations.<br /><br />The Saudis are outspending the former Soviet Union in their worldwide influence operations, and much of that money has been spent in the United States, intelligence officials claim. At one point in the 1990s, some $1.85 billion was funneled through a single reputed Saudi front group in Northern Virginia, the SAAR Foundation, to fund Islamist activity, according to SAAR documents reviewed by Insight. Raided by federal agents for suspected terrorist money laundering and now closed, the SAAR Foundation was part of a network of Wahhabi-sponsored political front groups, mosques, charities, educational foundations, youth and student organizations, investment firms and holding companies. Many currently are under federal investigation as part of the Treasury Department's Operation Green Quest to track down alleged terrorist money.<br /><br />"The Communist Party U.S.A. used labor unions as cover; the Wahhabi lobby uses charities," says Schwartz in his column. "The means and the ends are the same: Each represents the place where the ideological network encounters and seeks to control the masses. Each is used as a recruitment center and cover for terrorists." A leading active-measures expert says that while the Communist Party in the United States was very small and of "limited influence" on policy, "its value to the Soviets was that it provided the cadre to recruit people for front activities to promote Soviet interests."<br /><br />The most publicized Islamist groups in the post-Sept. 11 federal raids received notoriety for their covert funding of, and even overt political support for, terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda. So far there have been vocal protests of innocence and no legal proof of guilt, but multiagency investigations are continuing vigorously. Meanwhile, federal officials have yet to reel in a larger web of political and educational groups that are not suspected of funding terrorism but that do appear to be running Saudi propaganda operations under various guises. U.S. officials are more interested at the moment in tracking direct terrorist financial and operational support activity, but the FBI also has a mandate and a legal precedent to investigate covert foreign political-influence operations aimed at government decisionmakers.<br /><br />That, however, may be a while in coming. It is against the law to be an unregistered foreign agent, and the U.S. intelligence community defines such an individual as having a clandestine relationship with a foreign intelligence officer. However, current law contains loopholes that allow such individuals to operate without being monitored or stopped. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) inserted one such loophole into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).<br /><br />"Kennedy made it very clear that merely carrying out instructions of a foreign intelligence officer in support of a political objective would not be 'covered' under the law," according to Herbert Romerstein, a former professional investigator with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. "That loophole remains in the USA PATRIOT Act," passed after the Sept. 11 attacks as a tough new legal tool to fight terrorism, Romerstein says.<br /><br />The Saudis began their modern global propaganda campaign in the early 1960s, founding the Muslim World League (MWL) in 1962. Ten years later, the Saudi regime backed establishment of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and financed its activities. The MWL has offices around the world, including in New York and Virginia. Wa'il Jalaidan, a cofounder of al-Qaeda, was head of the MWL office in Pakistan. Federal agents raided the MWL Virginia offices in March for alleged ties to terrorism. Abdullah bin Laden, brother of terrorist Osama bin Laden, headed WAMY's Virginia office. Insight sources say that an FBI probe into WAMY's alleged terrorist ties has "mysteriously ended."<br /><br />At press time, the MWL was sponsoring a high-profile tour of the United States to promote Muslim understanding.<br /><br />Under the wings of the early Saudi international fronts sprang networks of other organizations sharing interlocking leaderships and responsible for a range of activities: one group to coordinate and recruit students on college campuses nationwide, another for political agitation and others for political lobbying, education, cultural and religious outreach, cadre-building; charities (to include fund raising for terrorist organizations); and holding companies, investment funds and tax-exempt foundations to finance the networks.<br /><br />Many of these active-measures operations reportedly are run through mosques, where they are not subject to IRS reporting requirements and until passage of the USA PATRIOT Act last autumn were practically off-limits to the FBI. Federal authorities raided or shut down at least 17 of the organizations for alleged financial improprieties since Sept. 11. All the affected organizations maintain their innocence.<br /><br />Recent years have seen a merger between some old Soviet front organizations and left-wing activist groups and Islamic terrorist causes. The New York-based National Lawyers Guild (NLG) ? officially cited as having been created in the 1930s under Josef Stalin as the foremost legal bulwark for the Communist Party U.S.A., its fronts and controlled organizations ? survived its Soviet sponsors and now is considered by national-security specialists to be the main legal group facilitating terrorists and related causes. Among its projects, the NLG has published brochures advising people how to stand up to the FBI if questioned in terrorist cases. The brochure is available on the NLG Website in several languages, including Arabic, Farsi and Punjabi.<br /><br />The NLG leadership runs the day-to-day operations of another group, the National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom (NCPPF), founded in the 1960s to provide legal support for domestic terrorist groups such as the Weather Underground, Symbionese Liberation Army, Black Liberation Army and Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation (see "Domestic Front in the War on Terror," Jan. 7).<br /><br />The NCPPF's current president, Sami al-Arian, has been identified as a leading figure in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, on the State Department terrorist list. Confronted publicly about his terrorist connections by Fox News' Bill O'Reilly and others, al-Arian said he was "shocked" that some of his friends turned up in the Middle East as terrorist leaders and protested that "We have been involved in intellectual-type activity."<br /><br />The NLG, NCPPF and other reputedly Marxist operations of long-standing, such as the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), defend their clients as being unjustly accused, condemned through guilt by association or simply as misunderstood individuals whose politically unpopular views and actions must be protected under the Constitution. Critics of their clients, as well as law-enforcement agencies and anyone else acting against them, are labeled "racists and bigots" ? now favorite terms of agents of the Wahhabi netwar.<br /><br />This apparently is a 21st century adaptation of defense tactics that have served Soviet operatives well since the 1940s. <br /><br />"Like the Communists before them, the Wahhabis have presented arrestees, detainees and indicted suspects as people persecuted because they are 'foreign-born' or victims of 'ethnic profiling,'" says Schwartz.<br /><br />"In the long term, the communist juridical operation aimed at protecting their terrorist, treasonous and spying activities was successful," Schwartz adds. "It should therefore surprise nobody that when the Wahhabi lobby came under American investigative scrutiny in the 1990s, their response and that of their defenders (including a considerable number of ultrasecularist and leftist Jews) almost exactly reproduced the effort mounted earlier in American history by Stalinist Communists and their protectors. Aside from the claim that they were victims because they were 'foreign-born' or were 'ethnically profiled,' the Wahhabis have recycled a full range of Stalinist techniques for evading the law."<br /><br />Indeed, the AMC denounced the Treasury Department's March 20 raids on suspected terrorist fund-raising fronts in Virginia. The raids, AMC said in a news release slamming federal agents for "McCarthy-like tactics" in search of "evidence of wrongdoing that does not exist," were anti-Muslim. AMC exhorted, "Brothers and Sisters, this is YOUR community that has been attacked."<br /><br />Veteran congressional investigator Romerstein urges federal investigators not to be intimidated or fall further into pander mode: "The FBI should be planting informants in these groups and monitoring them."<br /><br />U.S. Fails to Expose Islamist Active Measures<br /><br />The U.S. government is poorly equipped to monitor and evaluate foreign covert political-influence operations against Americans, and especially against U.S. decisionmakers.<br /><br />"The reason we were successful in exposing Soviet active measures was that we did it in a coordinated way," says Herbert Romerstein, who founded and directed the Office of Counter Soviet Active Measures at the now-defunct U.S. Information Agency (USIA). "We raised the costs to the Soviet Union of spreading their lies, causing problems that snapped back on them, making it more of a problem to spread their propaganda and disinformation."<br /><br />With no other government agency taking the lead, the Pentagon created an Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) that would, in part, wage the war of ideas in the Muslim world. Insight sources alleged Department of Defense (DoD) spokeswoman Torie Clarke covertly wrecked the OSI by leaking disinformation about the office's mission to the New York Times in February, leaving the government without a single tool for strategic-influence campaigns abroad. Clarke has refused to respond to Insight's many offers to allow her to refute these charges.<br /><br />U.S. officials, including some supportive of OSI, tell Insight that the Pentagon is not the proper venue for an effort to counter pro-terrorist propaganda abroad on a daily basis, or to deal with Wahhabi and other Islamist covert operations inside the United States.<br /><br />Looking back on the USIA Office to Counter Soviet Active Measures, Romerstein notes, "We don't have an apparatus now to counter the lies being spread by America's enemies in the Arab world." In fact, the United States has nothing in place to do this at home.<br /><br />The FBI lacks its own analytical unit and its internal database is so antiquated that agents have to write files in longhand.<br /><br />The bureau also was stung in the 1980s for investigating communist terrorist activity that operated under the cover of Christian churches, resulting in the famous CISPES case that cost the careers of key senior FBI antiterrorism officials. As for the CIA, with few exceptions it does not collect intelligence on organizations inside U.S. borders. The mandates of other federal law-enforcement and investigative agencies also are extremely narrow, pertaining to tax evasion, immigration violations, undeclared foreign funding, money-laundering and so forth, with no other agency connecting the dots.<br /><br />Security experts tell Insight that the new Department of Homeland Security, with its planned intelligence-analyses office, must establish a unit dedicated to monitoring and assessing Wahhabi and other foreign-funded influence operations aimed at American citizens and decisionmakers, and to taking appropriate defensive measures.<br /><br />That's fine, counters Romerstein, but the key to analysis is the actual collection of information. "If you can't gather the data in the first place, you can analyze to your heart's content, but you won't have the information."<br /><br />FBI Draws Line Between Muslims, Terrorists<br /><br />FBI Director Robert Mueller heaped praise on those Muslims in America who have helped the bureau crack down on domestic and foreign terrorist groups. But what he didn't say was more revealing.<br /><br />In a controversial June 28 appearance before the American Muslim Council (AMC), where he thanked American Muslims for their help, Mueller broke protocol and avoided praising the organization hosting his speech. Indeed, he said this: "Unfortunately, persons associated with this organization in the past have made statements that indicate support for terrorism and for terrorist organizations. I think we can, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, justifiably be outraged by such statements."<br /><br />In the week prior to the speech, various TV personalities, including MSNBC's Alan Keyes and Fox News' Bill O'Reilly, tried to get AMC Executive Director Eric Vickers to denounce terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda. While denouncing acts of terrorism, Vickers avoided denouncing these notorious terrorist groups themselves.<br /><br />The night before Mueller addressed the AMC, guest host Mike Barnicle on CNBC's Hardball asked Vickers to condemn Hamas and Hezbollah. Vickers would not. Barnicle followed, "How about al-Qaeda?"<br /><br />According to the transcript, Vickers' only response was, "They are involved in a resistance movement."<br /><br />An Islamic Republic in America?<br /><br />"I wouldn't want to create the impression that I wouldn't like the government of the United States to be Islamic sometime in the future." <br />Ibrahim Hooper, director of communications, Council on American-Islamic Relations.<br /><br />"I think if we are outside this country, we can say oh, 'Allah, destroy America.' But once we are here, our mission in this country is to change it. There is no way for Muslims to be violent in America, no way. We have other means to do it. You can be violent anywhere else but in America." <br />The American Muslim Council's Abdurahman Alamoudi.<br /><br />"The center of gravity of the Muslim world is shifting to this country."<br />Faiz Rehman, communications director, American Muslim Council. June 27, <br /><br />J. Michael Waller is a senior writer for Insight magazine.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-25483431527381706522008-03-23T21:43:00.000-07:002008-03-23T21:45:08.100-07:00Wahhabis in Old Dominion: What the federal raids in Northern Virginia uncoveredWahhabis in Old Dominion: What the federal raids in Northern Virginia uncovered<br /><br /><br />Stephen Schwartz<br />Weekly Standard Monday, April 08, 2002<br /><br />FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT has kicked over quite an anthill in Northern Virginia. A U.S. Treasury task force, Operation Green Quest, has been investigating the funding of Islamic terror. Raids on March 20 struck an extraordinary array of financial, charitable, and ostensibly religious entities identified with Muslim and Arab concerns in this country, most of them headquartered in Northern Virginia. <br /><br />Reaction to the raids suggests the Feds inflicted serious injury on the Wahhabi lobby, the Saudi-backed extremist network that largely controls Islam in America. Officials of the targeted groups as well as their non-Muslim apologists--notably GOP operative Grover Norquist, the chief enabler of Islamic extremists seeking access to the White House--have condemned the raids as civil rights violations. <br /><br />The convoluted system of interlocking directorates, global banking transactions, and ideological activities exposed in Northern Virginia will take time to sort out. Operation Green Quest has drawn attention to a previously overlooked aspect of support for extremism in this country: The principal threat comes not from the thousands of working-class Arab immigrants in places like New Jersey and Michigan who contribute modest sums to the so-called Islamic charities, but from the Arab elite. <br /><br />The Saudis stand behind all of it. The kingdom pledged $400 million last year for the support of "martyrs' families," according to the Saudi Embassy website. At $5,300 per "martyr," that works out to about 75,000 martyrs, suggesting the Saudi princes anticipate a lot more suicide bombings than Israel has yet suffered. The Saudis offered a fraudulent "peace" plan this year intended to divert attention from their involvement in the horrors of September 11. <br /><br />The keystone of the Saudi-sponsored Northern Virginia network is the Saar Foundation, created by Suleiman Abdul Al-Aziz al-Rajhi, a scion of one of the richest Saudi families. The Saar Foundation is connected to Al-Taqwa, a shell company formerly based in Switzerland, where its leading figures included a notorious neo-Nazi and Islamist, Ahmed Huber. Subsequently moved to the United States, Al-Taqwa was shut down after September 11 and its assets frozen by U.S. presidential order. But operations continued, as the Wahhabi lobby shifted to its backup institutions here. <br /><br />Saar has also been linked to Khalid bin Mahfouz, former lead financial adviser to the Saudi royal family and ex-head of the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia. Mahfouz has been named by French intelligence as a backer of Osama bin Laden; Mahfouz endowed the Muwafaq Foundation, which U.S. authorities confirm was an arm of bin Laden's terror organization. Muwafaq's former chief, Yassin al-Qadi, oversaw the financial penetration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania by Wahhabi terrorists in the late 1990s. <br /><br />Men like al-Rajhi, Mahfouz, and al-Qadi are the big players in the financing of Islamic extremism. And their paths repeatedly lead back to Northern Virginia. They don't play for small stakes: Saar received $1.7 billion in donations in 1998, although this was left out of the foundation's tax filings until 2000. No explanation has been offered for this bit of accounting sorcery. <br /><br />A major personality on the ground in Virginia is an individual named Jamal Barzinji, whose office in Herndon was a major target of the raids. In 1980, he was listed in local public records as a representative of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), an arm of the Saudi regime with offices in Virginia. WAMY has been deeply involved in providing cover for Wahhabi terrorism. The 2002 entry in the U.S. Business Directory lists the president of the WAMY office in Annandale, Va., as Abdula bin Laden--the terrorist's younger brother. <br /><br />Barzinji serves as a trustee and officer of the Amana Mutual Funds Trust, a growth and income mutual fund headquartered in Bellingham, Wash., conveniently near the Canadian border. Amana's board also includes Yaqub Mirza, a Pakistani physicist who shares Barzinji's Herndon office address and who is widely described as a financial genius. Another board member and tenant in the Herndon office is Samir Salah. He formerly ran a branch of Al-Taqwa in the Caribbean, heads a financial firm linked to Saar, and directs Dar al-Hijra, a mosque in Falls Church, Va., notable for hardline Wahhabi preaching. Salah is also deeply involved with Taibah International Aid Association, a Virginia charity with a Bosnian branch that is being investigated by authorities in Sarajevo. <br /><br />Front groups interfacing between the Wahhabi-Saudi money movers under federal suspicion and the broader American public include two institutions active in the religious field: the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) and the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS). The involvement of GSISS with the financing of extremism is especially startling in that it alone is credentialed by the Department of Defense to certify Muslim chaplains for the U.S. armed forces. Barzinji has appeared on the boards of both. <br /><br />The day of the raids, Barzinji appeared on U.S. television news insisting he knew of no questionable behavior by the groups under scrutiny, and promising full cooperation with the authorities. But in a familiar pattern of duplicity, he expressed himself quite differently in the Islamic media. Barzinji told the Internet news service Islam Online (www.islam-online.net) he believed the investigations fulfilled the will not of the Bush administration, but of "elements within the government, media, and [academia] who were unhappy with the positive attention being given to Muslims." This tortured formulation, repeated in several variations, embodies the Islamist fantasy that every doubt cast on the activities of the Wahhabi lobby is the product of Jewish influence. <br /><br />Speaking to Islam Online, Barzinji spelled out his anxieties. He alleged that the real powers behind the raids were "self-styled Middle East 'experts,'" individuals "who do not want to see Muslims develop such excellent relations with the government, assuming political rights." This line simply dumbs down one peddled by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which condemns any challenge to the Wahhabi lobby as a product of "right-wing commentators." <br /><br />Barzinji, CAIR, and their cohort give the impression of living in their own conspiratorial world, divorced from reality. For them to imagine that the aftermath of September 11 has been anything but disastrous for the image and credibility of American Muslims is absurd. The presumption that anybody outside government dictates policy to the Treasury, however, is only the classic supposition about alleged Israeli influence that infests the Arab mind. <br /><br />Perhaps it's to be expected that the Wahhabi lobby would react to a federal investigation with its usual combination of pseudopatriotic protest, claims of innocence, and paranoia. But perhaps the White House might suggest to friends like Norquist that they should stop trying to protect enablers of terrorism. <br /><br />Otherwise, more and more people will wonder whether the administration really understands the problems afflicting Islam in the United States, and whether it really is united in resisting the influence of the extremists. <br /><br /><br />Stephen Schwartz's new book, "The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud From Tradition to Terror," is forthcoming.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-7611000995847989312008-03-23T21:41:00.000-07:002008-03-23T21:42:55.581-07:00Sept. 11 Families Join to Sue Saudis: Banks, charities and royals accused of funding al Qaeda terrorist networkSept. 11 Families Join to Sue Saudis: Banks, charities and royals accused of funding al Qaeda terrorist network<br /><br /><br /><br />Susan Schmidt<br />Washington Post Friday, August 16, 2002<br /><br />Families of 600 people killed in the Sept. 11 attacks filed suit yesterday against Saudi Arabian banks and charities and members of the royal family, accusing them of financially sponsoring the al Qaeda terrorist network and its leader, Osama bin Laden.<br /><br />Named as defendants in the lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court here were three Saudi princes, seven banks, the government of Sudan and international charities that the U.S. government has contended are linked to terrorist groups.<br /><br />Banding together to seek hundreds of billions of dollars in damages, the families asserted in the lawsuit that "terrorists like Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network cannot plan, train and act on a massive scale without significant financial power, coordination and backing. By taking vigorous legal action against the financial sponsors of terror, the plaintiffs will force the sponsors of terror into the light and subject them to the rule of law."<br /><br />The lawsuit renews the sensitive question of sponsorship of terror by the Saudis that only recently caused friction between the U.S. government and one of its key Middle Eastern allies.<br /><br />In a controversial briefing to a Pentagon advisory board in July, a Rand Corp. analyst contended that "the Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot-soldier, from ideologist to cheerleader." Saudi Arabia was described as an enemy of the United States, in the briefing prepared by Laurent Murawiec.<br /><br />Pentagon and Bush administration officials quickly distanced themselves from the briefing, insisting that the government does not share that view of the Saudis.<br /><br />The lawsuit does not allege that the Saudi defendants directly participated in the Sept. 11 attacks, or approved them. That would be a difficult assertion to support because bin Laden, who was banished from the Saudi kingdom in 1991, has declared war on Saudi leaders as well as the United States.<br /><br />Instead, the plaintiffs contend that some of the leading figures in Saudi society -- top businessmen, charity executives and members of the royal family -- gave money to foundations and front groups that sustained al Qaeda and moved its money.<br /><br />Officials at the Saudi Embassy did not return telephone calls seeking comment on the lawsuit.<br /><br />Some families of Sept. 11 victims have split off from this lawsuit in a dispute with the lawyers as a result of what they contend was an unauthorized overture aimed at settlement. About 80 families intend to file a similar suit with new counsel, said Stephen Push, one of those family members, though he said he expects the cases to be consolidated.<br /><br />In seeking damages for the wrongful deaths of people who perished at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a Pennsylvania field where United Flight 93 went down, the families are following a strategy previously employed by one of their attorneys against the Libyan government.<br /><br />Allan Gerson of Washington also represents relatives of passengers who died on Pan Am 103, the aircraft downed by terrorists over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. Gerson is in negotiations with the Libyans, who have tentatively agreed to pay $2.7 billion for its role in the 1988 bombing.<br /><br />His co-counsel, Ronald Motley, is a prominent South Carolina lawyer who successfully sued tobacco companies for $300 billion on behalf of attorneys general in 36 states.<br /><br />"This, I think, will be the trial of the century," Gerson said. "Saudi Arabia and others have been involved in a protection racket for many years. The function of the lawsuit is to expose this and to seek damages, not only for its own sake but to serve as a deterrent."<br /><br />Matt Sellitto, whose 23-year-old son, Matthew, a broker at Cantor Fitzgerald, died in the World Trade Center, said yesterday that "we have to stop the terrorists, and one of the surest ways of stopping them is stopping their access to money.<br /><br />"I really believe if we didn't do this, there would be something wrong with us," said Sellitto, who lives in Harding Township, N.J. "My son was murdered because he was living the American dream. We have to take every means we can to stop this thing."<br /><br />Members of the Saudi royal family named in the suit include Prince Turki al-Faisal, former chief of Saudi intelligence; Prince Sultan, Saudi defense minister and a brother of King Fahd; and Mohammed al Faisal al Saud.<br /><br />Also named as defendants are major financial entities in Saudi Arabia, including the al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp., which the plaintiffs contend is the primary bank for a number of charities that funnel money to terrorists.<br /><br />The suit also alleges that Khalid bin Mahfouz, onetime chief operating officer of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, later operated a bank that funneled millions of dollars to charities controlled by al Qaeda.<br /><br />The 259-page court filing relies, in part, on assertions by officials of the Treasury and State departments, along with statements from foreign governments. Many of the assertions about the role of the charities and banks, in particular, have been made public before. Some of the new accusations in the lawsuit are based on a variety of sources, including bank records and unpublished intelligence memos from the French government.<br /><br />The charitable groups include the International Islamic Relief Organization, Sanabel Al Kheer Inc., the Muslim World League, the SAAR Foundation, Rabita Trust, al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth.<br /><br />The Treasury Department has previously stated that al Haramain has a financial link to al Qaeda. Since Sept. 11, the government has raided or seized the assets of several Muslim charities operating in the United States, including the now-defunct SAAR Foundation in Herndon and Benevolence International of Chicago.<br /><br />The suit asserts that the world's largest Muslim charity, the Saudi-financed Muslim World League, was formerly funded by bin Laden. It also claims that a League subsidiary, the International Islamic Relief Organization, donated more than $60 million to Afghanistan's Taliban regime.<br /><br />Staff writers John Mintz and Douglas Farah contributed to this report.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-36151905645065775982008-03-21T05:10:00.000-07:002008-03-21T05:19:40.013-07:00Anwar Ibrahim's Terrorist fundingTerrorist funding - <br />Posted by gravelrash in Gravelrash, Islam, News, Politics (Sunday September 17, 2006 at 1:05 am) <br />Message from Felis:<br /><br />The article below deserves  all the expossure it can get and so I moved it into the front page just in case you’d like to go through it again. <br /><br />The document below raises serious questions about Islamic funds in Australia, the various people who have access to them and their ties to International terrorists. Not included in the document, which is in the format of a submission, (as it was originally intended to be tabled in a Government inquiry into our terrorism laws) are serious questions about the role of various senior Australian politicians. For more detail on those questions, the following links are included. Link1, Link2, Link3<br /><br /><br /> Some evidence of terrorist financing networks in Australia and their links to foreign terrorist entities<br /><br /> <br /><br />The purpose of this submission is to provide empirical evidence of the presence of persons in Australia who are associated with parties regarded as supporters and/or perpetrators of acts of violence against civilians in the name of Islam. This submission is therefore a submission in favour of the proposed anti-terrorism legislation.<br /><br />An analysis of a terrorist financing network present at least in part here in Australia, based on evidence that is primarily in the public domain, forms the basis of the submission.<br /><br /> <br /><br />In RE: Commercial IBT Pty Ltd (CIBT)<br />CIBT is a proprietary company which started life as Everich Trading (Aust) Pty Ltd in 1988. It then changed its name to Commercial Banktrust Pty Ltd, then Commercial BT Pty Ltd, and finally Commercial IBT Pty Ltd in 2002. <br />Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) records show that between April 2002 and 2004, CIBT’s shareholders were two other companies. One of the two, RG Investment Management Pty Ltd, is also incorporated in Australia and had a paid–up capital of just A$ 2. This was later increased to A$50,000.<br />The other, QI LLC, appears to be incorporated in California ,with its principal business being listed in a Dun and Bradstreet search as being off-set printing.<br /><br />Documents lodged with ASIC as at 30 July 2004 disclosed that Commercial IBT’s issued and paid up capital was AU$2,209,930,550 (AU$2.2 billion)<br />CIBT was also registered with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, as a registered financial corporation pursuant to section 8 of the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001. It was only later in June 2004 that APRA caused the name of the corporation and other particulars relating to the corporation to be removed from its register; and that the corporation ceased to be a registered entity within the meaning of subsection 5(3) of the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001. <br /><br />Nevertheless, incorporation under ASIC’s rules and regulations, as well the entry of its name onto the APRA register allowed CIBT to make an application to the Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority ( LOFSA ) for an off-shore banking license. <br /><br />LOFSA is a Malaysian Government authority which has jurisdiction over the Labuan Offshore Financial Centre, located on the island of Labuan, which lies just of the coast of the state of Sabah, on the island of Borneo. <br />LOFSA itself comes under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. Since 1998, the Prime Minister has also been Finance Minister.<br /><br />LOFSA requires that applicants for off-shore banking licenses meet the following minimum criteria <br />• Be already a bank or financial institution; <br />• Possess sound track record;<br />• Accorded a good credit rating by acceptable rating agencies;<br />• Supervised by a competent regulatory authority; and <br />•Conform to generally accepted standards of international banking practices or BIS, as the case may be. <br /><br />In order to meet the requirement of a good credit rating by an acceptable rating agency, CIBT approached Rating Agency of Malaysia Bhd (RAM).<br />RAM  issued a rating report in May 2002, which can be summarized as follows:<br />RAM has assigned respective long- and short-term ratings of AA1 and P1 to Commercial BT Pty Limited (“Commercial BT†or “the Bankâ€). The ratings reflect the stand-alone credit risk of Commercial BT. Commercial BT is an Australian-based investment bank which primarily focuses on general investment, corporate advisory services and investment banking activities. The main strength of the Bank lies in its solid balance sheet. Commercial BT, by virtue of its extensive business in the Asia-Pacific region, is also a member of the Asian Bankers Association (“ABAâ€). Members of ABA comprise financial institutions that are based or have operations in Asia and the Australia-Pacific region. Commercial BT has total assets of US$8.12 billion and has world-wide representation, with a staff strength of 150 employees.<br /><br />LOFSA issued CIBT a license to operate a  full deposit taking bank in Labuan sometime in late 2002. LOFSA, in its annual report for the year ended 31 December 2002 states that Commercial IBT, together with Macquarie Bank Ltd, also of Australia, were the two organizations that year which were granted deposit taking licenses. <br /><br /> <br /><br />CIBT in business<br /><br /><br />Upon being granted the license by LOFSA, CIBT issued a press release which was published in Malaysian business dailies. The stories amongst other things quoted CIBT’s president director Dr Adrian Ong saying that Labuan was specifically chosen because it is well regarded internationally for its stringent regulatory regime, competitive rates and infrastructure. <br /><br />By this time CIBT was advertising itself on its website as being a full licensed bank in Labuan Malaysia involved in all aspects of banking and investment banking including receiving deposits, corporate finance and advisory, private banking, trade finance and fund and asset management. The headquarters of Commercial IBT Bank however, was listed on the website as being in Melbourne, Australia.<br /><br />It described its activities in Australia as being that of a private investment bank and a registered financial institution with the Reserve Bank of Australia under the Financial Corporations Act 1974 and the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority. <br /><br />Soon after, in September 2003, a member of the opposition in the Malaysian Parliament, Husham Musa, raised questions about CIBT’s business and standing both in Malaysia and Australia. He contended, amongst other things, that CIBT was not a bank as defined by LOFSA, and hence should not have been granted the license it had in Labuan. <br /><br />The Government, via the Finance Ministry Parliamentary Secretary Hashim Ismail responded by saying that CIBT had only been issued an investment banking license, and that there was therefore no need for it to be a bank in its own jurisdiction in order that it be granted a license by LOFSA.<br /><br />However, as mentioned earlier, LOFSA’s own annual report of 2002, which must be tabled before Parliament explicitly states that CIBT was issued a license to operate as a deposit taking bank.<br /><br /> <br /><br />On August 6, 2004, ASIC announced that it had obtained orders in the Supreme Court of Victoria appointing a Provisional Liquidator to Commercial IBT Pty Ltd (Commercial IBT) .<br /><br />In making its application, ASIC alleged that Commercial IBT had not provided accurate and consistent information to Australian regulators. In support of this contention, ASIC submitted that Commercial IBT had provided or reported inconsistent financial data and reports to ASIC, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), the Australian Taxation Office, an Australian bank, and foreign regulatory authorities and rating agencies.<br /><br />In addition, ASIC said that it was concerned that Commercial IBT had inadequate accounting and financial reporting measures in place and had failed to keep proper books and records. <br /><br />ASIC’s application for the appointment of a provisional liquidator to Commercial IBT was supported by APRA.<br /><br />On 12 November 2004 ASIC announced that it had obtained orders in the Supreme Court of Victoria to wind-up CIBT.<br />RAM initially suspended the CIBT rating, pending the outcome of the ASIC investigation, without actually revoking it. This was despite the fact that CIBT’s shareholders cancelled the corporation’s shares and reduced its paid-up capital to just $2, just after ASIC gave notice that (it) would be making an application to wind-up the company . RAM withdrew the rating only after ASIC had obtained winding up orders in the Supreme Court of Victoria against CIBT . <br />LOFSA on the other hand, has yet to take any action against CIBT, and has allowed for the company to continue operating its bank in Labuan. LOFSA continues to list CIBT as a bank registered in Labuan, and names its chief executive, Dr Adrian Ong, a man sought by ASIC, as the bank’s contact person. According to affidavits filed by ASIC and APRA officers as well as the court appointed administrator, LOFSA is fully aware of the orders ASIC obtained against CIBT.<br />All this taken together with the fact that LOFSA and the Malaysian Ministry of Finance attempted to mislead the public on the issue of the actual license granted CIBT leads to one of two possible conclusions; the first, that Malaysian authorities are involved in a massive cover-up, or two, there is for some reason an unwillingness to act against CIBT even when there is evidence of suspicious dealings. <br /><br /> <br /><br />Evidence of links between CIBT and the Al-Qaeda financier Sheik Yassin Al-Qadi<br /><br /><br />When the member of the opposition in the Malaysian Parliament , Husham Musa , raised questions about CIBT’s business in the Malaysian Parliament, he was almost immediately approached by a Malay-Muslim businessman by the name of Wan Hasni Wan Sulaiman, ( who lives and works in Kuala Lumpur,) asking him to stop probing into CIBT’s affairs .<br />Wan Hasni and business partner Dr Rahim Ghouse, also of Malaysia but who now lives and works in Melbourne, remain shareholders in a Malaysian incorporated company called Abrar Group Sdn Bhd. The CEO and controlling shareholder of that company is one Sheik Yassin Al-Qadi. Wan Hasni and Rahim Ghouse are no longer board members.<br />Sheik Yassin Al-Qadi has been named by the United States Government and the UN as one of Al-Qaeda’s main financiers. His assets are the subject of freezing orders issued pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1267 .<br />Despite having his assets frozen in the US and the UK as a result of being named in Resolution 1267 Al-Kadi remains a shareholder of Abrar as well as its chief executive in charge of the company in Malaysia. He has been given permanent residence there.<br />A subsidiary of that company, Abrar Discounts, is a major financier of Malaysian corporations.<br /><br />When the member of the opposition in the Malaysian Parliament , Husham Musa , raised questions about CIBT’s business in the Malaysian Parliament, he was almost immediately approached by a , ( who lives and works in Kuala Lumpur,) asking him to stop probing into CIBT’s affairs .Wan Hasni and business partner , also of Malaysia but who now lives and works in Melbourne, remain shareholders in a Malaysian incorporated company called The CEO and controlling shareholder of that company is one  Wan Hasni and Rahim Ghouse are no longer board members. has been named by the United States Government and the UN as one His assets are the subject of freezing orders issued pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1267 .Despite having his assets frozen in the US and the UK as a result of being named in Resolution 1267 Al-Kadi remains a  as well as its chief executive in charge of the company in Malaysia. A subsidiary of that company, is a major financier of Malaysian corporations. <br /><br />It appears, therefore, that Al-Qadi’s assets have been given shelter by the Malaysian Government.<br />Both Ghouse and Wan Hasni never had resources of their own, and are not thought of as being independently wealthy but for the capital provided them by Al-Qadi, and a slew of finance industry related licenses provided them by the former Malaysian deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, when he was still Minister for Finance. Ghouse remains, as he has been since 1998, a director and spokesperson of the International Free Anwar Campaign (IFCA). <br /><br />The IFCA now concerns itself with returning Anwar to power. It implicated itself in the matter of Commercial IBT when , in a series of articles published on its website www.malaysia-today.net, it accused APRA and ASIC of being accomplices in a scheme to discredit Anwar Ibrahim by investigating Commercial IBT’s financial affairs. <br />Another IFCA director, Raja Petra Kamaruddin admitted that he attempted to prevent further questions about CIBT being raised in the Malaysian Parliament because it might effect Anwar Ibrahim. <br /><br /><strong>Anwar Ibrahim himself has been linked to terrorist financing, as a consequence of his directorship of the International Institute of Islamic Thought. The IIIT is suspected of financing, amongst others, the Palestinian Jihad. Anwar founded the IIIT with a number of others who have known to be members of the Muslim Brotherhood .<br />Anwar’s entry into mainstream politics was as a result of the intervention of the late Ismail Faruqi, who was also known to have links to the Muslim Brotherhood, an organistation banned even in parts of the Middle East for its extremist views. <br />Prior to his entry into mainstream politics Anwar was better known as the young Islamic radical who founded the Malaysian Muslim Youth Force, or Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) <br />More recently Anwar has spoken in support of Sheik Yusof Al-Qaradawy, after the latter was refused entry to Germany. Al-Qaradawy is already barred from entering the United States as a result of his support for HAMAS.<br />Anwar visited Australia in March 2005,and is believed to have met with local representatives of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth.Anwar was a founder of WAMY USA,an organization once headed by Abullah bin Laden, brother of Osama, and which is known to have published anti-Semitic material. US investigators also found considerable overlap between the leadership of WAMY USA and the IIIT. </strong><br />Wan Hasni is considered the key man in Commercial IBT, and is known to be the person who makes all appointments within CIBT. Both Wan Hasni and Rahim Ghouse have admitted on camera to having met with Dr Adrian Ong, CIBT’s CEO. (Recall that Wan Hasni has done more than just meet with Adrian Ong, he has also attempted to prevent investigation into the company).<br /><br />Rahim Ghouse in Australia and the work of the Muslim Community Co-Operative Australia<br /><br /><br />Rahim Ghouse is today general manager in charge of the operations of the Muslim Community Cooperative of Australia. He has been involved with the Cooperative since at least 2002.<br /> The Cooperative says that Ghouse’s duties include bringing to the Cooperative his contacts in the international capital markets.<br />In September2004, at about the same time that ASIC moved against CIBT, the MCCA announced that it had secured AUD 500 million for a home equity housing loan scheme. Such a scheme is run as an alternative to the interest charged mortgage loans provided by other financiers but which are prohibited to Muslims. A scheme such as this was promoted by the Menzies Institute to make housing more affordable but failed to find backers. The MCCA on the other hand claim to have found a major local wholesale financier to back their scheme, but have so far refused to provide details as to the financier’s identity. <br />The MCCA came to public attention in late 2003, when it was reported that it was the owner of a rural property where Muslim cleric Sheikh Mohammed Omran lived. <br /><br />Rahim Ghouse is today general manager in charge of the operations of the He has been involved with the Cooperative since at least 2002. The Cooperative says that Ghouse’s duties include bringing to the Cooperative his contacts in the international capital markets.In September2004, at about the same time that ASIC moved against CIBT, the Such a scheme is run as an alternative to the interest charged mortgage loans provided by other financiers but which are prohibited to Muslims. A scheme such as this was promoted by the to make housing more affordable The MCCA on the other hand claim to have found a major local wholesale financier to back their scheme, The MCCA came to public attention in late 2003, when it was reported that it was the owner of a rural property where Muslim cleric lived. <br /><br />Sheikh Omran came to public attention in September 2003 when it was reported that the Melbourne-based cleric appeared to have links with terror suspect Abu Dahdah, who was recently sentenced to 27 years in jail by a Spanish court on charges of conspiracy in the September 11 attacks and for being a leader of a terrorist group . He had also been identified as the prime mover behind the March 11 2004 terror attacks in Madrid. <br />Ghouse has denied any involvement in Yassin Al-Qadi’s Abrar Group since at least 1998. <br />However, as recently as late December 2004, Rahim, as head of the MCCA, sponsored a series of seminars in Australia on Islamic banking  at which the main speaker was the chief executive of Abrar Discounts Sdn Bhd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Yassin Al-Qadi’s Abrar Group .<br />He may have also hosted in Melbourne another Al-Kadi associate in July 2002, Dr Tareq Al-Suwaidan. US investigators have found that Al-Suwaidan had represented Al-Kadi’s business interest in the United States,as well as preached jihad against the West. Al-Suwaidan is known to be a leading member of the Kuwaiti Branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. <br /><br /> He was also, together with Ghouse and Wan Hasni a director of a company called Abrar Inc. That company ceased operations in the United States when it became subject of an investigation by the FBI into the financing of a chemical company named Global Chemicals. <br />In July 2002 The Fellowship of Australian Muslim Students and Youth (FAMSY) hosted their 20th Annual Conference in Melbourne. The conference brought many prominent Muslim speakers to the Australian stage including Dr. Maneh Al-Johani, President of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Dr. Tareq Al-Suwaidan, Mr. Peter Barnett A.M and Dr. Zachariah Matthews .<br /><br />Ghouse has refused to either confirm or deny that he met with Al-Suwaidan during the latter’s 2002 visit. <br /><br />MCCA in the community<br />The MCCA is active in the Muslim community, especially amongst the youth. <br />Working with WAMY, and Human Appeal International  (which has been accused of financing HAMAS) the MCCA has sponsored talks in Australia by various speakers who have included Shaker Elsayed ,Secretary General of the Muslim American Society (MAS), titled “Muslim Activism Against Terrorism” held in Sydney on 10 July 2004,and Anwar Ibrahim, titled ” Social Justice and Economic Empowerment” on Sunday, 20 March 2005. <br />Much has already been said about Anwar,so nothing need be added here .<br /><br />On Shaker’s speech it is interesting to note that despite the title, he appeared more concerned with justifying actions by Muslims in support of followers of the faith who are perceived to be oppressed.<br /><br />Shaker ended his speech with the following words:<br />“…..the plague of violence did not start with Muslims. Muslims constitute more than 73 % of the world’s refugees. There is no ho spot war region in the world where it is Muslims who are occupying other lands or torturing their subjects who are their enemies or it is Muslims who are aggressing against others. It is always the other way around. And as Muslims we stand with pride and support for anyone who sets out his life to defend his rights.”<br /><br />These appear to be the same fighting words used by Muslims associations involved in the public debate throughout Australia on the matter of terrorism . <br />These words are described as fighting words for one must remember that ostensibly, Jihad is only justifiable in self-defence. Therefore, an argument of oppression can justify violence.<br /><br />Heading the MCCA’s community programmes is a Singaporean, Zulfikar Shariff ,who has openly supported Osama bin Laden as well as Sheik Abdullah Azzam, a religious leader credited with inspiring violent jihad in modern times, as well as being a spiritual mentor to Osama. <br />The MCCA also provides funds for schools.For example it provided funds for the Minaret College, Springvale, Victoria’s school hall building project. Interestingly, the school saw it fit to use in its fund raising activities a fatwa issued by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi that calls on Muslims to donate to Muslims schools outside the Muslim world because these “serve as castles for Jihad†and “shields against the surrounding evils.†<br />There also appears to have been put in place an initiative to forge Muslim students into a unified whole. In this regard, the MCCA has employed a physiologist whose main duties include “building sustainable relationship between Islamic schools across Australia and become the coordinator of Young Australian Muslim of the Year (YAMY) Award (2005) and school involvement projectâ€. <br /><br />(GR: Waleed Aly’s wife, Suzanne Carland, was YAMY in 2003/4)<br />The psychologist Monique Toohey, a convert to Islam, has said that the YAMY project aims at “building capacity†within Islamic schools so that they might deliver a better product to the community. <br />On the political front, the MCCA has considerable influence over the Islamic Council of Victoria. The ICV’s president, Malcolm Thomas, is married to Nora Thomas who works at the MCCA as an administrator. The secretary of the ICV, Nail Aykan, is also a senior executive of the MCCA.The ICV’s chief executive Rowan Gould regularly distributes material onto mailing list issued by the MCCA,and appears to have a close working relationship with Rahim Ghouse. <br />The ICV in turn appears to have significant influence over the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) the peak Muslim body that regularly represents the Muslim community in making representations to state and federal governments. The ICV itself is represented by its Malcolm Thomas on the prime minister’s consultative committee. Another member of its board, Waleed Aly, is often quoted by media on matters concerning the proposed anti-terrorism legislation.<br />The ICV’s executive, including Malcolm Thomas, Rowan Gould, and Waleed Aly have all refused repeated queries sent them concerning their relationship and that of the ICV to Ghouse and his associates including Yassin Al-Kadi. <br /><br />Why Australia?<br /><br />The above shows how persons who have been under scrutiny for terrorist related activities overseas have had no difficulty entering Australia. This factor alone is probably the most important in explaining why the above-mentioned entities have chosen to operate from and in Australia.<br />On the matter of Australia being used as a base by terrorist financiers like Yassin Al-Kadi, the above shows how easy it has been to escape scrutiny by Australian regulators even when moving around very large sums of money.<br />In addition, it appears Yassin Al-Qadi and his backers had already tested the waters here as far back as 1998, and found that regulators here were quite forgiving and not prone to asking uncomfortable questions. This assertion is best proven by the case of the East Asian Property Group and its investments here including what is now known as the ABN-AMRO Tower on Macquarie Street.<br /><br />In 1998 Lend Lease announced that it was to partner the East Asia Property Group (EAPG) in financing the building of the ABN-AMRO Tower on Macquarie Street. As was reported in the AFR :<br />(EAPG) was formed in 1992 when Istethmar International, the investment company for the Saudi-based bin Mahfouz family’s holding company, took a controlling stake. One year earlier family patriarch Sheikh Khalid (bin Mahfouz)  was caught up in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International scandal, the world’s largest banking fraud. More recently the bin Mahfouz family has been linked with the owner of the suspect Sudan pharmaceutical plant destroyed by US missiles in August, Sudanese businessman Mr Salah Idris. This was verified last week when East Asia’s Hong Kong managing director Mr Paul Salnikow, told The Australian Financial Review: “Mr Idris is an adviser with the<br />National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia,” the bin Mahfouz family’s<br />major asset. The bin Mahfouz family is also said to be allegedly linked to Islamic militant Osama bin Laden, the US Government’s prime suspect in the recent bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which left more than 250 people dead. Former CIA director Mr James Woolsey<br />told a US Senate hearing and the American media that the owner of the plant, is a protégé of a Mr Hafous (sic) chairman of the $US23.2<br />billion NCB.<br />Sheik Khalid bin Mahfouz is said to be Sheik Yassin Al-Qadi’s financial backer. Their partnership is best described in this extract from the plaintiffs’ statement of claim in the 9-11 class action :<br />Yassin Abdullah al-Kadi and Muwaffaq<br />330. One month after the September 11, 2001 attacks, on October 12, 2001, with Executive Order 13224, President George W. Bush designated Saudi businessman Yassin al-Kadi as a terrorist entity and sponsor for financially supporting al Qaeda. As stated in a United States Department of Treasury Press Release on October 12, 2001:<br />Yasin al-Qadi (heads) the Saudi-based Muwafaq, (or “Blessed Relief†Foundation, an al Qaeda front that transfers millions of dollars from wealthy Saudi businessmen to bin Laden. <br />331. Defendant Muwaffaq (or “Blessed Relief”) was registered in the Channel Islands in 1992 but run from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The Blessed Relief charity had an international presence with offices in Europe, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia and a post office box in the United States. Blessed Relief purported to conduct traditional relief work such as the distribution of food, clothing and medical equipment to victims of war or famine. Blessed Relief was endowed by Defendant Khalid bin Mahfouz, the al Qaeda financier, and run by Yassin al-Kadi. Khalid bin Mahfouz’s son, Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz, is also a director of the Blessed Relief charity.<br />332. Yassin al-Kadi ran Blessed Relief from 1992 until approximately 1997 with $15 to $20 million of his own money, along with contributions from other wealthy associates. Millions of dollars have been transferred to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda through Blessed Relief. An audit of the Defendant National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia in the mid-1990s, which was then run by Khalid bin Salim bin Mahfouz, reveals the transfer of $3 million for Osama bin Laden that was moved from the accounts of wealthy Saudi businessmen to Blessed Relief.<br />333. In a 1995 interview, Osama bin Laden identified Blessed Relief’s place in his support network, “The bin-Laden Establishment’s aid covers 13 countries . . . this aid comes in particular from the Human Concern International Society.” Osama bin Laden went on to list a number of the Human Concern International’s branches, including the Blessed Relief Society.<br />The EAPG remains a company controlled by the bin Mahfouz family, and continues to build its portfolio of assets in this country.<br /><br /><br />Conclusion<br />Australia appears to have become the jurisdiction of choice for Al-Qaeda financiers seeking a safe-haven for their assets that might be otherwise frozen in other jurisdictions.<br />The influence of groups associated with these persons is growing both within and without the Muslim community and its does appear as if there is a concerted effort to create here an effective Muslim lobby which can strongly influence governments.<br />Anecdotal evidence from the media would suggest that the objective of these efforts is to turn Australia into a supporter rather than an objector to the jihadi cause, more aligned to current European than American policies towards the Middle East.’<br />This objective does not however preclude the use of force in this country, this assertion evidenced by the constant use of “fighting words.†Nevertheless, it is obvious that the matters outlined above are not likely to be offences as currently defined by Australian law.<br /><br />Australia appears to have become The influence of groups associated with these persons is growing both within and without the Muslim community Anecdotal evidence from the media would suggest This objective does not however preclude the use of force in this country, this assertion evidenced by the constant use of “fighting words.†Nevertheless, it is obvious that the matters outlined above are not likely to be offences as currently defined by Australian law. <br /><br />However, can Australia afford to ignore the matters described above? Surely the answer to that question must be in the negative. <br /><br />Thus it is submitted that the above provides arguments for:<br />a) Better surveillance of Islamic financial co-operatives, charities and other social organizations, and their officers and employees. <br />b) Closer scrutiny of all financial flows. In this regard, the roles played by ASIC and APRA need to be re-evaluated to determine if the proposed legislation ought to be broadened to cover the work of these organizations as well.<br />Hence, it is submitted that there is evidence in support of the case for legislation of the type proposed. <br /><br /> <br /><br /><br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /><br /> <br /><br />[1] Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) company search<br /><br />[2] See http://www.lofsa.gov.my/lofsa5/labiofc/offbank/guidebank.pdf<br /><br />[3] Sadna Saifuddin†Commercial IBT Bank opens Labuan branch†, 5 April 2003 Business Times<br />[4] see archived CIBT website at http://web.archive.org/web/20030410055226/www.cibtbank.com/about.htm <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />[5] See ASIC press release at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic_pub.nsf/byheadline/04-370+ASIC+winds+up+Australian-based+Malaysian+bank?openDocument<br />[6] see Note 1<br />[7] http://www.ram.com.my/custom.cfm?name=press.cfm&id=937<br /><br />[8] Interview with Husham Musa<br /><br />[9] See generally http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267Template.htm<br /><br />[10] Dun and Bradstreet search current as of May 2004<br />[11] See story by Raja Petra Kamaruddin “ Does a conspiracy to GET ANWAR really exist?†and related stories at  http://www.malaysia-today.net/Blog-e/2005/06/does-conspiracy-to-get-anwar-really.htm <br /><br />[12]See paragraph 6-8 of website located at  http://www.malaysia-today.net/loonyMY/2005/06/if-fire-is-too-hot-get-out-of-kitchen.htm<br /><br />[13] see story at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/southeastasia/view/53888/1/.html<br /><br />[14] See the affidavit of US Customs Agent David Kane; http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/ArchivePress/SeptemberPDFArchive/03/biheirisupp091203.pdf<br /><br />[15] http://euronews.net/create_html.php?page=detail_info&article=310931&lng=1<br /><br />[16]Anwar, institute linked to overseas terror group - Aussie TV report, Bernama, 23 October 2003, located at <br /><br /> http://www.mca.org.my/story.asp?file=/articles/news/2003/10/25/19027.html&sec=In+The+News. Readers attention is drawn to the last paragraph that reads:<br /><br />Rahim said he had no dealings with Sheikh Yassin since leaving Malaysia for Australia in 1998. “I left all these matters to Dr Wan Hasni on all the matters of Abrar,” he said. -<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />[17] See advertisement at http://islamicsydney.com/story.php?id=1925<br /><br />[18] See generally Abrar Discounts website located at http://www.abrardiscounts.com.my/<br /><br />[19] See note 12:<br /><br />[20] See the affidavit of the FBI’s Valerie Donahue. Story reported in the Wall Street Journal by Glenn R. Simpson; Tracing the Money Trail, U.S. Terror Investigators Encounter Yassin <br />Qadi — As Saudi Businessman’s Deals Draw Scrutiny, He Denies Any <br />Wrongdoing — The $2.1 Million That Vanished: 27 November 2002<br />The Asian Wall Street Journal <br /><br />[21] see http://www.icv.org.au/ICV_Sep.pdf<br /><br />[22] Email queries to Ghouse were sent in mid-2004<br /><br />[23] Nick Mckenzie; Islamic charity questioned over terrorist links; ABC Radio National; 23 September 2003  <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />[24]For example,    Soadad Doureihi of the Hizb ut-Tahrir branch in Sydney,Australia<br /><br />spoke at Sydney University on 24 August 2005, on the topic of<br /><br />terrorism, invited by the Sydney University Muslims Students<br /><br />Association ,as part of their Islamic Awareness Week activities.<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />Soadad Doureihi’s main points were these:<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />a)The war against Iraq, Afghanistan and indeed Muslims all over the<br /><br />world is a continuation of the Western world’s war against political<br /><br />Islam commenced by the West at the turn of the century; but which can<br /><br />trace its origins back to the Crusades and indeed to the earliest days<br /><br />of the Caliphate founded by the Prophet Mohamad.<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />b) From the earliest days, Muslims ever only acted in self-defence;<br /><br />Soadad Doureihi implied that this is the case even today, for there is<br /><br />not any proof that Muslims were responsible for 9-11 or the London<br /><br />bombing.<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />c) Muslims today are not only being attacked by Western armies, they<br /><br />are also being “coerced” into accepting the values and norms of the<br /><br />West-he includes here Muslims living in the West, including Australia.<br /><br />Military might and force ,as well as propaganda are the tools of<br /><br />this coercion.<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />d) While Muslim leaders are being “ordered” to address the issue of<br /><br />terrorism , Western nations themselves are not willing to apologise<br /><br />for their colonial past and its consequences which include:<br /><br />i) imposition of arbitrary borders on the Muslim world<br /><br />ii) purposeful division that has led to internal conflict among Muslims<br /><br />iii) installation and support for corrupt regimes and rulers-these<br /><br />include Mustafa Atatruk-” a puppet of the British and Americans.”<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />e) That internal conflict among Muslims is a cause for what the West<br /><br />calls terrorism, -and they fail to see that they must accept the<br /><br />consequences of their own actions.<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />Thus Hizb ut Tahir appears to justify acts of violence by Muslims by arguing that Muslims are being oppressed. <br /><br />The reference to war against the Muslim world and the coercion of<br /><br />Muslims in Western countries must be seen in context of the argument<br /><br />that the Prophet and his followers only commenced war in self-defence.<br /><br />Thus, in accordance with the Sunnah (the acts and words of the<br /><br />Prophet) , it is acceptable, even required of Muslims to wage war<br /><br />against those who would coerce them, and this would include the<br /><br />Australian Government.<br /><br />[25] See http://www.mcca.com.au/page.php?id=sponsorship&product_id=16<br /><br />[26] Zulfikar Shariff arrived in Australia seeking refuge from what he claimed was religious persecution in Singapore.However,very soon after his arrival he began working to deflect media investigations into CIBT ,and then went on to work at the MCCA.Thus hre we again see a further link between CIBT ,Ghouse and radical Islam.<br /><br />[27] http://web.archive.org/web/20020206160430/http://www.fateha.com/cgi-bin/newspro/qa/fullnews.cgi?newsid1001413396,19170<br /><br />[28]See http://web.archive.org/web/20030508082917/http://www.fateha.com/cgi-bin/newspro/commnews/fullnews.cgi?newsid1001482954,60735<br /><br />[29] http://www.minaret.vic.edu.au/news/statement.htm <br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />[30] http://www.mcca.com.au/page.php?id=4000&product_id=4<br /><br />[31] http://www.unimas.my/kaunseling05/files/speaker_info/bio_%20moniques.htm<br /><br />[32] Email query and response from Monique Toohey<br /><br />[33] http://www.mcca.com.au/page.php?id=MelbBranch&product_id=63<br /><br />[34] Lisa Allen, Saudi Link With Renzo Piano Tower, Australian Financial Review, 15 October 1998<br /><br />[35] see Burnett v. al Baraka Investment and Dev. Corp; Case Number<br /><br />1:02CV01616(JR)<br /><br />Âlexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-88298764164721042982008-03-21T05:05:00.000-07:002008-03-21T05:10:18.784-07:00Al Qaeda linked IIIT & Anwar IbrahimUCF funded by Al Qaeda linked IIIT for Islamic chair "to promote Islamisation of knowlege" refuses to cancel Islamofacist event<br />March 10, 2006<br /><br />University of Central Florida Slated To Become Cultural Jihad Hub <br /><br />...Imam Dremali's Islamist-Fest Seen As Program's Debut...<br /><br />By Beila Rabinowitz & William A. Mayer - E&P PipeLineNews.org <br /><br />March 10, 2006 - Washington, DC - PipeLineNews.org - <br /><br />On March 8 PipeLineNews.org correspondent Beila Rabinowitz broke a story University Of Central Florida Funding Islamist Da'wa Event which detailed how this publicly funded college was promoting and hosting a Muslim Da'Wa [conversion] seminar featuring noted radical Imams. <br /><br />We have been in touch with UCF officials, including Kerry P. Welch who is the Director of Student Involvement at the campus, with the intent of making clear our concern that this event should not take place as scheduled on March 17. <br /><br />We were informed by Mr. Welsh that the event will go forward regardless of the concerns of many organizations including the American Jewish Congress. <br /><br />We have discovered that there is a reason for UCF's intransigence in this matter. <br /><br />Our research shows that the college is looking to create - through a huge endowment by the IIIT [International Institute of Islamic] a Saudi group linked to al-Qaeda - an "Islamic Studies" chair which will in actuality serve to propagate Islamist intolerance throughout the Southeast. <br /><br />IIIT's Terror Links <br /><br />Anwar Ibrahim is a founder and director of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), a think tank in Virginia that has alleged links to terrorism. IIIT's 2003 tax-exempt IRS filing lists a $720 donation to the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation of Ashland, Oregon, which was designated as a terrorist funding organization by the U.S. government in 2004. Among the Treasury Department's findings were that the Oregon branch of al-Haramain engaged in tax fraud, money laundering, supporting Chechen mujahideen affiliated with al Qaeda, and had "direct links between the U.S. branch and Usama bin Laden." In fact, many of al-Haramain's offices around the world were closed for supporting terrorism.<br /><br />"There is more evidence of IIIT's links to terrorism. A few examples: according to court documents, in the early 1990s IIIT donated at least $50,000 to a think tank run by Sami al-Arian, the World Islamic and Study Enterprise (WISE), that served as a front group for Palestinian Islamic Jihad. IIIT is also named as a defendant in two class-action lawsuits brought by victims of the 9/11 attacks. One alleges that IIIT received the bulk of its operating expenses from the SAAR network, whose component groups are accused in another class-action suit of being "fronts for the sponsor of al Qaeda and international terror." The same suit lists IIIT as well as every officer of IIIT besides Anwar Ibrahim as a supporter of the SAAR network. This public information was available to SAIS, yet the school extended a fellowship to Ibrahim." - Source Link, Campus Watch<br /><br />Not wanting to lose that funding UCF policy is being twisted to accommodate and explain away what can only be described as a troubling - March 17 "Returning to Our Rabb" [Lord] Muslim proselytizing - presence on the campus. <br /><br />Background: <br /><br />In February noted American Islamist apologist John Esposito, ended an address at UCF in this manner: <br /><br /><br />"...Esposito closed his speech with a reminder of the important role UCF and other universities around the country play in fostering the understanding of Islam that is crucial to its relationship with the West. He expressed optimism in UCF, noting that its growing international focus and interest in Middle Eastern studies is being noticed around the country...UCF must continue to build and develop programs offering dynamic curricula and study abroad opportunities in the Middle East and other Muslim countries, Esposito said. UCF also should bring others from the Muslim world to the campus to interact with students and faculty..." - Georgetown Professor: Wars, Repression, Media Helped Build Conflicts Between Islam, the West<br />Professor Esposito is closely linked to the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) which has been promoting the below referenced - "Al Ghazli Islam Studies Project." Esposito's Alwaheed Center at Georgetown University was funded by Saudi Wahhabist money - the same methodology apparently playing out at UCF. <br /><br />Of this project IIIT states: <br /><br /><br />"...The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) will match donations to an endowment for a chair in Islamic studies at the University of Central Florida. The idea of an islamic studies chair is the initiative of a small group of community and university members under the auspices of Al-Ghazali Educational Foundation, LLC. This endowment seeks to bring a distinguished Islamic scholar to the University of Central Florida in the College of Arts and Sciences' Middle Eastern Studies Program. <br />Led by Imam Tariq Rasheed, Sr. Safia Ansari and Professor Husain Kassim, Al-Ghazali Educational Foundation's effort seeks to help establish chairs for Islamic studies at selected university campuses."<br /><br />The IIIT mission statement shows that their agenda is indoctrination not education and that adding UCF would merely be one more trophy in the Wahhabist campaign. <br /><br />From the IIIT website, in which announce that they are engaged in, <br /><br /><br />"Signing agreements of cooperation with various universities, research centers and academic institutions throughout the world to carry out activities of mutual interest...The International Institute of Islamic Thought is dedicated to the revival and reform of Islamic thought and its methodology in order to enable the Ummah to deal effectively with present challenges, and contribute to the progress of human civilization in ways that will give it a meaning and a direction derived from divine guidance. The realization of such a position will help the Ummah regain its intellectual and cultural identity and re-affirm its presence as a dynamic civilization. - Source Link, IIIT Website<br />In his response to our request to cancel the conference, the UCF Director of Student Involvement Kerry Welch replied that, "...freedom of speech is what makes this country great." <br /><br />This is a twisted and cynical justification for holding an extremist Muslim conference. It is also transparent in that the primary consideration at this point seems to be avoiding any offense to the Wahhabis who might potentially endow UCF's Islamic Studies chair. <br /><br />If the University of Central Florida carries through with the plan to accept funding from the IIIT, it will have made the decision that the University's "mutual interests" are with the supporters of terrorism and Islamofacism. <br /><br />In that manner the University of Central Florida will be opting to become the "UCF - Ummah of Central Florida" joining the ranks of Jihad U [the University of South Florida] as a hub of terror. <br /><br />©1999-2006 PipeLineNews.org, all rights reserved.lexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5814134832960766340.post-75377528757673208602008-03-21T05:01:00.000-07:002008-03-21T05:05:43.125-07:00Wahhabism & Islam in the U.S.E-mail Author<br />Send to a Friend<br /> Version<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br />June 30, 2003, 11:20 a.m.<br />Wahhabism & Islam in the U.S.<br />Two-faced policy fosters danger.<br /><br />By Stephen Schwartz<br /><br />EDITOR’S NOTE: This is the text of testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security on Thursday, June 26, 2003.<br /> <br /> <br /><br /> hairman Kyl, other distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation to appear here today. <br /><br />I come before this body to describe how adherents of Wahhabism, the most extreme, separatist, and violent form of Islam, and the official sect in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have come to dominate Islam in the U.S. <br /><br />Islam is a fairly new participant at the "big table" of American religions. The Muslim community only became a significant element in our country's life in the 1980s. Most "born Muslims," as opposed to those who "converted" — a term Muslims avoid, preferring "new Muslims" — had historically been immigrants from Pakistan and India who followed traditional, peaceful, mainstream Islam.<br /><br />With the growth of the Islamic community in America, there was no "Islamic establishment" in the U.S. — in contrast with Britain, France, and Germany, the main Western countries with significant Islamic minorities. Historically, traditional scholars have been a buffer against extremism in Islam, and for various sociological and demographic reasons, American Islam lacked a stratum of such scholars. The Wahhabi ideological structure in Saudi Arabia perceived this as an opportunity to fill a gap — to gain dominance over an Islamic community in the West with immense potential for political and social influence. <br /><br />But the goals of this operation, which was largely successful, were multiple.<br /><br />First, to control a significant group of Muslim believers. <br /><br />Second, to use the Muslim community in the U.S. to pressure U.S. government and media, in the formulation of policy and in perceptions about Islam. This has included liaison meetings, "sensitivity" sessions and other public activities with high-level administration officials, including the FBI director, that we have seen since September 11. <br /><br />Third, to advance the overall Wahhabi agenda of "jihad against the world" — an extremist campaign to impose the Wahhabi dispensation on the global Islamic community, as well as to confront the other religions. This effort has included the establishment in the U.S. of a base for funding, recruitment, and strategic/tactical support of terror operations in the U.S. and abroad.<br /><br />Wahhabi-Saudi policy has always been two-faced: that is, at the same time as the Wahhabis preach hostility and violence against non-Wahhabi Muslims, they maintain a policy of alliance with Western military powers — first Britain, then the U.S. and France — to assure their control over the Arabian Peninsula.<br /><br />At the present time, Shia and other non-Wahhabi Muslim community leaders estimate that 80 percent of American mosques are under Wahhabi control. This does not mean 80 percent of American Muslims support Wahhabism, although the main Wahhabi ideological agency in America, the so-called Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) has claimed that some 70 percent of American Muslims want Wahhabi teaching in their mosques.1This is a claim we consider unfounded.<br /><br />Rather, Wahhabi control over mosques means control of property, buildings, appointment of imams, training of imams, content of preaching — including faxing of Friday sermons from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia — and of literature distributed in mosques and mosque bookstores, notices on bulletin boards, and organizational solicitation. Similar influence extends to prison and military chaplaincies, Islamic elementary and secondary schools (academies), college campus activity, endowment of academic chairs and programs in Middle East studies, and most notoriously, charities ostensibly helping Muslims abroad, many of which have been linked to or designated as sponsors of terrorism.<br /><br />The main organizations that have carried out this campaign are the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), which originated in the Muslim Students' Association of the U.S. and Canada (MSA), and CAIR. Support activities have been provided by the American Muslim Council (AMC), the American Muslim Alliance (AMA), the Muslim American Society (MAS), the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences, its sister body the International Institute of Islamic Thought, and a number of related groups that I have called "the Wahhabi lobby." ISNA operates at least 324 mosques in the U.S. through the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT). These groups operate as an interlocking directorate.<br /><br />Both ISNA and CAIR, in particular, maintain open and close relations with the Saudi government — a unique situation, in that no other foreign government directly uses religion as a cover for its political activities in the U.S. For example, notwithstanding support by the American Jewish community for the state of Israel, the government of Israel does not intervene in synagogue life or the activities of rabbinical or related religious bodies in America.<br /><br />According to saudiembassy.net, the official website of the Saudi government, CAIR received $250,000 from the Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank, an official Saudi financial institution, in 1999, for the purchase of land in Washington, D.C., to construct a headquarters facility.2<br /><br />In a particularly disturbing case, the Islamic Development Bank also granted US$295,000 to the Masjid Bilal Islamic Center, for the construction of the Bilal Islamic Primary and Secondary School in California, in 1999.3 Hassan Akbar, an American Muslim presently charged with a fatal attack on his fellow soldiers in Kuwait during the Iraq intervention, was affiliated with this institution.<br /><br />In addition, the previously mentioned official website of the Saudi government reported a donation in 1995 of $4 million for the construction of a mosque complex in Los Angeles, named for Ibn Taymiyyah, a historic Islamic figure considered the forerunner of Wahhabism.4 (It should be noted that Ibn Taymiyyah is viewed as a marginal, extremist, ideological personality by many traditional Muslims. In the wake of the Riyadh bombings of 2003, the figure of Ibn Taymiyyah symbolized, in Saudi public discourse, the inner rot of the regime. An article in the reformist daily al-Watan was headlined, "Who is More Important? The Nation or Ibn Taymiyyah"? Soon after it appeared, Jamal Khashoggi, editor of al-Watan and former deputy editor of Arab News, was dismissed from his post.) <br /><br />The same official Saudi website reported a donation of $6 million, also in 1995, for a mosque in Cincinnati, Ohio.5 The website further stated, in 2000, "In the United States, the Kingdom has contributed to the establishment of the Islamic Center in Washington DC; the Omer Bin Al-Khattab Mosque in western Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Islamic Center, and the Fresno Mosque in California; the Islamic Center in Denver, Colorado; the Islamic center in Harrison, New York City; and the Islamic Center in Northern Virginia."6<br /><br />How much money, in total, is involved in this effort? If we accept a low figure of control, i.e. NAIT ownership of 27 percent of 1,200 mosques, stated by CAIR and cited by Mary Jacoby and Graham Brink in the St. Petersburg Times,7 we have some 324 mosques.<br /><br />If we assume a relatively low average of expenditures, e.g. $.5 million per mosque, we arrive at $162 million. <br /><br />But given that Saudi official sources show $6 million in Cincinnati and $4 million in Los Angeles, we should probably raise the average to $1 million per mosque, resulting in $324 million as a minimum.<br /><br />Our view is that the number of mosques under Wahhabi control actually totals at least 600 out of the official total of 1,200, while, as noted, Shia community leaders endorse the figure of 80 percent Wahhabi control. But we also offer a number of 4-6,000 mosques overall, including small and diverse congregations of many kinds. <br /><br />A radical critic of Wahhabism stated some years ago that $25m had been spent on Islamic Centers in the U.S. by the Saudi authorities. This now seems a low figure. Another anti-extremist Islamic figure has estimated Saudi expenses in the U.S., over 30 years, and including schools and free books as well as mosques, near a billion dollars.<br /><br />It should also be noted that Wahhabi mosques in the U.S. work in close coordination with the Muslim World League (MWL) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), Saudi state entities identified as participants in the funding of al Qaeda.<br /><br />Wahhabi ideological control within Saudi Arabia is based on the historic compact of intermarriage between the family of the sect's originator, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and the family of the founding ruler, Ibn Saud. To this day, these families divide governance of the kingdom, with the descendants of Ibn al-Wahhab, known as ahl al-Shaykh, responsible for religious life, and the Saudi royal family, or ahl al-Saud, running the state. The two families also continue to marry their descendants to one another. The supreme religious leader of Saudi Arabia is a member of the family of Ibn al-Wahhab. The state appoints a minister of religious affairs who controls such bodies as MWL and WAMY, and upon leaving his ministerial post he becomes head of MWL. <br /><br />The official Saudi-embassy website reported exactly one year ago, on June 26, 2002, "The delegation of the Muslim World League (MWL) that is on a world tour promoting goodwill arrived in New York yesterday, and visited the Islamic Center there." The same website later reported, on July 8, 2002, "During a visit on Friday evening to the headquarters of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) [Secretary-General of the MWL Dr. Abdullah bin Abdulmohsin Al-Turki] advocated coordination among Muslim organizations in the United States. Expressing MWL's readiness to offer assistance in the promotion and coordination of Islamic works, he announced plans to set up a commission for this purpose. The MWL delegation also visited the Islamic Center in Washington DC and was briefed on its activities by its director Dr. Abdullah bin Mohammad Fowaj."8<br /><br />In a related matter, on June 22, 2003, in a letter to the New York Post, James Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute, a civic lobbying organization, stated that his attendance at a press conference of WAMY in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, had been organized by the U.S. embassy in the kingdom. If this is true, it is extremely alarming. The U.S. embassy should not act as a supporter of WAMY, which, as documented by FDD and the Saudi Institute,9 teaches that Shia Muslims, including even the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, are Jewish agents. <br /><br />This is comparable to Nazi claims that Jewish business owners were Communists, or Slobodan Miloševic's charge, in the media of ex-Yugoslavia, that Tito was an agent of the Vatican. The aim is to derange people, to separate them from reality completely, in preparation for massacres. We fear that official Saudi anxiety their large and restive Shia minority, aggravated by Saudi resentment over the emergence of a protodemocratic regime in Iraq led by Shias, and consolidation of popular sovereignty in Shia Iran, may lead the Saudi regime to treat Shias as a convenient scapegoat, making them victims of a wholesale atrocity. The history of Wahhabism is filled with mass murder of Shia Muslims.<br /><br />There is clearly a problem of Wahhabi/Saudi extremist influence in American Islam. The time is now to face the problem squarely and find ways to enable and support traditional, mainstream American Muslims in taking their community back from these extremists, while employing law enforcement to interdict the growth of Wahhabism and its financial support by the Saudis. If we fail to do this, Wahhabi extremism continues to endanger the whole world — Muslims and non-Muslims alike.<br /><br />Thank you for your attention.<br /><br />NOTES<br />1 Council on American Islamic Relations, The Mosque in America: A National Portrait, A Report from the Mosque Study Project, April 26, 2001.<br /><br />2 Saudi Embassy Press Archive, August 15, 1999.<br /><br />3 Islamic Development Bank; also, "IDB Allocates $202 Mln to Finance Islamic Development Ventures," Arabic News, 1/25/2000. <br /><br />4 Saudi Embassy Press Archive, July 8, 1995.<br /><br />5 Saudi Embassy Press Archive, November 10, 1995.<br /><br />6 Saudi Embassy Press Archive, March 5, 2000.<br /><br />7 "Saudi Form of Islam Wars With Moderates," St. Petersburg Times, March 11, 2003.<br /><br />8 Saudi Embassy Press Archive.<br /><br />9 Ali al-Ahmed and Stephen Schwartz, "Saudis Spread Hate Speech in U.S," Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Washington, copublished with Saudi Institute.<br /><br /><br />— Stephen Schwartz is director, Islam and Democracy Program at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br />--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /> <br /> <br /> http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-schwartz063003.asplexhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06860977589373953330noreply@blogger.com0